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Introduction and Thesis
Outline
This thesis studies policy reforms and their relation with productivity performance.
It argues that heterogeneity at the ﬁrm-level is at the core for understanding the re-
lation between policy and productivity. The chapters in this thesis focus on two
Latin American countries, namely Brazil and Chile. Latin American countries ex-
perienced large swings in government policy during the past decades, therefore
providing potentially interesting case studies of the role and impact of ﬁrm hetero-
geneity on the effects of policies on productivity trends.
The main policy reform in Latin America in the past decades was the switch
from state-led growth to market-oriented growth. In the aftermath of the 1982 cri-
sis, a market-oriented laissez-faire approach was considered best to achieve ma-
croeconomic stability and accelerate economic growth (Edwards, 1995). Market-
orientedreformsdidnotliveuptoexpectations. Economicgrowthafterthereforms
was modest at best and lower than before the crisis. This was partly related to di-
minished opportunities for catch-up and less vigorous investment in physical and
human capital. However, most researchers argue that slow productivity growth is
the main culprit behind Latin America’s disappointing economic performance after
the market-oriented reforms.1 Low productivity growth is of profound concern to
academics and policy makers. As succinctly put by Krugman (1994):
"Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything. A coun-
1See for instance Cole et al. (2005); De Gregorio (2006); Inter-American Development Bank (2005);
Szirmai (2008).2 Chapter 1
try’s ability to improve its standard of living over time depends almost entirely on
its ability to raise its output per worker. Compared with the problem of slow pro-
ductivity growth, all our other long-term economic concerns -foreign competition,
the industrial base, lagging technology, deteriorating infrastructure, and so on- are
minor issues. Or more accurately, they matter only to the extent that they have an
impact on our productivity growth." p. 13 and p. 18 in Krugman (1994)
Figure 1.1 presents labor productivity growth rates, deﬁned as growth in output
minus growth in employment, for Brazil and Chile. Latin America is added for
comparative purposes.2 During the 60s and 70s, state-led growth in Brazil and
Chile was substantial. Labor productivity grew at an annual average of about 3
percent in Brazil and 2 percent in Chile, which implies living standards improved
rapidly during this period.3 However, the 1982 debt crisis, which heralded the lost
decade in Latin America, resulted in large capital outﬂows, macroeconomic insta-
bility, and a substantial drop in output per person.
Chile was an early adopter of those policy reforms which the US treasury and
the international organizations in Washington considered the best remedies to rise
from the sickbed. The proposed market-oriented reforms, summarized as the Wa-
shingtonconsensusbyWilliamson(1990), includedprivatization, deregulation, ma-
croeconomic adjustments, and the reduction of barriers to trade. Chile was an early
reformer. It radically liberalized trade and undertook macroeconomic adjustments.
Chile experienced productivity growth after the reforms.
Brazil andmost otherLatin Americancountries adoptedmarket-oriented policy
reforms much later, mainly during the late 1980s and early 1990s.4 The reforms,
however, failed to result in productivity growth in Brazil and in most other Latin
American countries.
Low growth after compliance with the Washington consensus poses a puzzle to
researchers and politicians (Rodrik, 2007). The mediocre productivity performance
of Brazil and Latin America in general (except for Chile) has led policy makers and
international organizations to re-evaluate their policy advice to developing coun-
tries (see e.g. World Bank (2005)).
This thesis aims to add various pieces to solving the puzzle why growth in Latin
2GDP per person employed in Latin America is an output weighted trend of seventeen Latin American
countries, including among others Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.
3Total factor productivity, deﬁned as growth in output minus share-weighted growth in employment
and capital, gives similar results (Hofman, 2000).
4Edwards (1995) provides a detailed overview on the timing of reforms in various Latin American
countries.Introduction and Thesis Outline 3
Figure 1.1. Trend growth in GDP per person employed
Data Source: The Conference Board, Total Economy Database, http://www.conference-board.org/economics. Trend
is estimated using Hodrick and Prescott (1997) ﬁlter on growth in GDP per person employed.
America did not accelerate despite wide-ranging reforms. It explores the relation
between policy reforms and productivity performance using ﬁrm-level data for a
large services sector, namely the retail sector. Latin American growth is becoming
increasingly services-led. Currently, over 60 percent of the labor force in Brazil and
Chile is employed in the services sector. More people are employed in wholesale
and retail services than in manufacturing (Timmer and de Vries, 2009). The tradi-
tional thesis of manufacturing as the engine of growth might not be applicable to
Brazil and Chile anymore (Szirmai, 2009), which would call for new strategies for
accelerating productivity performance. Growth dynamics in the services sector are
poorly understood. At the same time, it is subject to a large set of government regu-
lations and policy initiatives such as the opening up to foreign direct investment.
Economic development is a dynamic and complex process. For long it has the-
refore been argued that a macro approach is too aggregate to take into account the4 Chapter 1
complexity of the growth process (Nelson, 1981). Currently, with the increasing
availability of ﬁrm-level surveys, the process of productivity growth is studied at
the micro-level as well.5 In addition, new theories loosen up the neo-classical re-
presentative ﬁrm paradigm and stress the importance of heterogeneity for unders-
tanding the relation between policy and productivity growth (Melitz, 2003), which
necessitates the use of ﬁrm-level data.
Firms differ among others in size, in productivity, in the products they pro-
duce or the services they deliver, and in the production process (labor- or capital-
intensive technologies) they employ. Many policies, however, are generic. For
example, entry barriers and taxes on gross proﬁts are set for all ﬁrms, regardless
of their heterogeneity. An aggregate analysis using country or industry data col-
lapses ﬁrm heterogeneity to a single aggregate and might not capture differential
effects of policies due to ﬁrm heterogeneity. To understand the heterogeneous ef-
fects of policy reforms for productivity performance, this thesis uses micro data for
the retail trade sector.
The remainder of this chapter elaborates upon the aims and content of this the-
sis.
1.1 Trade Liberalization and Productivity
The ﬁrst aim of this thesis is to explore the relation between liberalization of the
retail sector and improvements in productivity. Chile was a pioneer in the libera-
lization process, opening up industrial and services sectors during the 1970s and
80s. Brazil reformed trade much later. The Brazilian retail sector was opened up
only in the World Trade Organization 1995 General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices, and the freeing from restrictions on the participation of foreign capital in
retail ﬁrms in the Sixth Constitutional Amendment of 1995 (World Bank, 2004). Be-
cause ﬁrm-level surveys are available at the national statistical institute for Brazil
since the mid-1990s, the relation between liberalization and productivity is studied
for Brazilian retail ﬁrms in this thesis.
Liberalization was expected to result in increased competition, which would
induce ﬁrms to improve their performance. Indeed, studies of the manufacturing
sector found that productivity within ﬁrms improved as a result of trade liberaliza-
tion.6 In addition, trade reforms aimed to stimulate growth by allowing resources
5See for example Bartelsman and Doms (2000); Tybout (2000); Inter-American Development Bank
(2005).
6E.g. Hay (2001); Muendler (2004); Schor (2004); Pavcnik (2002); Bergoeing et al. (2006).Introduction and Thesis Outline 5
like capital and labor to move about more freely. If prices signal where inputs
should move, proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms reallocate inputs in the direction of their
most valued activities. Hence, trade reforms were expected to result in a realloca-
tion of resources toward high marginal-productivity ﬁrms.
Various recent theoretical models of growth are consistent with expectations
from trade reforms. Vintage capital models (Aghion and Howitt, 1994) and trade
models (Melitz, 2003) predict that inputs will reallocate from low-productive to
high-productive activities as the economy liberalizes. For example, trade liberali-
zation in Melitz (2003) drives the least-productive domestic ﬁrms out of the mar-
ket, because they are unable to compete with more productive international ﬁrms
setting up shop there. In contrast, more productive domestic ﬁrms are induced
to enter the foreign market, thereby increasing proﬁts and expanding production.
Hence, the Melitz model predicts that liberalization results in the reallocation of
resources toward more productive ﬁrms boosting aggregate growth.
Recent studies for the retail sector have shown that productivity growth in
OECD countries occurred through a process of creative destruction. That is, growth
originated from reallocation dynamics through ﬁrm churning (the entry and exit
of ﬁrms) and resource reallocation to more-productive retail chains. For example,
new establishments from retail chains (including, but not only, Wal-Mart) displa-
cing ’mom-and-pop’ stores accounted for virtually all growth in the US in the past
decades (Foster et al., 2006). Similar ﬁndings for the U.K. are presented by Haskel
and Sadun (2009) and for Japan by Matsuura and Motohashi (2005).7
In chapter 2, similar decomposition methodologies as in these studies are em-
ployed to understand the performance of Brazil’s retail sector. This chapter exa-
mines the question whether resource allocation improved after liberalization of the
Brazilian retail sector. It therefore extends the discussion of the productivity gains
from liberalization in Latin America to the services sector.
1.2 Regulation and Resource Allocation
The second aim of this thesis is to delve deeper into the relation between regulation
and resource allocation by considering how taxes and access to credit affect the
allocation of factor inputs across ﬁrms.
7Although development patterns between the U.K. and the U.S. retail sector are similar, Haskel and
Sadun (2009) argue that size restrictions on new establishments from continuing chains are related with
the differential productivity performance between the U.K. and the U.S. due to increasing returns to
scale for multi-establishment chains.6 Chapter 1
Recent models of ﬁrm productivity follow Banerjee and Duﬂo (2005) by com-
paring marginal revenue products with the costs of factor inputs to examine the
(mis)use of resources. That is, policies might result in idiosyncratic distortions such
that marginal products no longer equal marginal costs at the ﬁrm level.
Guner et al. (2008) argue that policy distortions may depend on ﬁrm size, which
they refer to as size-dependent policies. In their model, the key idea is that if a ﬁrm
wants to expand the use of inputs beyond a given level, it faces a marginal cost of
using the inputs that is larger than its price.
Size-dependent policies might be prevalent in developing economies (Gollin,
2006). For example, in Brazil, despite the opening up of the retail sector to fo-
reign ﬁrms, labor and product markets are still heavily regulated. Taxes reach over
200 percent of gross proﬁts in Rio de Janeiro (World Bank, 2006). Selective policy
implementation and enforcement may create implicit or de facto differences in the
business environment small and large ﬁrms face. For example, governments often
ﬁnd it impractical to collect taxes from small ﬁrms. Instead, governments are likely
to set higher tax rates and enforce compliance only among larger ﬁrms (Tybout,
2000). Likewise, difﬁculties in access to credit and strict labor market regulations
may prevent the growth of successful small retailers and worsen their competitive-
ness relative to informal retailers. Capital market imperfections might be a bigger
constraint for smaller ﬁrms that lack collateral.
Chapter 3 also examines the question whether resource allocation improved af-
ter liberalization of the Brazilian retail sector. Chapter 2 used average ﬁrm pro-
ductivity to examine the relation between productivity and the opening up of the
retailsector. However, thischapterfollowsBanerjeeandDuﬂo(2005)bycomparing
marginal revenue products with the costs of factor inputs to examine the (mis)use
of resources. Distortions create a wedge between the opportunity cost and mar-
ginal revenue product of factor inputs. Implications of these wedges for aggregate
productivity are studied. In addition, this chapter relates distortions with taxes and
credit.
This chapter argues that difﬁculty in access to credit creates relatively larger dis-
tortions to capital for small ﬁrms, because they lack collateral. Similarly, it hypo-
thesizes that taxes on gross proﬁts create relatively larger distortions to output for
large ﬁrms, because they are easier targets for government authorities (especially if
collecting taxes involves ﬁxed costs). Exploiting variation in regulation across the
Federal states of Brazil, it examines the relation between regulation and distortions
to capital and output in a differences-in-differences approach. This way, regulationIntroduction and Thesis Outline 7
is related with changes in allocative efﬁciency.
1.3 Informality and Productivity
The third aim in this thesis is to relate productivity with regulatory compliance.
Firms in developing countries often differ in the degree of compliance with regu-
lations. Those ﬁrms that do not register for taxes are commonly deﬁned as infor-
mal ﬁrms, whereas formal ﬁrms are registered for taxes (Fajnzylber et al., 2009).8
Informal ﬁrms account for a large share of output and employment in Latin Ame-
rica. The output share of the informal sector in Brazil is estimated at 40 percent in
1999/2000 (Schneider, 2005).
Programs to simplify and reduce tax burdens for small informal ﬁrms have been
implemented in recent years in various Latin American countries. The aim of these
programs is to lower the costs for informal ﬁrms to join the formal sector. For
example, Chile simpliﬁed income taxes, and Brazil simpliﬁed and lowered taxes
for small ﬁrms in the Brazilian Integrated System for Tax and Social Security Pay-
ments for Micro and Small Firms (Sistema Integrado de Pagamento de Impostos e
Contribucoes as Microempreses e Empresas de Pequeno Porte, SIMPLES) Program
(World Bank, 2007).
The recent literature assumes formal ﬁrms are more productive than informal
ﬁrms and studies the effectiveness of government initiatives in increasing forma-
lity.9 However, studies often do not examine whether the productivity differences
between formal and informal ﬁrms are robust to controlling for such characteris-
tics as the ﬁrm’s age and the owner’s managerial ability. Controlling for ﬁrm and
ﬁrm-owner characteristics may be unfeasible if only few ﬁrms are surveyed or the
survey contains little information on ﬁrm characteristics. Yet, if these controls are
not included, it cannot be ruled out that a positive correlation between formality
and productivity is merely spurious. For example, formal ﬁrms might be older
than informal ﬁrms and run by more educated ﬁrm owners, explaining their hi-
gher productivity performance.
In addition, studies of the relation between formality and productivity usually
do not take into account that formality is a choice of the ﬁrm. Rauch (1991) presents
a model which explains the co-existence of formal and informal ﬁrms. The model
8Deﬁnitions of informality may vary due to differences in the degree of compliance with regulations.
For example, a ﬁrm might be registered for taxes, but this need not imply that the ﬁrm actually ﬁlls in
the tax forms.
9See World Bank (2007) for a survey.8 Chapter 1
assumes managers differ in ability and informal ﬁrms face a limitation on size.10
Individuals with the lowest managerial ability become workers, and the ones with
the highest ability become formal managers. An intermediate group runs informal
ﬁrms. High-abilitymanagerswillnaturallyrunlargerﬁrms. Asaresulttheychoose
to operate in the formal sector, where they do not face a penalty once detected by
the government. For an informal ﬁrm the costs (e.g. taxes) of joining the formal
sector outweigh the beneﬁts (e.g. no size-restrictions). Hence, there may be self-
selection into the formal sector by more productive ﬁrms who are willing to incur
the cost of registering and paying taxes and as a result beneﬁt from access to formal
credit, access to public goods, the possibility to advertise, and the ability to increase
the customer base by issuing tax receipts.
Chapter 4 examines whether formal ﬁrms are more efﬁcient than informal ﬁrms.
Self-selection and a rich set of ﬁrm, industry, and ﬁrm-owner characteristics are
controlled for when examining differences in productivity between formal and in-
formal ﬁrms. Because large retail ﬁrms may beneﬁt from economies of scale (Doms
et al., 2004), attention is limited to retailers with less than ﬁve employees where
scale economies are absent or small at best. The study uses stochastic frontier ana-
lysis, where self-selection is controlled for by using a proxy for the degree of value-
added tax compliance among the ﬁrm’s suppliers and buyers.
This chapter adds to a nascent literature on the micro-level effects of formality
on ﬁrms. Fajnzylber et al. (2009) examined the effect of credit, training, paying
taxes, and belonging to business associations on the proﬁts of Mexican ﬁrms. Using
propensity score matching to control for the selection bias, they found a positive
effect of formality on proﬁts. McKenzie and Sakho (2009) examined the effect of tax
registration on proﬁtability of Bolivian ﬁrms. Using distance to the tax ofﬁce as an
instrument in a treatment-effects model, they found that registering for taxes has a
positive effect on business proﬁts. These ﬁndings suggest that registering for taxes
results in proﬁt gains. A related question is whether acquiring a formal status will
increase a ﬁrm’s productivity. It is productivity growth, rather than proﬁt making,
which is contributing to a country’s welfare.
10de Paula and Scheinkman (2007) extent the model with capital, where informal ﬁrms face a higher
rental cost of capital because they lack collateral.Introduction and Thesis Outline 9
1.4 ICT adoption and Production Technologies
The ﬁnal aim of this thesis is to examine the relation between productivity and the
adoption of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Investments in
ICT contribute strongly to economic growth in OECD countries. For the United
States, evidence on the growth impact of ICT is paramount, in particular for the
growth acceleration after 1995 (Jorgenson et al., 2005). For European countries and
Japan, studies also ﬁnd that ICT investments contribute to growth and productivity
(Jorgenson and Motohashi, 2005; van Ark et al., 2008).
At the macro level, de Vries et al. (2010) present series of investment in infor-
mation and communication technology in Latin American countries, and examine
the contribution of ICT to economic growth. During 1990 to 2004, they ﬁnd that
ICT investment levels in Latin America are below those in Europe and the United
States except for Chile and Costa Rica who are approaching European levels. ICT
investments contribute most to growth in Chile and Costa Rica and least in Argen-
tina. While Latin American countries do not miss out on the ICT revolution, its
contribution to growth remains below that in most OECD countries.
At the micro level, it is widely accepted that the adoption of information and
communication technology (ICT) inﬂuences the organization of ﬁrms and their cost
structures (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Haynes and Thompson, 2000; Bartel et al.,
2007). Therefore, a relation is expected between ICT adoption and production pro-
cesses across ﬁrms.
Greene(2005)developedaneconometricmodeltodistinguishﬁrms’production
technologies in a single estimation procedure. This stochastic frontier panel model,
the latent-class stochastic frontier model, allows testing for the existence of multiple
production technologies across ﬁrms and considering the associated implications
for efﬁciency measures.
Chapter 5 models retail production technologies in a latent class stochastic fron-
tier model, where the ﬁrm’s probability of technology group membership is deter-
mined by ICT use. A unique data set of Chilean retailers is used, including detailed
information on ICT capital and ICT use for each ﬁrm.
Results from this study help identify those ﬁrms for which productivity gains
are largest from reducing operational slack, and those ﬁrms where gains are largest
from adopting ICT. Results from this study therefore have implications for policies
that aim at fostering ICT adoption among ﬁrms. It may be that economic gains from
providing technical assistance to improve the efﬁciency in using ICT are larger than
providing incentives for higher ICT adoption to these ﬁrms. Firm-heterogeneity10 Chapter 1
affects the potential of particular policies to improve productivity performance.
1.5 Thesis outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 presents decompositions of productivity growth for a census data set
of retail ﬁrms in Brazil. Growth is split up into the contribution from within-ﬁrm
growth, between-ﬁrm resource reallocation, and entry- and exit-effects. The obser-
veddevelopmentpatterndiffersremarkablyfortheexpansionofmulti-establishment
retail chains between Brazil and OECD countries.
Chapter 3 also examines the question whether resource allocation improved af-
ter liberalization of the Brazilian retail sector. In addition, this chapter relates dis-
tortions to output and capital across ﬁrms with taxes and credit.
Chapter 4 moves on to study small formal and informal retail ﬁrms. This chap-
ter focuses on the question whether formal ﬁrms are more productive than informal
ﬁrms.
Chapter 5 focuses on the importance of technology adoption as a source of pro-
ductivity growth in Chile. It argues that the production process of retail ﬁrms dif-
fers with the adoption of information and communication technology (ICT).
Chapter 6 reviews the main research ﬁndings and concludes.Chapter 2
Did Liberalization Start A
Retail Revolution In Brazil?
2.1 Introduction
Brazil’s poor growth performance and macroeconomic instability in the 1980s mo-
tivated the government to undertake profound structural reforms in the early and
mid-1990s (Baer, 2008). The government adopted prudent macroeconomic policies,
achieved stabilization after a long period of hyperinﬂation, and created a more li-
beral trade and investment climate. The retail sector was opened up in the World
Trade Organization 1995 General Agreement on Trade in Services, but also wi-
thin the MERCOSUL1, and between the MERCOSUL members and the European
Union. In addition, the participation of foreign capital in Brazilian retail ﬁrms was
freedfromrestrictionsintheSixthConstitutionalAmendmentof1995(WorldBank,
2004).
The reforms created very suitable conditions for investments by foreign chains.
As a result, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the retail sector increased rapidly.2
The FDI stock in the retail sector increased sixfold from 1995 to 2000, and growth
was above average FDI growth (Censo de Capitais Estrangeiros). In turn, these
This chapter is based on the paper ’Did Liberalization Start A Retail Revolution In Brazil?’, GGDC
research memorandum 105.
1Mercado Comum do Sul, the regional trade block consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uru-
guay.
2See Santos and Gimenez (1999) and Concha-Amin and Dias de Aguiar (2006) for an overview of
foreign retail chains which entered or expanded their market share. Concha-Amin and Dias de Aguiar
(2006) concluded that during 1989-2002, 93 percent of all mergers and acquisitions by foreign ﬁrms took
place after 1997.12 Chapter 2
investments created the perception that liberalization had started a retail revolution
through the expansion of modern retail chains (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002).
The retail sector accounts for a large share of the Brazilian economy, both in
terms of GDP and employment. During 1996-2004, the employment and value ad-
ded share in the total economy was respectively about 11 percent and 5 percent
(Timmer and de Vries, 2009). A revolution was considered necessary for the deve-
lopment of a sector long characterized by many small family-run stores operating
alongside a few large modern retail chains. In the mid-1990s, various domestic
(or partially foreign-owned) chains were active, but the sector mainly consisted of
independent retailers, often operating their business in a traditional way at low
productivity levels (McKinsey, 1998). The increasing presence of retail chains was
expected to spur development by reducing waste (many agricultural products rot
before reaching the market), lowering prices for consumers,3 improving the qua-
lity of goods and assurance of its delivery, raising the productivity of supplying
industries (Javorcik et al., 2006), and raising the sector’s productivity level.4
So far, productivity growth of the retail sector has been disappointing under
the structural reforms. While productivity growth of the total economy has been
disappointing as well (King and Ramlogan, 2008), available evidence suggests that
productivity growth of the retail sector was below that of the total economy during
the 1990s (de Melo et al., 1998; Mulder, 1999; Timmer and de Vries, 2009). This
experience contrasts with OECD countries, where growth of the retail sector was
above productivity growth of the total economy during the past decades (Inklaar
et al., 2008). Obviously, this raises the question what held back growth of Brazil’s
retail sector.
RecentstudieshaveshownthatproductivitygrowthintheretailsectorofOECD
countries occurred through a process of creative destruction. That is, growth ori-
ginated from reallocation dynamics through ﬁrm churning (the entry and exit of
ﬁrms) and resource reallocation to more-productive retail chains. For example,
new establishments from retail chains (including, but not only, Wal-Mart) displa-
cing ’mom-and-pop’ stores accounted for virtually all growth in the US in the past
decades (Foster et al., 2006). Similar ﬁndings for the UK are presented by Haskel
and Sadun (2009) and for Japan by Matsuura and Motohashi (2005).
We use similar decomposition methodologies as in these studies to understand
3Bradford and Gohin (2006) show in a general equilibrium framework that a more efﬁcient wholesale
and retail trade produces large welfare gains.
4The beneﬁcial effects of foreign retail chains are not undisputed. In particular, concerns about their
effects on wages and employment have been raised (Basker, 2007). For example, Durand (2007) argues
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the performance of Brazil’s retail sector. While Brazil’s retail sector is dynamic, our
results suggest that liberalization failed to deliver high growth because a process
of creative destruction did not take off. During 1996-2004, we ﬁnd little evidence
for a reallocation of productive inputs and outputs. New establishments from retail
chains did not replace low-productive independent stores at a large scale. Instead,
large chains acquired other (smaller sized) chains. This contributed to a deepening
of the dual structure in which low-productive independent stores continued to co-
exist with a declining number of retail chains.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In the following section
we present the data set and discuss the main characteristics of Brazil’s retail sector.
We describe our productivity decomposition method in section 2.3. Decomposition
results are discussed in section 2.4. Conclusions and a discussion why the sector
does not show patterns similar to the US are in section 2.5.
2.2 Brazil’s Retail Sector
To examine the contribution of reallocation dynamics to growth, we use a census
dataset of retail ﬁrms. Our principal data source is the annual survey of distributive
trade ﬁrms (Pesquisa Anual de Comércio, PAC) from 1996 to 2004. Firms registered
in the Cadastro Nacional da Pessoa Jurídica from the ministry of Economic Affairs
and classiﬁed as distributive trade ﬁrms in the Cadastro Central de Empresas of
the national statistical ofﬁce are surveyed in PAC. The PAC dataset consists of two
groups, namely a group of ﬁrms which surpass the threshold and are included by
census and another group of ﬁrms which are below the threshold and are inclu-
ded by sample. Sampled ﬁrms are surveyed for a maximum of three consecutive
years and ﬁll in a simpliﬁed questionnaire. The empirical analysis focuses on ﬁrms
included by census only.5
Firms in the dataset are linked using their identiﬁcation numbers from the tax
registry. Different national sector deﬁnitions are used in PAC over time, which are
converted to the International Standard Industry Classiﬁcation Revision 3.0. After
ﬁrms are linked, observations of nominal output divided by nominal input that fall
into the ﬁrst and the ninety-ninth percentile of the distribution at the most detailed
industry classiﬁcation are considered outliers and deleted. A detailed discussion of
these steps is provided in appendix 2.A.
5We discuss implications of excluding ﬁrms below the threshold in section 2.4. Registered ﬁrms with
less than 20 employees are selected by means of a stratiﬁed random sampling procedure. The dataset
has 12,402 sampled ﬁrms in 1996 and 10,596 sampled ﬁrms in 2004.14 Chapter 2
Firms with more than 20 employees or ﬁrms with less than 20 employees but
with establishments in more than one Federal State are included in PAC by cen-
sus.6 For 1996 this amounts to 14,445 ﬁrms included by census. In 2004 the number
of ﬁrms included by census has risen to 17,366. While ﬁrms included by census
constitute a fairly small share of the total population of retail ﬁrms, they represent
the major part of the sector in terms of sales (about 60 percent). Furthermore, al-
though our analysis excludes small (often informal) ﬁrms, the dataset mainly in-
cludes single-establishment stores with low productivity levels. For example, in
2004 about 69 percent of the ﬁrms in our dataset are single-establishment ﬁrms (see
appendix table 2.B.2). Therefore, results are considered representative for the sec-
tor.
Output and input variables are available to construct productivity measures.
We measure labor productivity (LP) as the volume of sales divided by employ-
ment.7 Because retail ﬁrms sell goods to consumers, we used the consumer price
index to deﬂate output. We used the overall consumer price index to deﬂate output
of retail ﬁrms. In some cases it was possible to use more detailed price series, for
example for ﬁrms selling food and drinks.8
Figure 2.1 shows pie charts for the employment shares of ﬁrms (distinguished
by the number of establishments a ﬁrm has) in 1996 and 2004 (see appendix tables
2.B.1 and 2.B.2 for further detail). The employment share of single-establishment
ﬁrms did not decline from 1996 to 2004. In fact, the employment share of inde-
pendent stores increased from 22 percent to 29 percent in the retail sector. Never-
theless, we ﬁnd an increasing presence of large-size chains (ﬁrms with >100 esta-
blishments) at the expense of small and medium-size chains as well. In particular,
in food retailing (a sub-industry of the retail sector) the employment share of large-
size retail chains increased from 5 percent to 23 percent, reﬂecting the entry and
market expansion of large international retail chains.9 Thus, we ﬁnd an increasin-
gly dual market structure.
Table 2.1shows productivitylevels bysize class. Clearly, productivitylevels rise
6Firms in several northern regions which are located outside the Federal States’ capital are not included
in the survey because of the high costs involved in collecting information for these ﬁrms. These regions
are: Rondônia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Pará, Amapá, and Tocantins.
7Since some retailers employ part-time workers and family workers, a preferable measure of labor
input is hours worked. Data limitations force us to use employment. Productivity is therefore underes-
timated for retailers who employ relatively more part-time and or family workers.
8Further detail is provided in appendix 2.A.
9Wealsocomputedconcentrationratios. Fortheretailsector, theconcentrationratioofthetoptenﬁrms
by sales is 0.23 in 1996 and increased to 0.27 in 2004. In comparison to OECD countries, concentration
ratios are still low (see for instance Boylaud and Nicoletti (2002); Haskel and Sadun (2009)).Did Liberalization Start A Retail Revolution In Brazil? 15
Figure 2.1. Firms and employment shares in 1996 and 2004
with size class. Across the retail sector, retail chains tend to be more efﬁcient than16 Chapter 2
single-store retailers because of technology and scale advantages.10 These diffe-
rences in productivity levels across size classes indicate the scope of resource real-
location for boosting productivity growth. That is, resource reallocation toward
retail chains offers much potential for productivity growth.
Table 2.1. Productivity levels, deﬁned as sales divided by employment, by size class
Number of Productivity level Productivity level
Employees 1996 2004
20-49 100 100
50-99 104 102
100-249 107 105
250-499 106 106
500+ 120 113
Note: Unweighted average productivity by size class. The productivity
level for the size class 20-49 is set to 100.
What is puzzling, is the low aggregate productivity growth of the sector despite
the combination of a higher productivity level across size classes and an increasing
market share of large retail chains. In the remainder of this chapter, we will use the
census data set and our productivity decomposition method to understand why
productivity growth was not higher. The next section presents the decomposition
method, before turning to the results in section 2.4.
2.3 The Productivity Decomposition Method
Starting with the preliminaries of the productivity decomposition, aggregate pro-
ductivity, LPA, is the weighted geometric average of ﬁrm’s productivity:
LPA
t = Õ
i
LP
qit
it , (2.1)
where subscripts i and t refer to ﬁrm and time respectively, q is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
share in total employment, LP is labor productivity (sales per worker), and Õ de-
notes multiplication. If we take the logarithm of productivity, the aggregate pro-
ductivity level is deﬁned as a weighted arithmetic mean:
ln LPA
t = å
i
qit ln LPit. (2.2)
10See Doms et al. (2004), and Foster et al. (2006) for further detail for the US.Did Liberalization Start A Retail Revolution In Brazil? 17
Aggregate productivity growth between two years is the percentage change
measured by:
Dln LPA = ln LPA
t   ln LPA
t 1. (2.3)
For the decomposition, consider three types of ﬁrms. Continuing ﬁrms are de-
noted by C, entering ﬁrms are denoted by E, and exiting ﬁrms are denoted by X.
Firms in the initial year (t-1) either continue or exit the market. So in year t-1, conti-
nuing and exiting ﬁrms are active. In the ﬁnal year (t), only ﬁrms that continued or
entered the market are present. Hence, in year t, continuing and entering ﬁrms are
active.
Aggregate productivity growth between two periods can therefore be decom-
posed into:
Dln LPA = ln LPA
t   ln LPA
t 1 = (å
i2E
qit ln LPit + å
i2C
qit ln LPit) (2.4)
 (å
i2X
qi,t 1 ln LPi,t 1 + å
i2C
qi,t 1 ln LPi,t 1).
Equation 2.4 is the basic decomposition of productivity growth. It shows that
aggregate productivity can be decomposed into the contribution of entering, exi-
ting, and continuing ﬁrms. Aggregate productivity growth between two periods is
either due to within-ﬁrm improvements or reallocation dynamics. So far, however,
equation 2.4 does not separate the contribution to growth from continuing ﬁrms
into within-ﬁrm improvements and resource reallocation. Preferably, these contri-
butions from continuing ﬁrms are to be separated. Several methods have been
developed to distinguish between these two contributions from continuing ﬁrms
(see Baldwin and Gu (2006) for the derivations). In this chapter we follow the de-
composition method developed by Griliches and Regev (1995), hereafter denoted
GR:11
11This method has the advantage that it avoids the mixing of Paasche-type measures with Laspeyres-
type measures by using a symmetric decomposition method (Balk, 2001). In addition, by taking period
averages, the inﬂuence of measurement error becomes smaller. The disadvantage of the GR method is
that, because of taking averages, the within-ﬁrm effect is affected by changes in the market share, and the
between-ﬁrm effect is affected by changes in productivity. In section 2.4 we consider alternative decompo-
sition methods and ﬁnd that our main conclusions are independent from the particular decomposition
method used.18 Chapter 2
Dln LPA = å
i2E
qit

ln LPit   LP
A
(entry) (2.5)
+ å
i2C

qit + qi,t 1
2

(ln LPit   ln LPi,t 1) (within)
+ å
i2C
(qit   qi,t 1)

ln LPit + ln LPi,t 1
2
  LP
A

(between)
  å
i2X
qi,t 1

ln LPi,t 1   LP
A
, (exit)
where LP
A =
ln LPA
t +ln LPA
t 1
2 and the terms on the right-hand side of equation
2.5 are:
 The entry effect: the sum of differences between entering ﬁrms’ productivity
and average aggregate productivity, weighted by the ﬁrm’s market share.
This term measures the contribution of entering ﬁrms to growth.
 Thewithin-ﬁrmeffect: thesumofproductivitychangewithincontinuingﬁrms,
weighted by the ﬁrm’s average market share. This term reﬂects gains from
productivity growth within ﬁrms.
 The between-ﬁrm effect: the sum of productivity change due to the expansion
or contraction of continuing ﬁrms, where the ﬁrms’ average productivity is
measured in deviation from average aggregate productivity. This term cap-
tures productivity gains from the expansion of more-productive ﬁrms, or the
contraction of less-productive ﬁrms.
 The exit effect: the sum of differences in the productivity of exiting ﬁrms and
average aggregate productivity, weighted by initial market shares. Exiting
ﬁrms have a positive effect on aggregate productivity growth if the ﬁrms ex-
hibit productivity levels below average productivity.
If liberalization started a retail revolution through the entry and expansions of
retail chains, this shows up from the decomposition as large reallocation dynamics
(the sum of entry effects, between-ﬁrm market-share changes, and exit effects). For
OECD countries, these dynamics accounted for most growth. For example, for the
US it was found that reallocation dynamics accounted for 83 percent of growth
during 1987-1997 (Foster et al., 2002).
Table 2.2 shows descriptive statistics of the census data set we use. Output and
input variables are reported by entering, exiting, and continuing ﬁrms. ContinuingDid Liberalization Start A Retail Revolution In Brazil? 19
ﬁrms are on average the largest ﬁrms in terms of sales and employees, and they
show the highest productivity (sales per employee) as well. Exiting and entering
ﬁrms are less productive, with exiting ﬁrms marginally more productive than en-
tering ﬁrms. Although surprising at ﬁrst, below average productivity of entering
ﬁrms is a common ﬁnding across countries (Bartelsman et al., 2005). It is generally
interpreted as the result of market experimentation in which selection and learning
effects eventually sort out the most competitive entrants.12
Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics of entering, exiting, and continuing ﬁrms
Continuing ﬁrms Entering ﬁrms Exiting ﬁrms
Real Sales 16.05 14.29 14.08
Employment 4.62 3.44 3.18
Labor productivity 10.62 10.26 10.34
Entry rate 0.25
Exit rate 0.18
Observations 84,101 25,403 18,329
Note: Sales is measured in Brazilian reais. Real sales, employment, and labor productivity are in
natural logarithms. The entry (exit) rate is the average annual number of entrants (exiters) divided by
the total number of ﬁrms. The values are averages for the period 1996 to 2004. Descriptive statistics
are for ﬁrms included by census in PAC.
Entry and exit rates reveal substantial churning. Table 2.2 reports average an-
nual entry rates of 25 percent and exit rates of 18 percent. In comparison to ma-
nufacturing industries in Latin America, there appears more churning in retailing
(for instance, Eslava et al. (2006) reports average annual entry rates of 9 percent and
exit rates of 10 percent for Colombian manufacturing industries). Firm turnover is
higher in the retail sector because it has a much higher share of small businesses,
whichhavealowerprobabilityofsurvivalthanlargebusinesses(Fosteretal.,2002).
Churning in Brazil’s retail sector is comparable to that observed in the US retail sec-
tor, where Foster et al. (2002) describe the sector as having ’enormous rates of entry
and exit’ (p. 7) and Jarmin et al. (2004) ﬁnd that 50 to 60 percent of retailers that
exist one year disappear within ﬁve years.
2.4 Brazil: No Retail Revolution Here
We performed productivity decompositions at detailed industry levels using equa-
tion 2.5. However, in this section we report results for the total retail sector (indus-
12In our decompositions of productivity growth (see section 2.4) we increased the time horizon to exa-
mine the selection and learning effect. We found that increasing the time horizon raises the contribution
to growth from entering ﬁrms in line with selection and learning effects, but the additional contribution
is small.20 Chapter 2
try 52) and for food retailing (industry 521), because we are mainly interested in the
aggregate outcomes. To this end the detailed decomposition results were aggrega-
ted.13 We decomposed growth annually and present period averages of the annual
contributions.
Figure 2.2 shows the GR decomposition of labor productivity growth. Aggre-
gate productivity growth averaged 1.1 percent for the retail sector during 1996-204.
The within-ﬁrm contribution to productivity growth is larger than the contribution
from reallocation dynamics in the various periods considered. In fact, the negative
value for reallocation dynamics indicates that reallocation often exerts a drag on ag-
gregate productivity growth. For example, the average annual 1.1 percent growth
during 1996-2004 is due to a 2.8 percent productivity contribution from within-ﬁrm
improvements and to a -1.7 contribution from reallocation dynamics.
Figure 2.2. Productivity growth decomposition
Results are similar for food retailing, with the exception of the period 2000-2004.
Productivity of food retailers declined during the 2000-2004 period, which might be
13The weights which were used to average across the industries are nominal gross output by industry
averaged over the ﬁrst and last year of the period for which the change is measured. These weights
were kept constant across the decompositions. Hence, the results are within-industry decompositions
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due to the expansion in services offered (such as amenities and the breadth of as-
sortment) not accounted for in the output measure we employed (Betancourt and
Gautschi, 1993; Ratchford, 2003). However, for both the total retail sector and food
retailing, the main ﬁnding from the decomposition analysis is that within-ﬁrm ef-
fects account for most growth. In addition, a comparison of the 1996-2000 period
with 2000-2004 shows that despite increasing FDI ﬂows during the period consi-
dered (Concha-Amin and Dias de Aguiar, 2006), the contribution of reallocation
dynamics did not increase.
Reallocation dynamics consist of between-ﬁrm effects and the contributions
from ﬁrm entry and exit. The contributions of these different components are
shown in the last columns of table 2.3. Between-ﬁrm effects were positive (with
the exception of food retailing during 2000-2004), indicating that more-productive
ﬁrmsexpandedtheirmarketshareatthecostofless-productiveﬁrms. Thebetween-
effect is modest however, especially in food retailing (we discuss this below). Entry
effects are negative reﬂecting that productivity of entering ﬁrms was below average
productivity. Finally, the exit effect positively contributed to growth, because the
productivity of exiting ﬁrms was below average productivity, which is consistent
with the idea that competition drives the least competitive ﬁrms out of the market.2
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Table 2.3. Productivity growth decomposition
Industry Average Contribution from:
Period annual growth Within-ﬁrm Total reallocation Between-ﬁrm Entry Exit
(in percentage effect effect effect effect effect
points) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Retail sector
1996-2000 1.1 1.5 -0.4 1.5 -4.8 2.9
2000-2004 1.2 4.1 -3.0 1.0 -7.0 3.0
1996-2004 1.1 2.8 -1.7 1.3 -5.9 2.9
of which:
Food retailing
1996-2000 1.4 2.7 -1.3 0.4 -2.5 0.7
2000-2004 -0.3 3.3 -3.6 -0.7 -4.3 1.5
1996-2004 0.6 3.0 -2.4 -0.1 -3.4 1.1
Note: Griliches and Regev (1995) decomposition of labor productivity growth. Decompositions are performed annually, average annual percentage
points contributions to growth are presented. Total reallocation effect, (2) = (3) + (4) + (5).Did Liberalization Start A Retail Revolution In Brazil? 23
We examined the robustness of our results. First, we used alternative decom-
position methods proposed by Foster et al. (2006), and Baldwin and Gu (2006).
The relative contributions of decomposition components were comparable. Hence,
our main conclusions are independent from the particular decomposition method
used. Second, since there is a census threshold, entrant ﬁrms in our dataset may
not be true entrants but simply ﬁrms that grow beyond the threshold. We ad-
dressed that limitation by artiﬁcially raising the threshold and examining changes
in the decomposition results. Our ﬁndings suggested that raising the threshold
leaves the relative contributions of the components unchanged. Similarly, Scar-
petta et al. (2002) examined the sensitivity of decomposition results to a threshold
for Finnish manufacturing industries. They ﬁnd that results are insensitive to va-
rious artiﬁcially set thresholds as well. Third, note that we examine ﬁrm dynamics
using ﬁrm-level data. Most studies examined ﬁrm dynamics this way (Bartelsman
and Doms, 2000; Bartelsman et al., 2005). But some studies examined ﬁrm dyna-
mics at the establishment level (Foster et al., 2006; Matsuura and Motohashi, 2005).
The difference between the two concepts is that ﬁrm-level analysis does not distin-
guish between single-establishment ﬁrms and ﬁrms with multiple outlets whereas
an establishment-level analysis does. Therefore an establishment-level analysis is
able to decompose movements in productivity into changes within establishments
on the one hand and changes within ﬁrms on the other. The unit of analysis should
be kept in mind when comparing decomposition results in this chapter with other
studies. New establishments from continuing ﬁrms are included in between-ﬁrm
effects in our chapter, whereas it is counted as an entering establishment from a
continuing ﬁrm in Foster et al. (2006). This has no important implications for the
interpretation of the results, since both effects are part of the reallocation dynamics.
Therefore, our results are robust.
High within-ﬁrm effects and modest reallocation dynamics suggest that the re-
forms did not start a retail revolution through the entry and expansion of foreign
and domestic retail chains. Although liberalization in the 1990s did result in the ex-
pansion of chains (see section 2.2), our ﬁndings question the extent to which retail
chains have contributed to aggregate outcomes by entering the market or expan-
ding their market shares. So far, it is more likely that if liberalization did result in
productivity gains, they are reﬂected in within-ﬁrm improvements. That is, some
ﬁrms started to adopt new Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)
when the market for ICT goods was liberalized in the 1990s (Baer, 2008), reorgani-
zed their business as a result of increased competition, and beneﬁted from cheaper24 Chapter 2
imported goods for resale.14 These gains, however, are largely temporary. The
major gains should originate from a fundamental restructuring of the sector.
Our ﬁnding of limited reallocation dynamics correspond with several recent
qualitative studies of the retail sector of Brazil (and Latin America in general). For
example, Booz-AllenHamilton(2003)claimthat’Small-scaleretailersinLatinAme-
rican markets have demonstrated remarkable resilience, and previous gains against
[large retail chains] are tapering off or even reversing slightly in some cases. In
Argentina and Brazil, small-scale retailers have been particularly successful in sta-
ving off the large chains’ (p. 2-3). They argue that small-scale retailers managed
to retain their market share, because they are located close to consumers, offer the
product assortment which their customers demand, sell products only at a small
price-disadvantage, provide a ’personal touch’, and offer special services such as
selling on credit.
Further, our results for food retailing conﬁrm concerns raised by Humphrey
(2007) that the depth and implications of the food retail transformation in Latin
America have been overstated in previous research (for example by Reardon et al.
(2003)). In particular, distinguishing the food retailing sector from the total retail
sector shows that the between-ﬁrm market share changes are low in the former (see
table 2.3). This corroborates Farina (2002), who analyzes the supermarket sector in
Brazil and shows that the share of food sales by supermarket chains declined from
45.1 percent to 42.8 percent during 1994 to 2000. During this period, the share of
independent stores grew from 40 percent to 44 percent (the remaining food sales
are by traditional stores). Thus, single-establishment ﬁrms were not replaced by
retail chains, and our decomposition analysis shows that the observed changes in
market shares added little to productivity growth.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
Brazil undertook profound structural reforms during the 1990s. In combination
with stabilization after a long period of hyperinﬂation, this resulted in increasing
FDI inﬂows. In turn, these foreign investments by retail chains were expected to al-
ter the sector which had long been characterized by independent stores operating
their businesses in traditional ways with low productivity levels. That is, the ope-
ning up of the retail sector was expected to raise productivity growth through the
14If price changes of inputs were taken into account, the lower price of purchased goods for resale
would not be reﬂected in the productivity measure. We were unable to take price changes of inputs into
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entry and expansion of international retail chains. Thus, the main effects of the re-
forms were expected to work through reallocation dynamics. However, growth of
the sector has been low, averaging about 1.1 percent per annum, raising questions
about the effects of the reforms.
This chapter examined the effects of liberalization on productivity growth in
Brazil’s retail sector. We decomposed growth into the contribution from within-
ﬁrm improvements and reallocation dynamics during 1996-2004. We found sub-
stantial churning, with average annual entry rates of 25 percent and exit rates of
18 percent. However, two ﬁndings suggested that reforms did not live up to ex-
pectations. First, we found no strong tendency of retail chains displacing inde-
pendent stores. In fact, the employment share of single-establishment ﬁrms increa-
sed slightly. Second, the contribution of reallocation dynamics to growth was nega-
tive, averaging -1.7 percentage points per year, whereas within-ﬁrm improvements
contributed 2.8 percentage points per year.
In the US, chains of convenience stores with bargaining power, centrally per-
formed operations, and best-practice operations have been displacing single-shop
convenience stores for several decades (Jarmin et al., 2004). For the US, this process
explains virtually all growth (Foster et al., 2006) and has transformed the retail sec-
tor into a sector which leads the aggregate economy (Inklaar et al., 2008). Clearly,
this development process is lagging in Brazil. At least three aspects deserve ca-
reful examination in future research to understand why the sector does not show
patterns similar to the US.
First, business regulation is slowing down the expansion of retail chains. In
particular, regulations concerning zoning and commercial real estate act as barriers
to the development of the retail sector. For example, quantitative limits on retail
ﬂoor space in particular geographical areas (often city centers) are set. This occurs
even if national legislation puts little restrictions on ﬂoor space, because decisions
are often taken at the local level (for instance by city vereadores) where choices can
be inﬂuenced by local pressure groups (e.g. small retailers). In addition, business
regulation in other markets such as in transport and logistics limit the expansion of
multi-establishment ﬁrms. Excessive business regulation distorts the functioning
of the Brazilian economy. For example, Brazilians have the saying "to my friends:
everything, to my enemies: the law". In fact, according to a World Bank study on
doing business across countries, Brazil is one of the most regulated countries in the
world (World Bank, 2006). Thus, zoning laws and excessive business regulation in
other markets slow down the emergence of chains in Brazil.26 Chapter 2
Also, the quantity, quality, and orientation of rail and road networks is holding
back the emergence of national distribution systems and thereby the expansion of
chains. The physical gap in transport networks between Brazil and OECD coun-
tries is large (Calderón and Servén, 2004). In addition, only a small part (less than
20 percent) of the road network is paved and the provision of infrastructure did not
grow during the past decade as a result of the retrenchment of the public sector in
this area (Calderón and Servén, 2004). Furthermore, early investments in railways
were meant to integrate Brazil in the international economy (that is, to export pri-
mary products) rather than to integrate the regions into a large domestic market
(Baer, 2008).
Finally, demand factors inﬂuence the expansion of multi-establishment ﬁrms.
Consumer patterns are culturally determined, and many Brazilians prefer to buy
theirgoodsatstreetmarketsandlocalstoresinsteadofatsupermarketsfromchains
withaﬁxedassortment, becauseoffoodpreparationhabitsandtheperceivedfresh-
ness of the produce there (Zinkhan et al., 1999; Humphrey, 2007). Therefore, consu-
mer preferences inﬂuence the cohabitation of modern and traditional forms of re-
tailing. In addition, car penetration inﬂuences the attractiveness for retail chains to
establish large supermarkets outside crowded residential areas. Thus, with lower
car penetration, especially in the poorer Northern states, it has been less attractive
for chains to invest in large new establishments there. However, other demand
factors are slowly favoring modern retail formats, such as the increasing female
labor force participation (shifting demand to one-stop shopping), the recent impro-
vements in the income distribution, and the growing middle class. This indicates
that once supply constraints are eased, a revolution may be in the making.Did Liberalization Start A Retail Revolution In Brazil? 27
2.A Data Appendix
Data Cleaning
IBGE has the policy to encrypt the identiﬁcation number of ﬁrms (CNPJ) before
giving researchers access to the data. The method which is used to encrypt identi-
ﬁcation numbers is equal across years. Therefore, a ﬁrm can be traced throughout
the sample. We inspected the encrypted ﬁrm ID’s and deleted ﬁrms with duplicate
numbers.
We used the following procedure to detect outliers before the productivity de-
composition. First, nominal output is divided by nominal input for each ﬁrm. Ob-
servations of nominal output divided by nominal input that fall into the ﬁrst and
the ninety-ninth percentile of the distribution at the most detailed industry classi-
ﬁcation (four digits) are identiﬁed as outliers. After two periods have been linked,
ﬁrms with outlying productivity values or missing data in one of the two periods
are deleted. Entrant and exiting ﬁrms are determined from the remaining data. We
also decomposed productivity growth without the outlier procedure. Results from
these decompositions are similar.
Price Deﬂators
Several industry-wide and economy-wide price indices are available for Brazil.
Choices, however, are limited. We worked with price indices at fairly aggregated
levels. Because retail ﬁrms sell goods to consumers, we used the consumer price
index to deﬂate output. Consumer price indices (Índices Nacionais de Preços ao
Consumidor - Amplo, INPC-A) are available at IBGE. We use the ampliﬁed consu-
mer price index (INPC-A) to deﬂate output measures, where we use either Brazil’s
or the Federal states’ price index for all goods or one of the following groups of
goods: (1) clothing; (2) household equipment; (3) food and beverages. Firms re-
port economic numbers that refer to the calendar year of the survey. Firms whose
business year differs from the calendar year are required to adjust their numbers
accordingly. Therefore, we used annual (mid-year) price deﬂators to deﬂate out-
put.
Conversion of CNAE to ISIC Revision 3.0
Different national sector deﬁnitions are used in PAC over time. We used data in
PAC from 1996 to 2004. Two national classiﬁcations are therefore relevant. First,28 Chapter 2
the CNAE classiﬁcation (Classiﬁcacão Nacional de Atividaded Econômicas), which
was adopted in 1995 and used until 2003. Second, from 2003 onwards, the CNAE
1.0 classiﬁcation.
Our approach has been to ﬁrst convert CNAE 1.0 in later surveys to CNAE. We
followed this approach because only two years with the new classiﬁcation are avai-
lable. Next, we converted CNAE to the International Standard Industry Classiﬁca-
tion Revision 3.0 (ISIC Rev. 3.0). At the one and two digit level, the industry clas-
siﬁcations CNAE, CNAE 1.0, and ISIC Rev. 3.0 are identical. Differences between
the classiﬁcations only occur at the three and four digit level. Usually, more detail
is offered in the CNAE/CNAE 1.0 classiﬁcation and aggregation of CNAE/CNAE
1.0 to groups recomposes ISIC groups. We describe the conversion CNAE x CNAE
1.0 and CNAE x ISIC Rev. 3.0 below.
First, consider the conversion of CNAE 1.0 to CNAE for distributive trade ﬁrms.
The difference between both classiﬁcations is not large. For 68 out of 72 (four digit)
industry categories, an exact matching exists. The lack of unique correspondence
between both classiﬁcations in the remaining 4 categories concerns wholesale of
machinery, equipment and supplies and retail trade not in stores. Differences arise,
because CNAE 1.0 does not distinguish between the different forms of commercia-
lization. For example, whether sales take place via a store, TV, or Internet, is no
longer separated in the new CNAE 1.0. This distinction is made in CNAE (and it
is made in ISIC Rev. 3.0). This implies that no strict correspondence between both
classiﬁcations exists. Firms that belong to CNAE 1.0 industry code 51.64-0 and
51.65-9 all belong to a similar aggregate category in CNAE, namely 51.6 (CNAE).
Firms in CNAE 1.0 51.64-0 are all converted to CNAE 51.62-4, and ﬁrms in CNAE
1.0 51.65-9 are converted to CNAE 51.63-2. Firms in CNAE 1.0 52.62-0 are conver-
ted to CNAE 52.69-8, but some ﬁrms in CNAE 52.69-8 are moved to CNAE 1.0
64.12-2. These ﬁrms can no longer be traced and artiﬁcially disappear from the
data set. Firms in CNAE 52.61-2 and some ﬁrms in CNAE 52.69-8 are difﬁcult to
trace, because CNAE 1.0 does not distinguish between the various forms of com-
mercialization. IBGE (2004b) indicates that in the total population of retailers, only
5 retailers realized 100 percent of their sales via the Internet, 40 via the TV, and
584 via other forms of commercialization. In the total sample, this bias is unlikely
to be large. Furthermore, we focus in the productivity decompositions on broader
aggregates so to some extent these ﬁrms are possibly recomposed in an aggregate.
Second, we converted ﬁrms in four-digit CNAE sector classiﬁcations to four-
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matching is unique. The only difference between both classiﬁcations stems from
more detail in the CNAE classiﬁcation. Hence more detailed categories in CNAE
are recomposed in a broader ISIC category.
Firm Dynamics
To estimate the contribution of ﬁrm dynamics to growth, it is important to measure
’truly’ entering and exiting ﬁrms. We use unique ﬁrm identiﬁcation numbers to
measure entrants, exiters and continuing ﬁrms. But some characteristics of PAC
cloud the measurement of true entrants and exiters.
The structure of some ﬁrms change during the period analyzed. For example,
the structure of some ﬁrms change because of mergers, takeovers, and spin-offs. A
ﬁrm that is taken over, continues operating. But the ﬁrm now has a different ﬁrm
identiﬁcation number (the same as the ﬁrm that has purchased her). Due to the
takeover, the previous ﬁrm identiﬁcation number disappears. Without additional
information about changes in the structure of ﬁrms, we would count a "false" exit.
Other studies solved this problem by including information from business regis-
ters. We are partly able to solve this problem, because PAC asks ﬁrms to report
changes in legal and economic status (mudanças na estrutura da empresa). Fur-
thermore, if a change in the legal or economic status of the ﬁrm occurs, the ﬁrm
reports an additional tax number link (PAC provides two ﬁrm identiﬁcation num-
bers in these cases). Therefore, the additional tax number link changes its meaning
depending upon the change in legal or economic status.
Consider the possible changes in the structure of trade ﬁrms. First, if no change
is reported, the ﬁrm can be linked directly. However, note that the industry classi-
ﬁcation of a ﬁrm could change. This happens with a change in its main economic
activity. Firms that switched between industry classiﬁcations are dropped from the
data set. Second, a new ﬁrm can emerge from a merger. The merged ﬁrm has 2 pre-
decessors. Because we need two additional tax number links (in stead of one) and
because the newly emerged ﬁrm is often restructured considerably, we consider it a
new entrant. Likewise, if a ﬁrm emerges from a complete split-up, we considered it
a new entrant. The argument for making these choices is that this ﬁrm now stands
alone and gains experience on its own. Third, consider a partial spin-off. A new
ﬁrm emerges from a parent ﬁrm. We considered it a new ﬁrm, again, on the as-
sumption that this new ﬁrm stands alone and gains experience on its own. Fourth,
if the ﬁrm reports that it is acquired by another ﬁrm or it has acquired another ﬁrm,
output and input data are added to the purchasing ﬁrm. Fifth, a ’rest’ category30 Chapter 2
exists, where ﬁrms report other reasons for a change in its tax number link in ’ob-
servaçãos.’ Here, observations for old and new ﬁrm identiﬁcation numbers were
treated as one ﬁrm.
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Table 2.B.1. Employment shares by type of ﬁrm
1 2 3 4 5 6
Sector All Firms Firms Firms Firms Firms
ﬁrms with 1 with 2-5 with 6-10 with 11-100 with >100
establishment establishments establishments establishments establishments
number share number share number share number share number share
Employment (1996)
Retail sector 1,043,651 233,446 22% 247,032 24% 111,527 11% 372,837 36% 78,809 8%
Food retailing 455,799 84,627 19% 83,890 18% 50,360 11% 209,395 46% 24,233 5%
other 587,852 148,819 25% 163,142 28% 61,167 10% 163,441 28% 54,576 9%
Employment (2004)
Retail sector 1,344,476 393,834 29% 226,010 17% 107,831 8% 360,578 27% 256,278 19%
Food retailing 632,153 155,476 25% 91,934 15% 53,708 8% 185,563 29% 145,440 23%
other 712,323 238,358 33% 134,075 19% 54,124 8% 175,015 25% 110,838 16%
Note: columns 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 add up to column 1.3
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Table 2.B.2. Number of ﬁrms by type of ﬁrm
1 2 3 4 5 6
Sector All Firms Firms Firms Firms Firms
ﬁrms with 1 with 2-5 with 6-10 with 11-100 with >100
establishment establishments establishments establishments establishments
number share number share number share number share number share
Number of ﬁrms (1996)
Retail sector 14,445 7,760 54% 5,314 37% 813 6% 541 4% 17 0%
Food retailing 3,327 2,211 66% 897 27% 113 3% 103 3% 3 0%
other 11,118 5,549 50% 4,417 40% 700 6% 438 4% 14 0%
Number of ﬁrms (2004)
Retail sector 17,366 12,066 69% 4,119 24% 644 4% 507 3% 30 0%
Food retailing 4,684 3,760 80% 716 15% 110 2% 88 2% 10 0%
other 12,682 8,306 65% 3,403 27% 534 4% 419 3% 20 0%
Note: columns 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 add up to column 1.Chapter 3
Productivity in a Distorted
Market: The Case of Brazil’s
Retail Sector
3.1 Introduction
LatinAmerica’sdisappointingeconomicperformanceaftermarket-orientedreforms
in the 1990s is receiving widespread attention. According to a more and more do-
minant view, slow resource reallocation is the main culprit of low growth in Latin
America.1 In an increasingly competitive market, resources are assumed to ﬂow
from low- to high-productive users, improving allocative efﬁciency. Pages et al.
(2009) ﬁnd that the contribution of resource reallocation to growth was negative in
manufacturing industries of Latin America during the period after regulatory re-
forms. For Brazil’s manufacturing sector, Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2007) ﬁnd
labor is ﬂowing away from export industries because their labor productivity in-
creases faster than their production. While output shifts to more productive ﬁrms
labor is shed, adding to unemployment. Hence, reforms might be related with efﬁ-
ciency gains at the ﬁrm level2, but not at the aggregate when idle resources result.
This chapter is based on the paper ’Productivity in a Distorted Market: The Case of Brazil’s Retail
Sector’, GGDC research memorandum 112.
1See for example Cole et al. (2005); Mukand and Rodrik (2005); Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2007);
Pages et al. (2009).
2Studies typically ﬁnd strong ﬁrm-level productivity improvements after trade liberalization. For the
manufacturing sector in Brazil see: Hay (2001); Cavalcanti Ferreira and Rossi (2003); López-Córdova
and Mesquita Moreira (2003); Muendler (2004); Schor (2004).34 Chapter 3
In contrast to manufacturing, little is know about the role of the services sector
in Latin America’s economic performance. This is surprising, because the sector
accounts for over two-thirds of GDP and employment (Timmer and de Vries, 2009),
and insight in the functioning of the services sector is crucial for understanding
aggregate economic performance. Evidence suggests that reallocation only margi-
nally contributed to growth in the services sector as well (see Chapter 2). This raises
the question, what is preventing the reallocation of resources toward the most ef-
ﬁcient ﬁrms? This chapter studies allocative efﬁciency in the retail sector of Brazil,
and explores the relation between regulation and resource misallocation building
upon the model of Hsieh and Klenow (Hsieh and Klenow (2009), HK hereafter).
BrazilopenedupitsretailsectorintheWorldTradeOrganization’s1995General
Agreement on Trade in Services, but also within MERCOSUL,3 and between the
MERCOSUL members and the European Union. Furthermore, the participation
of foreign capital in Brazilian retail ﬁrms was freed from restrictions in the Sixth
Constitutional Amendment of 1995 (World Bank, 2004). It was expected that these
reforms would result in a retail revolution characterized by productive reallocation
through the expansion of modern retail chains and the growth of small successful
retail businesses (Reardon et al., 2003).
This retail revolution happened in other countries. For example, in the US ave-
rage annual labor productivity growth of 11 percent in the retail sector during the
1987-1997 period is for 90 percent due to new establishments from retail chains re-
placing independent mom-and-pop stores (Foster et al., 2006). A similar process,
albeit at a lower scale, took place in the UK (Haskel and Sadun, 2009).4
TheavailableevidenceforBrazil’sretailsectorsuggestsadifferentdevelopment
pattern. In Brazil, retail chains did not replace mom-and-pop stores during the per-
iod following reforms (see Chapter 2). Instead, large chains both domestic and
foreign typically acquired other existing (smaller-sized) chains. The share of small
low-productive ﬁrms remained stable or even increased. The limited role of reallo-
cation in Brazil’s retail sector may explain its low labor productivity growth, ave-
raging only 1 percent annually during 1996-2004 (Chapter 2). Limited reallocation
of resources in Brazil’s retail sector contradicts expectations from pro-competitive
reforms.
3Mercado Comum do Sul, the regional trade block consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uru-
guay.
4Haskel and Sadun (2009) argue that lower growth in the UK retail sector relative to the US is due
to retail chains opening up smaller new establishments because of size restrictions. In other words,
growth in UK’s retail sector originates from resource reallocation, but occurs at a slower pace because
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Various policies and institutions contribute to resource misallocation. Despite
the reforms, regulation in labor and product markets may have prohibited the start
of a retail revolution in Brazil. For example, taxes are high and reach over 200
percent of gross proﬁts in Rio de Janeiro (World Bank, 2006), reducing incentives
for retail ﬁrms in other states to enter the market in Rio de Janeiro. Also, difﬁculties
in access to credit and strict labor market regulations may prevent the growth of
successful small retailers and worsen their competitiveness relative to informal re-
tailers. Consistent with the idea that regulation in labor and product markets may
forestall growth in Brazil’s retail sector, Restuccia (2008) calibrated the implications
of taxes and entry costs for the misallocation of resources in Latin American coun-
tries. He found that taxes and entry costs can easily generate large misallocation
of resources and hence explain a lower aggregate total factor productivity level in
Latin America as compared to the US. Stringent regulations may prevent allocative
efﬁciency improvements in Brazil’s retail sector, and thereby impede growth.
This chapter measures distortions in the retail sector by comparing marginal re-
venue products with the costs of factor inputs, following the tradition of models
from Banerjee and Duﬂo (2005). We apply the Hsieh-Klenow (Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) model to study changes in resource allocation in Brazil’s retail sector during
the period from 1996 to 2006. Distortions to output and capital are inferred from
residuals in ﬁrst-order conditions in a model of monopolistic competition with he-
terogeneous ﬁrms. Wedges are measured if there is a difference between the cost
and the marginal revenue product of factor inputs. In turn, these wedges are used
to derive implications for aggregate productivity.
We apply the HK model to a dataset of retail ﬁrms in Brazil. The principal data
source is the annual census of retail ﬁrms from 1996 to 2006. This dataset offers
detailed information on output, inputs, and location of retail ﬁrms (and their esta-
blishments). The ﬁndings suggest there are large potential output gains from the
reallocation of resources to the most efﬁcient retailers. More importantly, the po-
tential aggregate productivity gains from resource reallocation have gone largely
unexploited during the post-liberalization period. We ﬁnd no allocative efﬁciency
improvements for the total retail sector and for most Federal states of Brazil separa-
tely. These results are consistent with the view that allocative efﬁciency is the main
culprit of low productivity growth in Latin America.
The implications of distortions for aggregate productivity are examined, and
distortionstooutputandcapitalarerelatedtoregionalvariationinregulationusing
a differences-in-differences approach. Selective policy implementation and enfor-36 Chapter 3
cement may create implicit or de facto differences in the business environment faced
by small and large ﬁrms. For example, governments often ﬁnd it impractical to col-
lect taxes from small ﬁrms. Instead, governments are likely to set higher tax rates
and enforce compliance only among larger ﬁrms (Tybout, 2000). In contrast, ca-
pital market imperfections might be a bigger constraint for smaller ﬁrms that lack
sufﬁcient collateral. Therefore, we allow the coefﬁcients in our econometric model
to vary by ﬁrm size. A novel aspect of the empirical approach is that we examine
distortions to output and capital separately. HK examined the combination of dis-
tortions to output and capital. We show that separating both types of distortions is
important due to opposing effects of regulation across size class and type of distor-
tion.
We ﬁnd that difﬁculty in access to credit results in distortions to capital for small
and medium ﬁrms, but not for large ﬁrms. In contrast, taxes on gross proﬁts create
distortions to output for large ﬁrms, but do not signiﬁcantly affect the output of
small and medium ﬁrms. Hence, the results suggest that regulation results in dis-
tortions to output and capital, but the effects differ by ﬁrm size.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 sketches the
HK model and derives measures and implications of distortions for aggregate pro-
ductivity. Section 3.3 describes the dataset. Potential gains and changes over time
from productive resource reallocation are estimated in section 3.4. Thereafter, sec-
tion 3.5 examines the relation between regulation and distortions to output and
capital. Finally, section 3.6 provides concluding remarks.
3.2 Theoretical framework
This section illustrates the relation between aggregate productivity and the alloca-
tion of resources. Implications of the misuse of resources for aggregate productivity
can be studied in a model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous ﬁrms.5
We follow the model introduced by HK. Based on the canonical model of Melitz
(2003), HK introduced distortions to output and capital.6 Here, we only discuss
the core elements and present the competitive equilibrium of the model in a format
which suits our empirical analysis.
5Firms are heterogeneous with respect to marginal costs.
6Various authors focused on speciﬁc mechanisms that could result in resource misallocation. For
example, Lagos (2006) studied the impact of labor market regulation on allocative efﬁciency; Buera
and Shin (2008) examined implications of ﬁnancial frictions, and Guner et al. (2008) developed a model
to examine resource misallocation as a result of size restrictions.Productivity in a Distorted Market 37
Two ﬁrm-speciﬁc distortions are considered. First, a capital distortion tKsi,
which changes the marginal revenue product of capital relative to the marginal
revenue product of labor. Second, an output distortion tYsi, which distorts the mar-
ginal revenue product of capital and labor in equal proportions. The former leads
ﬁrms to substitute labor for capital, while the latter results in a suboptimal size of
the ﬁrm.
Following HK, assume aggregate output Y is the combination of goods Ys in s
retail industries under perfect competition in both the output and input market:
Y =
S
Õ
s=1
Yqs
s . (3.1)
where the sum of industry shares å
S
s=1 qs = 1.7 Output Ys in industry s, is the
combination of Ns differentiated products sold by all ﬁrms (i = 1,..., Ns), which
face a constant elasticity of substitution s:8
Ys =
 
Ns
å
i=1
Y
s 1
s
si
! s
s 1
. (3.2)
The Cobb-Douglas production function of each retailer selling a differentiated
good in industry s is given by:
Ysi = AsiK
as
si L
1 as
si , (3.3)
where Ysi denotes the retailer’s value added, Asi productivity, K capital, and L
labor. The capital share as and labor share (1   as) are only allowed to vary across
industries. Costs Csi for a retailer are given by:
Csi = wLsi + (1+ tKsi)rKsi, (3.4)
7Under cost minimization psYs = qspY, where ps is the price of sales Ys in industry s and p 
Õ
S
s=1(
ps
qs )qs is the price of the ﬁnal good sold (which is set the numéraire, so p = 1). Throughout,
quantities will be denoted by capital letters, and prices by lower-case letters.
8Firms sell a single type of good or variety. These varieties are symmetrically differentiated, with a
common elasticity of substitution s between any two variables. In addition, we assume the elasticity
of substitution is time-invariant and does not differ across goods. We discuss the restrictiveness and
examine the sensitivity of the results to these assumptions in section 3.4.38 Chapter 3
where w is the wage rate, r is the rental cost of capital, and the capital distortion
tKsi raises the cost of capital relative to that of labor. Cost minimization results in
the optimal capital-labor ratio:
Ksi
Lsi
=

as
1  as
w
r

1
1+ tKsi

. (3.5)
Retailer’s proﬁts are given by:
Psi = (1  tYsi)psiYsi   wLsi   (1+ tKsi)rKsi, (3.6)
where psi is the price of the good sold by ﬁrm i in industry s, and tYsi is the
output distortion which affects the marginal products of capital and labor in equal
proportions. Proﬁt maximization results in the mark-up price over marginal cost,
which is ﬁxed because we assumed constant returns to scale in production, and is
given by:
psi =

s
s   1

w
1  as
1 as 
r
as
as 
(1+ tKsi)as
Asi(1  tYsi)

. (3.7)
If retail industry output Ys is maximized, we obtain the allocation of capital,
labor, and ﬁrm output across ﬁrms. The allocation of labor is (see HK for details):9
Lsi = c1 
(1  tYsi)sAs 1
si
(1+ tKsi)as(s 1). (3.8)
The allocation of capital is:
Ksi = c2 
(1  tYsi)sAs 1
si
(1+ tKsi)
as(s 1+ 1
as )
. (3.9)
9The parameter c1, c2, and c3 are constant within industries and given by:
c1 =

s 1
s
s 
(1 as)
w
s(1 as+ as
s )   as
r
as(s 1) Is 1qsY;
c2 =

s 1
s
s 
(1 as)
w
s(1 as+ as
s   1
s )   as
r
as(s 1+ 1
as ) Is 1qsY;
c3 =

s 1
s
s 
(1 as)
w
s(1 as)   as
r
ass Is 1qsY;
where I =

å
N
i=1 p1 s
si
 1
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And retailer’s output is:
Ysi = c3 
(1  tYsi)sAs
si
(1+ tKsi)ass . (3.10)
In equation 3.10, output across ﬁrms within industries may differ because of
heterogeneity in productivity Asi (as in Melitz (2003)), and because of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
output and capital distortions. Absent distortions, relative to other ﬁrms in the
industry a more productive ﬁrm will be larger. If a ﬁrm faces higher tax (enfor-
cement) on proﬁts, its size will be smaller than in the absence of distortions. This
might be particularly binding for large ﬁrms, since collecting taxes may involve
ﬁxed costs inducing authorities to enforce taxes on larger ﬁrms for which the effort
has a positive payoff.
To the extent resource allocation in an industry is driven by distortions along-
side ﬁrm productivity, this will result in differences in the marginal revenue pro-
ducts of capital and labor across ﬁrms. The marginal revenue product of labor is:
MRPLsi =
psiYsi
Lsi
=
w
(1  tYsi)

s
s   1

1
1  as

. (3.11)
The marginal revenue product of capital is:
MRPKsi =
psiYsi
Ksi
=
r(1+ tKsi)
(1  tYsi)

s
s   1

1
as

. (3.12)
Theafter-taxmarginalrevenueproductsofcapitalandlaborareequalizedacross
ﬁrms within industries because only distortions to output and capital are ﬁrm-
speciﬁc. But before-tax marginal revenue products may differ depending on the
distortions the ﬁrm faces. This has important implications for the ﬁrm’s revenue
productivity, which is an input share-weighted combination of the marginal pro-
duct of capital and labor.
Solving for the equilibrium allocation of resources across industries, aggregate
output can be expressed as (see HK for details):
Y =
S
Õ
s=1

TFPsKas
s L1 as
s
qs
. (3.13)40 Chapter 3
Next, to determine industry productivity TFPs, it is useful to distinguish bet-
ween the ﬁrm’s revenue productivity, TFPRsi, and the ﬁrm’s physical productivity,
TFPQsi. The use of a ﬁrm-speciﬁc deﬂator yields a ’pure’ measure of productivity,
termed physical productivity TFPQsi. In contrast, if an industry deﬂator is used,
ﬁrm-speciﬁc differences in prices are not taken into account. Using an industry
deﬂator gives a ’contaminated’ measure of productivity, which is termed revenue
productivity TFPRsi. Both ﬁrm productivity measures (TFPRsi and TFPQsi) are re-
lative to the industry average. Following Foster et al. (2008), physical and revenue
productivity are deﬁned as:10
TFPRsi  psiAsi 
(psiYsi/psYs)
(rKsi/rKs)as(wLsi/wLs)1 as
(3.14)
= c5 
(1+ tKsi)as
(1  tYsi)
.
TFPQsi  Asi 
(Ysi/Ys)
(rKsi/rKs)as(wLsi/wLs)1 as
(3.15)
= c4 
(psiYsi/psYs)
(rKsi/rKs)as(wLsi/wLs)1 as
.
In comparison to HK, we improve the productivity estimates for TFPRsi and
TFPQsi by making them unit invariant (that is, dividing output and inputs by the
industry averages for output and inputs). From equation 3.14, it follows that re-
venue productivity TFPRsi only varies across ﬁrms within industries if ﬁrms face
output and capital distortions. Firms with higher physical productivity TFPQsi de-
mand more capital and labor up to the point where the higher output results in a
lower price and thus the same TFPRsi as the other ﬁrms.
Industry TFPs can be shown to be:
TFPs =
 
Ns
å
i=1

Asi 
TFPRs
TFPRsi
s 1! 1
s 1
. (3.16)
An important aspect of the expression for industry productivity is that if all
10The parameters c4 =
w1 as(psYs)
  1
s 1
ps and c5 =
  s
s 1

1 as
1
as 1 
r
as
as
are constant within indus-
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ﬁrms face the same distortions, industry TFPs will be unaffected. That is, if tYsi =
tYs and tKsi = tKs for all i, the distortions disappear from the expressions for equi-
librium industry TFPs, and TFPs is given by As =

å
Ns
i=1 As 1
si
 1
s 1. This property
of the model allows us to isolate the effects of policies on TFP through resource
misallocation. The property is due to inelastic factor demand with respect to the
distortions. A change in average taxes only changes factor prices, such that the
ﬁrst-order conditions of all ﬁrms are satisﬁed with the same allocations.
Firm-level distortions cannot be observed from the empirical data and must be
identiﬁed. Distortions to output and capital are estimated from:
(1  tYsi) =
s
s   1
(wLsi/wLs)
(1  as)(psiYsi/psYs)
. (3.17)
(1+ tKsi) =
as
1  as
(wLsi/wLs)
(rKsi/rKs)
. (3.18)
Firm-speciﬁc output distortions are inferred from equation 3.17 (itself derived
from equation 3.11), when the ﬁrm’s labor share is low compared to the indus-
try elasticity of output with respect to labor. Capital distortions are inferred from
equation 3.18 when the ﬁrm’s ratio of labor compensation to capital services is high
relative to what one expects from the output elasticities of capital and labor of the
industry.
Animportantparameterininferringdistortionstooutputandtheirimplications
for aggregate productivity is the elasticity of substitution s between ﬁrm value ad-
ded. Aggregate productivity gains from the removal of distortions are increasing
in s. HK assume a common s across goods equal to s = 3. Initially, we use s = 3
as well, but the sensitivity of the results to the choice of s will be considered.
To estimate the ﬁrm’s productivity and its distortions to capital and output, a
choice has to be made on the benchmark capital share as. Because the average
capital distortion and the capital production elasticity in each industry cannot be
separately identiﬁed, we use the industry shares for the Federal district Brasilia as
the benchmark. HK use industry shares for the United States as the benchmark. We
do not use the US as the undistorted benchmark, because US industry characteris-
tics might not match those in the states of Brazil. That is, differences in institutions,
market structure, and geography may induce input shares to differ across coun-42 Chapter 3
tries.
Instead, weassumeBrasiliaiscomparativelyundistorted. Ourbenchmarkchoice
is motivated by the observations that GDP per capita is highest, overall business
regulation is least restrictive (see next section), and state-speciﬁc estimates of the
substitution elasticity s (explained in the sensitivity analysis in section 3.4) sug-
gests competition is strongest in Brasilia. Deviations of the ﬁrm’s input cost shares
from the median shares in that particular industry for Brasilia will show up as a
distortion to output and/or capital for the ﬁrm.
3.3 Data
To derive measures of productivity and distortions, we use the annual census of
retailers for the period from 1996-2006. The measures of distortions will be used
to examine implications for aggregate productivity in section 3.4. In addition, the
measures of distortions are related with indicators of regulation to examine whe-
ther taxes and difﬁculty in access to credit result in distortions to output and capi-
tal in section 3.5. This section describes the regulatory indicators and retail census
data.
3.3.1 Regulation: Taxes and Access to Credit
Information on regulation is provided by the World Bank’s Doing Business for Fe-
deral states in 2006 (World Bank, 2006). The indicators we use are paying taxes
and getting credit. Taxes are considered, because the complex and burdensome tax
system potentially distorts output. Getting credit is considered, because it is iden-
tiﬁed as one of the most important constraints on growth in Brazil (Rodrik, 2007).
In particular, small ﬁrms are constrained (World Bank, 2006), which may result in
relatively larger distortions to capital for these ﬁrms.11
The indicator of paying taxes records all taxes paid by a medium-sized ﬁrm,
which is dedicated to general commercial activities and services within the second
year of operation. Taxes are measured at all levels of government, resulting in more
than 25 different public, state, and municipal taxes. These taxes include among
others corporate income taxes, turnover taxes, and value-added taxes. Importantly,
labor taxes (such as payroll taxes and social security contributions) are not inclu-
11Another candidate would be labor market distortions. See Lagos (2006); Almeida and Carneiro (2007);
and Petrin and Levinsohn (2008) for ﬁrm-level analysis of the effects of labor regulation in Latin Ame-
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ded. Hence, the indicator of paying taxes can be used to examine distortions to
output as they are expected to proportionally affect the marginal revenue product
of labor and capital.
The indicator on getting credit measures the time and cost to create and register
collateral. The collateral agreement must be registered with the Registry of Deeds
and Documents in the city of the debtor. These registries are not linked across
regions, and often not digitalized. The cost to register a security includes ofﬁcial
duties and notary fees.
Information on taxes and access to credit is provided in table 3.1. The cost of
registering collateral (as a percent of loan value) ranges from 0.2 in Rio de Janeiro
to 3.8 in Ceará. In comparison, the cost of registering collateral is 0.01 percent of
loans in Canada and the United Kingdom. Taxes range from 89 percent of gross
proﬁts in the Amazone to 208 percent in Rio de Janeiro. Taxes in the United States
are 45 percent of gross proﬁts. Hence, although taxes and collateral registration
procedures are essential for an economy to function, both appear burdensome in
Brazil.4
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Table 3.1. Business regulations across the Federal states of Brazil, 2006
Federal Federal Amazonas Minas Rondônia Maranhão Rio Grande Mato Grosso
state district Gerais do Sul do Sul
Final Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Getting credit Time to create collateral 45 6 2 30 4 25 30
Cost to create collateral 0 2 1 2 1 1 1
Paying taxes Total tax payable 149 89 150 146 147 153 146
Number of payments 12 23 23 12 12 12 12
Federal Rio de Santa Bahia São Mato Ceará
state Janeiro Catarina Paulo Grosso
Final Rank 8 9 10 11 12 13
Getting credit Time to create collateral 27 25 26 na 23 40
Cost to create collateral 0 3 2 na 3 4
Paying taxes Total tax payable 208 144 144 148 146 137
Number of payments 12 23 12 23 23 23
Notes: Time to create collateral in days, cost to create collateral in percentage of loan value, total tax payable as percentage of gross proﬁts. Number of payments per year. Source: Doing
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The ﬁrst row of table 3.1 shows the ﬁnal ranking of states in terms of business
regulation (1 for the least regulated state, 13 for the most regulated state). This ﬁnal
ranking is a simple average of the ranking of a state on each indicator made by
the World Bank.12 The ranking suggests business regulation is least restrictive in
Brasilia, while most restrictive in Ceará.
3.3.2 Retail-ﬁrm data
The principal data source of retail trade ﬁrms is the annual survey of distribution
(Pesquisa Anual de Comercio, PAC) from 1996 to 2006. Firms registered in the Ca-
dastro Nacional da Pessoa Jurídica (CNPJ) from the ministry of Economic Affairs
and classiﬁed as wholesale and retail trade ﬁrms in the Cadastro Central de Em-
presas (CEMPRE) of the national statistical ofﬁce (IBGE) are surveyed in PAC. The
PAC dataset consists of two groups, namely a group of ﬁrms which surpass the
threshold and are included by census, and another group of ﬁrms below the thre-
shold included by sample only. The empirical analysis focuses on ﬁrms included by
census, because we do not have appropriate weights to assure the sample reﬂects
the population.
Firms with more than 20 employees or ﬁrms with less than 20 employees but
with establishments in more than one Federal State are included in PAC by cen-
sus.13 For 1996 this amounts to 14,445 ﬁrms included by census. In 2006, the num-
ber of ﬁrms included by census has risen to 19,346. While ﬁrms included by census
constitute a fairly small share of the total population of retail ﬁrms, they represent
the major part of the sector in terms of sales (about 60 percent). Firms are linked
across years using their identiﬁcation numbers from the tax registry.
The census includes detailed information on output and inputs. Gross value
added is obtained by subtracting purchases of goods sold and the costs of inter-
mediate inputs from sales. Value added consists of compensation for labor and
capital inputs. Labor input is measured by the ﬁrm’s wage bill, which crudely
controls for differences in human capital and hours worked (Hsieh and Klenow,
2009). Consistent with the ﬂow measures of output and labor input, we measure
capital services instead of capital stocks.14
12A wider set of indicators is considered for the ﬁnal ranking, also including starting a business, regis-
tering property, and enforcing contracts.
13Firms in several northern states located outside the Federal States’ capital are not included in the
survey because of the high costs involved in collecting information for these ﬁrms. These states are:
Rondônia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Pará, Amapá, and Tocantins.
14Renting and leasing expenditures are excluded from costs of intermediate inputs and included in
capital services.46 Chapter 3
Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics for selected states and all states combi-
ned. Estimates of TFPR and TFPQ using equations 3.14 and 3.15 are close to one,
because output and inputs are measured relative to the industry’s average. Distor-
tions to output are estimated from equation 3.17. Output distortions are negative
on average, thus labor’s share is high compared to what one would expect from
the industry elasticity of output with respect to labor. The positive values for dis-
tortions to capital (estimated using equation 3.18) indicate that the ratio of labor
compensation to the capital stock is high relative to what one would expect from
the output elasticities with respect to capital and labor. Hence, both distortions
suggest a relatively intensive use of labor compared to the benchmark. Distortions
to capital are high in Ceará, where access to credit is also most restrictive (see table
3.1), suggesting a positive relation between the two. Output and input data suggest
that ﬁrm size in Rio de Janeiro is below average, which might be related with above
average taxes distorting output more in this state than in others. We will formally
examine the relation between regulation and distortions to output and capital in
section 3.5.
Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics for retail ﬁrms, 2006
Variable All states Ceará Rio de Janeiro Brasilia
(UF=23) (UF=33) (UF=53)
Sales 14.44 14.70 13.91 14.75
1.55 1.63 1.38 1.60
Value added 12.96 12.95 12.75 13.28
1.25 1.47 1.15 1.38
Remuneration 12.67 12.49 12.47 12.85
1.11 1.29 1.05 1.19
Capital services 11.24 11.25 11.23 11.69
1.36 1.60 1.29 1.49
TFPR 1.16 1.22 1.11 1.23
0.81 1.11 0.59 1.10
TFPQ 1.04 1.08 0.98 1.14
1.00 1.37 0.75 1.15
tYsi -1.71 -2.29 -1.32 -1.65
2.61 3.57 1.63 2.56
tKsi 0.15 0.15 -0.09 0.11
1.70 1.40 1.08 1.58
Observations 19346 396 2607 413
Notes: The mean values (in natural logarithmic form) for Sales, Value added, Remuneration,
and Capital services are in current Reais. The standard deviation is below in italics. TFPR
is estimated using equation 3.14, TFPQ is estimated using equation 3.15, output distortions
are estimated from equation 3.17, and capital distortions are estimated from equation 3.18.
Source: Pesquisa Anual de Comercio (IBGE, 2006b).Productivity in a Distorted Market 47
3.4 Allocative efﬁciency in Brazil’s retail sector
We consider the productivity distribution and the gains in aggregate productivity
if distortions were to disappear. If there were no distortions (or all distortions were
the same across ﬁrms within industries), the TFPR distribution would be equal to
one, and there would be no potential gains in productivity from resource realloca-
tion. Hence, the variance of the TFPR distribution reﬂects ﬁrm-speciﬁc distortions
across states. One can estimate potential aggregate productivity gains by hypothe-
tically removing these idiosyncratic distortions.
3.4.1 The revenue productivity distribution
Table 3.3 shows statistics for the revenue productivity distribution. We estimated
the distribution of TFPR for each Federal state separately and for all states com-
bined. Output and factor inputs are relative to the industry mean, so the mean
and median of the TFPR distribution approximate one. The dispersion of TFPR va-
ries considerably across states. The variance ranges from 0.22 in Rondônia to 1.35 in
Espíritu Santo. If we correlate the variance in TFPR with the ranking of states on the
strictness of business regulation we ﬁnd a positive but insigniﬁcant relation, which
suggests a weak positive relation between regulation and dispersion in marginal
revenue products across ﬁrms within states. Obviously, these results are indicative
at best and will be further explored in the next section.15
3.4.2 Potential gains from resource reallocation
Potential gains in aggregate productivity across states are estimated by hypotheti-
cally removing distortions. If marginal products are equal across ﬁrms, industry
TFP is As =

å
Ns
i=1 As 1
si
 1
s 1. Potential gains are estimated from:
Y
Yef ficient
=
S
Õ
s=1
"
Ns
å
i=1

Asi
As

TFPRs
TFPRsi
s 1# qs
(s 1)
. (3.19)
For each industry, we calculate the ratio of actual TFPs (equation 3.16) to the
efﬁcient level of TFPs, and then aggregate this ratio across industries using the
15The number of ﬁrms differs considerably across states (see table 3.3). The limited number of observa-
tions for several states may result in incorrectly measured TFPR distributions. In section 3.5 we consider
the sensitivity of the relation between regulation and distortions to dropping states one at a time.48 Chapter 3
Table 3.3. TFPR distribution, 2006
Federal state n mean median variance
Rondônia 69 1.06 1.02 0.22
Acre 51 1.06 0.97 0.29
Amazonas 198 1.04 0.72 1.03
Roraima 31 1.00 0.88 0.26
Pará 182 1.08 0.90 0.56
Amapá 45 1.04 0.91 0.50
Tocantins 37 1.28 1.00 1.11
Maranhão 193 1.11 0.90 1.02
Piauí 163 1.10 0.87 0.77
Ceará 396 1.22 0.94 1.22
Rio Grande do Norte 265 1.18 1.04 0.55
Paraíba 185 1.22 0.97 0.83
Pernambuco 573 1.20 0.96 1.11
Alagoas 165 1.07 0.75 1.21
Sergipe 157 1.12 1.00 0.47
Bahia 917 1.17 0.91 1.04
Minas Gerais 2148 1.16 0.99 0.53
Espírito Santo 499 1.20 0.96 1.35
Rio de Janeiro 2607 1.11 0.99 0.35
São Paulo 5451 1.24 1.10 0.53
Paraná 1432 0.98 0.91 0.29
Santa Catarina 821 1.25 1.01 0.94
Rio Grande do Sul 1104 1.11 0.97 0.61
Mato Grosso do Sul 299 1.04 0.90 0.66
Mato Grosso 394 1.23 1.01 0.80
Goiás 551 1.15 0.93 1.06
Distrito Federal 413 1.23 0.94 1.21
Total economy 19346 1.16 1.00 0.65
Notes: TFPR is estimated using equation 3.14, TFPQ is estimated using equation
3.15, output distortions are estimated from equation 3.17, and capital distortions
are estimated from equation 3.18.
Cobb-Douglas aggregator (equation 3.1). Table 3.5 provides percentage TFP gains
by state from fully equalizing TFPR across ﬁrms in each industry for the years 1996,
2001, and 2006. The potential gains are large. For example, for 1996 potential TFP
gains are 217 percent in Brasilia (Distrito Federal), 239 percent in Rio de Janeiro,
and 244 percent in São Paulo.
Estimates of potential gains in retailing are higher than estimated productivity
gains from equalizing TFP within manufacturing industries. For China and India,
gains in manufacturing range from 86 to 128 percent (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).
Estimates for the manufacturing sector in Latin America are not yet available, but
preliminary evidence for Bolivian manufacturing suggests that it is roughly in theProductivity in a Distorted Market 49
sameballparkasChineseandIndianmanufacturing(MachicadoandBirbuet,2008).
The approach to estimate potential gains is not without limitations, because
’non-neoclassical’ features such as markups, adjustment costs, returns to scale, and
ﬁxed costs are also reﬂected in the gaps. The margin of error in estimated gains,
which is further examined below, preclude us from stating that distortions are lar-
ger in São Paulo as compared to Rio de Janeiro, because potential gains are smaller
in the latter (see table 3.5).
However, large potential gains are not out of line with estimates of TFP gaps in
retail between the US and Brazil. Estimates indicate that productivity levels in Bra-
zilian retailing are between 14 and 28 percent of the US productivity level (McKin-
sey (1998) Mulder (1999); Lagakos (2009)). Mulder (1999) ﬁnds that the relative
productivity level dropped from 28 to 14 percent during the period from 1975-1995.
This ﬁnding is consistent with the 14 percent level for food retailing in 1995 obtai-
ned by McKinsey (1998). Also, preliminary evidence based on differences in the
size composition between the US and Brazil, suggests that resource allocation im-
provements may account for half of this retail TFP gap (Lagakos, 2009). Assuming
larger ﬁrms have higher productivity levels, our estimates of the large potential
TFP gains from resource reallocation are in line with these ﬁndings. That is, impro-
vements in resource reallocation may improve TFP levels by a factor of two, which
would bring productivity levels in Brazil’s retail sector between 28 and 56 percent
of the US productivity level.
More important is whether potential TFP gains from resource reallocation have
been realized during the period following services liberalization. Changes in the
opportunity for increasing aggregate productivity by removing distortions are exa-
mined by comparing the potential gains between 1996 and 2006. Figure 3.1 pre-
sents results for the total economy and three large Federal states (Rio de Janeiro,
São Paulo, and Minas Gerais). The ﬁgure suggests potential gains from resource
reallocation have gone largely unexploited despite liberalization of the retail sector
since the 1990s.
In table 3.4, the last column shows the b-coefﬁcient from an OLS regression
where % TFP gains are regressed against time. A signiﬁcant negative value indi-
cates improvements in allocative efﬁciency. In most states, the coefﬁcient is positive
and insigniﬁcant. For some states we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient, but the
change over time is small. This ﬁnding suggests slow resource reallocation follo-
wing pro-competitive reforms as well.
Our ﬁnding of limited resource reallocation is consistent with earlier research50 Chapter 3
Figure 3.1. Potential aggregate productivity gains from resource reallocation
attributing Latin America’s disappointing performance after market-oriented re-
forms in the 1990s to the slow reallocation of inputs toward more efﬁcient ﬁrms.16
In particular, in chapter 2 we ﬁnd limited evidence of improvements in allocative
efﬁciency after reforms in the retail sector of Brazil.17
3.4.3 Sensitivity analysis of the potential TFP gains
We examined the sensitivity of estimated potential aggregate TFP gains in various
ways. The sensitivity analysis suggests that various adjustments affect the magni-
tude of potential TFP gains. However, changes over time in the opportunity for
increasing aggregate productivity by removing distortions are hardly affected.
First, potential gains are increasing in s, and HK argue that the ’estimated gains
16See for example Cole et al. (2005); Mukand and Rodrik (2005); Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2007);
Pages et al. (2009); Chapter 2.
17An alternative for considering the efﬁcient allocation of resources is by focusing on the productivity
distribution using the Olley and Pakes (OP) (Olley and Pakes, 1996) method. This method does not
weight input movements using differences in the gaps between marginal revenue products and input
prices, but measures whether resources are allocated efﬁciently in the cross section of ﬁrms by looking
at the differences between weighted and unweighted productivity at a given moment in time. If dis-
tortions are present, the difference between unweighted productivity and cross-sectional efﬁciency is
smaller. Applying this method to the retail sector in Brazil, we ﬁnd the difference between weighted
and unweighted log(TFPR) is 0.26 log points in 1996. This implies that aggregate productivity would be
around 26 percent lower if resources were allocated randomly. We do not ﬁnd an improvement in the
OP cross term over time. Hence, the OP method suggests allocative efﬁciency did not improve, which
is consistent with the ﬁndings using the HK model.Productivity in a Distorted Market 51
Table 3.4. TFP Gains from equalizing TFPR within industries
Federal state 1996 2001 2006 b
Rondônia 190 196 204 -1.52
Acre 231 187 214 1.91
Amazonas 188 216 235 2.93**
Roraima 212 236 229 0.72
Pará 204 212 218 1.19
Amapá 226 216 217 1.73
Tocantins 239 262 238 -0.48
Maranhão 179 196 238 2.83
Piauí 204 220 230 1.57*
Ceará 218 226 244 1.97*
Rio Grande do Norte 211 221 227 3.15**
Paraíba 224 227 237 1.56
Pernambuco 233 262 235 1.07
Alagoas 197 228 250 4.13***
Sergipe 203 223 206 0.57
Bahia 245 255 264 1.89
Minas Gerais 237 243 257 1.75
Espírito Santo 242 239 274 2.33*
Rio de Janeiro 239 246 223 -1.13
São Paulo 244 246 242 -1.12
Paraná 243 231 235 -1.40
Santa Catarina 235 247 254 1.84
Rio Grande do Sul 237 250 274 2.93
Mato Grosso do Sul 232 251 260 2.52
Mato Grosso 241 248 267 2.65*
Goiás 229 243 269 3.81***
Distrito Federal 217 239 250 4.45***
Total economy 257 266 257 -0.26
Notes: TFP Gains from equalizing TFPR within industries, elasticity of
substitution is 3. The last column shows the b-coefﬁcient from an OLS
regression where % TFP gains are regressed against time. A signiﬁcant ne-
gative value indicates improvements in allocative efﬁciency. * signiﬁcant
at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
are highly sensitive to this elasticity’ (p. 1425).18 Therefore, we examined the sen-
sitivity of TFP gains to the elasticity of substitution. Hopenhayn and Neumeyer
(2008) show s = 3 is a low value relative to what has been used in the literature.19
The parameter n (n = 1/(s  1)) is usually calibrated taking a value n = 0.15 0.2,
18We considered other common elasticities of substitution (e.g. 5 and 7) as well. In general, gains
increase in s.
19In the absence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc distortions, there is an equivalence between aggregate productivity in
the decreasing returns perfect competition economy (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008) and the constant
returns monopolistic competition economy (the HK model). Without distortions (or equal distortions
across ﬁrms), TFP is:
TFPRR
s =

å
Ns
i=1 A
1
n
n52 Chapter 3
which implies s = 6   72
3 (e.g. Atkeson and Kehoe (2005); Buera and Shin (2008);
Guner et al. (2008)). In addition to the assumption of a low elasticity of substitution
in HK (s = 3 implies n = 0.5), the assumption of a common elasticity may not
reﬂect differences in market circumstances.
More in line with calibration analysis of models with decreasing returns to scale
and perfect competition (e.g. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)), we let the elasti-
city of substitution vary between 3 and 7. Further, we relax the assumption of a
common elasticity of substitution by allowing it to vary across states in Brazil. Sub-
stantial differences in market characteristics across the states of Brazil motivate this
approach. The elasticity of substitution by state is estimated using indicators that
capture the degree of substitutability between ﬁrm’s value added in each state. Po-
pulation and retail-ﬁrm density, in combination with demand factors are likely to
increase competition. The variables considered are: population per km2, number of
retail ﬁrms per 1000 inhabitants, GDP per capita, female labor force participation
(a higher participation rate shifts preferences toward one-stop shopping), and the
share of households with a car. An unweighted average for the normalized values
of these indicators determines the elasticity of substitution. Appendix table 3.A.1
shows the indicators and the resulting s. The elasticity of substitution between the
output of ﬁrms is highest for Brasilia, and lowest for Pará.
The potential gains using state-speciﬁc s’s are shown in ﬁgure 3.2. The gains
for the total economy are larger as compared to the benchmark estimates, which is
mainly due to the higher estimates for São Paulo. This suggests that potential TFP
gains from resource reallocation are sensitive to the choice of s. However, if we
use state-speciﬁc s’s there is no apparent improvement in allocative efﬁciency over
time as well.
Second, we examined the inﬂuence of the tails of the TFPR distribution, be-
cause measurement error could inﬂuence the potential gains. We trimmed the 2.5
percent tails of TFPQ and the output and capital distortions.20 We allow the elas-
ticity of substitution to vary across states. Figure 3.2 shows these results as well.
Hypothetical TFP gains fall, from 257 to 248 percent for all states combined. Hence,
measurement error in the remaining 2 percent tails could matter, but if so it only
partially accounts for the big gains from removing distortions. Changes in alloca-
tive efﬁciency are similar, and again suggest a limited role of resource reallocation
TFPHK
s =

å
Ns
i=1 As 1
si
 1
s 1
Hence, for the parameter n = 1/(s   1), aggregate productivity is similar in both models.
20In the benchmark estimations of TFP gains, we trimmed the 0.5 percent tails of TFPQ and the output
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Figure 3.2. Potential aggregate productivity gains from resource reallocation
to productivity growth.
3.5 Regulation and distortions to output and capital
In an exploratory data analysis, we correlated the variables used in this chapter.
Correlations are shown in table 3.5. The relation between value added and produc-
tivity is positive suggesting larger ﬁrms are more productive, which is consistent
with core models of the size-productivity distribution of ﬁrms (Melitz, 2003). The
correlation between employment and distortions to output is positive. This may
reﬂect larger ﬁrms facing larger distortions to output. In contrast, the relation
between employment and distortions to capital is negative suggesting that smal-
ler ﬁrms face larger distortions to capital, although the relation is not signiﬁcant.
Hence, distortions may differ with ﬁrm-size.5
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Table 3.5. Correlation between variables, 2006
Value added Employment Capital services TFPR TFPQ tYsi tKsi
Value added 1
Employment 0.94 1
Capital services 0.84 0.82 1
TFPR 0.02  0.01c  0.01b 1
TFPQ 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.89 1
tYsi 0.04 0.02a 0.02b 0.42 0.37 1
tKsi -0.02  0.01c -0.03 0.25 0.14 -0.22 1
Note: Pearson correlation coefﬁcients. All pairwise correlations are signiﬁcant except for a Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, b Signiﬁcant at 10 percent
level, and c not signiﬁcant.Productivity in a Distorted Market 55
In this section we relate regulation to distortions using a particular form of a
differences-in-differences(DD)approach, popularizedbyRajanandZingales(1998).21
The advantage of this approach is that we are able to examine a causal relation bet-
ween regulation and distortions as compared to a simple correlation between both.
The substantial variation in regulation across states (see table 3.1) allows us to
examine the effects of regulations in a differences-in-differences approach. We exa-
mine how taxes and access to credit impact on distortions to output and capital. For
taxes, we examine whether retail industries with higher commercialization margins
will be more affected by higher sales taxes.22 For example, commercialization mar-
gins in the retail sale of household appliances, articles and equipment (CNAE 1.0
industry 5233) are higher than in specialized bakery and dairy stores (CNAE 1.0
industry 5221) (IBGE, 2006b).23 Therefore, retailers selling household appliances
will be more affected by taxes as compared to retailers selling food, beverages, and
tobacco. In turn, this will translate into higher distortions for high-margin ﬁrms in
states with high taxes relative to low-margin ﬁrms in the same state.
For access to credit, we examine whether retail industries that depend more
on external ﬁnancing are more affected by difﬁculty in access to credit (Rajan and
Zingales, 1998). Our measure for external ﬁnancial dependence is expenditures
related to outstanding debt (e.g. interest payments on loans). This measure should
reﬂect the amount of desired investment that cannot be ﬁnanced through internal
cash ﬂows generated by the same ﬁrm. Using this proxy suggests that the relative
dependence on external ﬁnance is higher in more capital-intensive retail industries.
For example, dependence on external ﬁnance is highest in hypermarkets (CNAE
1.0 industry 5211) and lowest in stores selling candy and chocolates (CNAE 1.0
industry 5222).
The differences-in-differences approach requires a relatively frictionless market.
We use the Federal State Brasilia as the comparatively undistorted benchmark. Ob-
viously, distortions are present in Brasilia as well, as suggested by the potential
gains from resource reallocation we found in section 3.4. However, what matters
is that the relative industry ordering of commercialization margins and external
ﬁnancial dependence in Brasilia corresponds to the ordering of natural commercia-
lization margins and natural external ﬁnancial dependence across industries, and
that these orderings carry over to other states in Brazil (Klapper et al., 2006).
21For recent applications, see Aghion et al. (2007), and Bruno et al. (2008).
22Commercialization margins, gross proﬁts, are deﬁned as resale revenues minus the cost of goods sold,
remuneration, and intermediate expenditures, over sales.
23CNAE is Classiﬁcação Nacional de Atividades Econômicas, the national industry classiﬁcation, which
closely maps the International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation 3.1.56 Chapter 3
3.5.1 Model speciﬁcation
For 2006, we regress distortions to output and capital on regulation interacted with
an industry-speciﬁc indicator. Initially, we do not allow effects to vary by ﬁrm size
(z), and therefore exploit three dimensions: (i) ﬁrm; (s) industry; and (r) region. If
we label the regulatory variable (taxes or access to credit) as ’policy’ and the related
industry-speciﬁcfactoras’industryfactor’, theestimatedspeciﬁcationisasfollows:
gi,s,r = d(policyr  industryfactors) +
R
å
r=1
brDr (3.20)
+
S
å
s=1
bsDs + ei,s,r.
The dependent variable, gi,s,r, is either a measure of the distortion to output
(tYsi) or capital (tKsi), or a combination of both (TFPRsi). Region dummies, Dr, and
industry dummies, Ds, are included to control for other market, technological, or
regulatory factors not included in the regressions. This speciﬁcation allows us to
relate regulation with idiosyncratic distortions. Since the speciﬁcation controls for
region- and industry-speciﬁc effects, the only effects that are identiﬁed are those
relative to the interaction term (the regulatory variable and the industry-speciﬁc
factor) that varies both cross regions and cross industries. For example, for taxes
we may examine whether differences in distortions to output between ﬁrms in in-
dustries with high or low commercialization margins are smaller in regions with
lower taxes.
In the introduction, it is argued that the effects of taxes and difﬁculty in access
to credit are likely to vary by ﬁrm size. The exploratory data analysis in this section
suggestedthatdistortionsmayvarywithﬁrmsizeasaresultofregulation. Further-
more, Bartelsman et al. (2008) use the World Bank Investment Climate Surveys to
examine the differential impact of policy factors on performance and growth pros-
pects of ﬁrms of different size in Latin America. They present descriptive evidence
that medium-size and, especially, large ﬁrms are more affected by high taxes and
cumbersome tax administration than small ﬁrms. Medium and large businesses
tend to be relatively less affected by lack of access to, and the cost of, ﬁnancing. To
allow for differential effects of policies, in a second speciﬁcation we allow the effect
to vary by ﬁrm size z:Productivity in a Distorted Market 57
gi,s,r,z =
Z
å
z=1
dz(policyr  industryfactors) +
R
å
r=1
Z
å
z=1
br,zDr,z (3.21)
+
S
å
s=1
Z
å
z=1
bs,zDs,z + ei,s,r,z.
Theemployment-sizecategoriesdistinguishedareﬁrmswithz1(<50employees),
z2 (51-100 employees), z3 (101-249 employees), and z4 (250 employees).24
A clear advantage of the DD approach compared to standard cross-state/cross-
industry studies is that it allows to control for state and industry effects, thereby
reducing problems with model misspeciﬁcation and omitted variable bias. Howe-
ver, recent research has highlighted some disadvantages of the DD approach as
well. Bertrand et al. (2004) argue that standard errors are biased due to autocor-
relation if a long time series is considered. In our model set up, a single cross-
section is considered, which is not susceptible to serial correlation problems. Do-
nald and Lang (2007) show potential problems with grouped error terms, because
the dependent variable differs across individuals while the policies being studied
are constant among all members of a group. Failure to account for the presence
of common group errors can generate biased standard errors as well. Therefore,
we correct the standard errors using a robust covariance estimator, where state-
industries are clustered. The large number of groups (13 states  20 industries) is
expected to result in an asymptotically normally distributed t-statistic.
3.5.2 Results
Table 3.6 shows results from estimating equation 3.20. Results show the average
impact of regulation without differentiating by size. In the uneven columns, re-
gional taxes on gross proﬁts are interacted with the industry’s commercialization
margin. For the even columns, difﬁculty in access to credit is interacted with the
industry’sﬁnancial dependence. Incolumns (1)-(4), we considerthe effectson reve-
nue (TFPRsi) and physical (TFPQsi) productivity. Recall that revenue productivity
is a composite measure reﬂecting also distortions to output and capital, whereas
physical productivity measures ’true’ productivity of the ﬁrm only (see equations
3.14 and 3.15). Therefore, regulations are expected to be related with revenue pro-
ductivity, and not with physical productivity.
24Aghion et al. (2007), and Bruno et al. (2008) distinguish similar employment-size categories.5
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Table 3.6. Regulation and distortions to output and capital, no allowance for size eﬀects of regulation
Variable TFPR TFPR TFPQ TFPQ tYsi tYsi tKsi tKsi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Taxes  Commercialization margins 0.094 0.037 -0.007 0.667
(1.09) (0.60) (0.05) (2.74)***
Credit  Financial dependence 0.144 0.180 0.126 0.131
(1.98)** (2.57)** (1.14) (1.29)
Observations 15010 9559 15010 9559 15010 9559 15010 9559
R2 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.11
Notes: OLS regressions, robust standard errors in brackets, region and industry dummies are included (not shown), clusters by region-industry. Number of
observations for regressions where access to credit is interacted with ﬁnancial dependence is smaller because no information on access to credit is available
for São Paulo. * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *** signiﬁcant at 1%.Productivity in a Distorted Market 59
Results in column (1)-(4) suggest that taxes and access to credit are positively re-
lated with distortions (higher revenue productivity) in industries with higher com-
mercialization margins and dependence on external ﬁnance, although the relation
is signiﬁcant for access to credit only. However, a similar relation is observed bet-
ween regulation and physical productivity (columns 3 and 4). This creates doubts
on the accurateness of distinguishing TFPR and TFPQ, because distortions should
solely be reﬂected in revenue productivity. Both productivity measures are highly
correlated and therefore TFPR may reﬂect distortions to output and capital as well
as true productivity to some extent. Furthermore, revenue productivity is a com-
posite measure of distortions, which may obscure channels by which regulation
affects resource misallocation. Therefore, examining distortions to output and ca-
pital separately appears more appropriate.
Regressions for distortions to output and capital are shown in columns (5)-(8).
Results suggest taxes are negatively related with distortions to output and posi-
tively related with distortions to capital. The opposing effects may explain why
taxes are not signiﬁcantly related with revenue productivity. Access to credit is po-
sitively related with both distortions to output and capital, which may explain why
is it signiﬁcantly related with revenue productivity.
A single coefﬁcient for all ﬁrms may hide opposing affects across ﬁrm size. For
example, distorting effects of difﬁculty in access to credit may be particular severe
for small ﬁrms lacking sufﬁcient collateral. Therefore, we allow the impact of re-
gulation to vary by ﬁrm size. Results from estimating equation 3.21 are shown in
table 3.7. Our interest centers on the relation between regulation and distortions to
output and capital separately.
Results in table 3.7 suggest different patterns across ﬁrm size. In relative terms,
taxes on gross proﬁts act as an output subsidy for small ﬁrms z1 (because of the
negative coefﬁcient), have ambiguous effects for medium ﬁrms (z2 and z3), and
distort output of large ﬁrms z4 (because of the positive coefﬁcient, see column 1).
Output distortions for large ﬁrms are higher in regions with higher taxes and in
industries with higher commercialization margins. This ﬁnding is consistent with
earlier literature (e.g. Gollin (2006); Guner et al. (2008)) and recent ﬁndings from
interviews with CEO’s of retail chains in Argentina (Sánchez and Butler, 2008). It
may be due to higher enforcement for large ﬁrms if tax collection involves ﬁxed
costs, or a combination of both.6
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Table 3.7. Regulation and distortions to output and capital, allowance for size eﬀects of regulation
Variable tYsi tYsi tKsi tKsi
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Taxes  Commercialization margins  z1 -0.041 0.606
(0.30) (2.51)**
Taxes  Commercialization margins  z2 0.147 1.019
(0.69) (3.36)***
Taxes  Commercialization margins  z3 -0.175 0.748
(0.87) (2.89)***
Taxes  Commercialization margins  z4 0.350 0.484
(2.29)** (2.04)**
Credit  Financial dependence  z1 0.368 0.304
(1.54) (1.37)
Credit  Financial dependence  z2 0.153 0.546
(0.56) (1.77)*
Credit  Financial dependence  z3 -0.161 0.077
(0.95) (0.49)
Credit  Financial dependence  z4 0.016 -0.068
(0.42) (1.99)**
Observations 15010 9559 15010 9559
R2 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.11
Notes: OLS regressions, robust standard errors in brackets, size-speciﬁc region and industry dummies are included (not
shown), clusters by region-industry. The employment-size categories distinguished are ﬁrms with z1 (< 50 employees),
z2 (51-100 employees), z3 (101-249 employees), and z4 (250 employees). Number of observations for regressions where
access to credit is interacted with ﬁnancial dependence is smaller because no information on access to credit is available
for São Paulo. * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *** signiﬁcant at 1%.Productivity in a Distorted Market 61
To explore the estimated impact of taxes on distortions to output we follow the
approach outlined in Aghion et al. (2007). We estimate the difference in distortions
to output between ﬁrms in industries with high commercialization margins (90th
percentile of distribution in Brasilia) and ﬁrms in industries with low commercia-
lization margins (10th percentile of the same distribution) in the region with the
highest taxes compared to the region with the lowest taxes:
dz[(Margin90th   Margin10th)(Taxesmax   Taxesmin)]. (3.22)
Using the coefﬁcients in column (1), the impact of taxes on distortions to output
is -0.02 for small ﬁrms and 0.19 for large ﬁrms. The differential impact is 0.21, which
is about 12 percent of the sample mean distortion to output, suggesting that taxes
have a modest but non-negligible impact on output distortions.
Difﬁculty in access to credit results in distortions to capital for small and me-
dium ﬁrms, but not for large ﬁrms (column 4). In other words, difﬁculties in ac-
cess to credit induce small and medium ﬁrms to substitute labor for capital. Smal-
ler ﬁrms are more likely to face borrowing constraints because of limited liability
and imperfections in the enforcement of debt repayment (Albuquerque and Ho-
penhayn, 2004). Therefore, small ﬁrms in industries that depend relatively more
on external ﬁnance are more likely to employ labor instead of capital. In a simi-
lar fashion as for the effect of taxes, we examine the estimated impact of access to
credit on distortions to capital. The differential impact between small and large
ﬁrms is 0.57, suggesting that difﬁculty in access to credit has a substantial impact
on distortions to capital at the sample mean.
3.5.3 Sensitivity of the results
The sensitivity of the main result, namely that the effects of regulations differ by
ﬁrm size and type of distortion, are examined along different dimensions. Overall,
the results are robust, but the sensitivity analysis uncovers several other interes-
ting ﬁndings. First, regressions might be affected by the hierarchical setup of the
model speciﬁcation. That is, distortions measured at the ﬁrm-level are related with
region-industry indicators. Although region-industry clusters were used to adjust
the standard errors, an alternative approach might be to include ﬁrm-speciﬁc va-
riables as explanatory variables (also using clustered standard errors). In columns
(1) and (2) of table 3.8, regressions are shown where the ﬁrm’s employment is in-62 Chapter 3
cluded. Employment was considered, because it proxies for ﬁrm size. Therefore,
we examine whether the results are driven by differences in proﬁt margins and
dependence on external ﬁnance between industries across size classes and not by
independent size effects. Including a ﬁrm-speciﬁc variable does not change the
distortionary effects of taxes and access to credit across ﬁrm size.P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
i
n
a
D
i
s
t
o
r
t
e
d
M
a
r
k
e
t
6
3
Table 3.8. Regulation and distortions to output and capital, sensitivity analysis
Variable tYsi tKsi tYsi tKsi
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Taxes  Commercialization margins  z1 -0.041 -0.067
(0.30) (0.51)
Taxes  Commercialization margins  z2 0.147 0.099
(0.69) (0.49)
Taxes  Commercialization margins  z3 -0.175 -0.305
(0.87) (1.44)
Taxes  Commercialization margins  z4 0.350 0.090
(2.29)** (0.51)
Credit  Financial dependence  z1 0.301 0.353
(1.36) (1.51)
Credit  Financial dependence  z2 0.545 0.590
(1.77)* (1.84)*
Credit  Financial dependence  z3 0.078 0.113
(0.49) (0.70)
Credit  Financial dependence  z4 -0.070 -0.060
(2.52)** (1.70)*
Observations 15010 9559 15041 9581
R2 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.11
Notes: OLS regressions, robust standard errors in brackets, size-speciﬁc region and industry dummies are included (not
shown), clusters by region-industry. The employment-size categories distinguished are ﬁrms with z1 (< 50 employees),
z2 (51-100 employees), z3 (101-249 employees), and z4 (250 employees). Number of observations for regressions where
access to credit is interacted with ﬁnancial dependence is smaller because no information on access to credit is avai-
lable for São Paulo. * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Columns (1) and (2) include ﬁrm’s
employment; columns (3) and (4) show results when the elasticity of substitution is allowed to vary across size groups.64 Chapter 3
Second, we considered the sensitivity of the results to the elasticity of substi-
tution varying by ﬁrm size. It may be argued that the elasticity of substitution is
higher for small ﬁrms, perhaps because of customer-binding marketing strategies
and the broader assortment of large ﬁrms, and less ﬁxed costs in small ﬁrms. As a
crude proxy, we allow the elasticity to vary between 7 and 3 for the different size
groups instead of letting it vary between states. Results from regressing the dif-
ferent measures of distortions to output and capital are shown in columns (3) and
(4). For difﬁculties in access to credit, the relation with distortions to capital is si-
milar. However, for taxes we no longer ﬁnd a signiﬁcant distortionary inﬂuence on
output for large ﬁrms. This suggests competition reduces the effect of tax policies
on distortions.
Finally, we examined the sensitivity of the results to changes in the sample. We
re-estimated the main regression of interest (columns (5) and (8) in table 3.6) re-
moving one region at a time from the sample. This approach is motivated by sub-
stantial differences in the number of observations between states. Appendix ﬁgure
3.A.1 and 3.A.2 present the estimated coefﬁcients differentiated by size classes. The
ﬁrst set of results (ﬁgure 3.A.1) suggests the amplitude of the coefﬁcient for taxes
interacted with commercialization margins is insensitive to the regions included
in the sample. In particular, the distorting effect of taxes for large ﬁrms is stable
across the different regressions, although the effect is at the 5 percent border of si-
gniﬁcance if Rio Grande do Sul (UF 43) is excluded from the sample. The second set
of results (ﬁgure 3.A.2) indicates that the results for difﬁculty in access to credit in-
teracted with ﬁnancial dependence are affected by the exclusion of certain regions.
In particular, excluding Minas Gerais, the state where access to credit is least difﬁ-
cult, affects the coefﬁcient for large ﬁrms. Nevertheless, the sensitivity analysis still
indicates substantial different effects across size classes irrespective of the exclusion
of regions one at a time.
3.6 Concluding remarks
An increasingly dominant view holds the limited role of allocative efﬁciency as the
main culprit of low growth following reforms in Latin America since the 1990s. So
far, this view has been largely based on evidence from the manufacturing sector.
In this chapter, we extended the analysis by examining allocative efﬁciency in the
retail sector of Brazil. A novel methodological approach, following Banerjee and
Duﬂo (2005), which uses the gaps between marginal revenue products and inputProductivity in a Distorted Market 65
prices to measure resource allocation, was followed.
We applied the HK model to a detailed census dataset of retail ﬁrms. Wedges
between the opportunity cost and marginal product of factor inputs were measu-
red and implications for aggregate productivity were imputed. The results indi-
cate large potential productivity gains from the reallocation of resources toward
the most efﬁcient retailers. The potential TFP gains appear larger for the retail sec-
tor found in this study than that of the manufacturing sector found by others, but
comparative evidence for the manufacturing sector in Brazil and the retail sector of
other countries is still missing.
Importantly, we ﬁnd no evidence for improvements in allocative efﬁciency. Po-
tential output gains from resource reallocation have not been realized during the
1996 to 2006 period as the gap remained more or less constant. This ﬁnding is in
line with the view that the absence of productive reallocation is underlying low
growth in Latin America following reforms.
After obtaining measures of distortions at the ﬁrm level and examining its im-
plications for aggregate productivity, we related these distortions with regional va-
riation in regulation using a differences-in-differences approach. Selective policy
implementation and enforcement may create implicit or de facto differences in the
business environment faced by small and large ﬁrms. Therefore, we allowed the
coefﬁcients in our econometric model to vary by ﬁrm size. We ﬁnd that difﬁculty in
access to credit results in distortions to capital input for small and medium ﬁrms,
but not for large ﬁrms. In contrast, taxes on gross proﬁts create distortions to out-
put for large ﬁrms, but do not signiﬁcantly affect the output of small and medium
ﬁrms. Hence, the results suggest that regulation results in distortions to output and
capital, but the effects differ by ﬁrm size.
The approach in this chapter to measure distortions and their implications for
aggregate productivity is theoretically a preferable measure of aggregate producti-
vity with ﬁrm-level data (Petrin and Levinsohn, 2008). However, the approach is
not without limitations, because ’non-neoclassical’ features such as markups, ad-
justment costs, returns to scale, and ﬁxed costs are also reﬂected in the gaps. Re-
sults in this chapter therefore await further comparisons to potential TFP gains in
the services sector of other developed and developing countries. In addition, fu-
ture research may address what speciﬁc distortions generate greater dispersion in
marginal products.
Despite liberalization of the services sector in the 1990s, allocative efﬁciency in
Brazilian retailing did not improve. Our results suggest that regulations are posi-66 Chapter 3
tively related to distortions in output and input choice, and may have prevented
improvements in allocative efﬁciency. In particular, our results call for a closer exa-
mination of the differential impact of various regulations on ﬁrms of different sizes
(see also Syverson (2010)).Productivity in a Distorted Market 67
3.A Appendix tables and ﬁgures
Table 3.A.1. Elasticities of substitution by Federal state
Federal UF Pop. Firm GDP Fem. Car s
State dens. pc part.
Acre 12 3.66 1.86 3.91 0.40 14.13 3.37
Alagoas 27 101.46 3.22 2.80 0.39 13.51 3.64
Amazonas 13 1.79 1.38 6.02 0.42 12.40 3.50
Amapá 16 3.34 2.77 5.15 0.42 15.66 3.62
Bahia 29 23.16 3.64 3.76 0.44 15.37 3.82
Ceará 23 51.00 4.99 3.10 0.39 15.56 3.75
Distrito Federal 53 353.53 6.45 21.37 0.54 52.05 7.00
Espírito Santo 32 67.26 5.25 6.86 0.48 31.22 4.78
Goiás 52 14.71 5.60 5.88 0.46 34.37 4.58
Maranhão 21 17.03 2.69 2.19 0.38 7.79 3.16
Minas Gerais 31 30.50 7.13 5.73 0.45 32.98 4.71
Mato Gr. do Sul 50 5.82 5.15 5.81 0.46 33.13 4.46
Mato Grosso 51 2.77 4.84 6.58 0.43 28.24 4.24
Pará 15 4.96 0.49 3.25 0.38 9.93 3.00
Paraíba 25 61.12 3.94 2.94 0.39 17.62 3.66
Pernambuco 26 80.37 3.44 3.59 0.41 18.37 3.81
Piauí 22 11.31 4.01 2.11 0.39 13.74 3.43
Paraná 41 47.99 6.92 7.43 0.48 43.35 5.14
Rio de Janeiro 33 328.59 4.97 9.58 0.45 33.79 5.42
Rio Gr. do Norte 24 52.32 4.06 3.52 0.38 20.33 3.71
Rondônia 11 5.81 0.99 4.45 0.42 19.72 3.51
Roraima 14 1.45 4.32 5.41 0.49 24.90 4.36
Rio Gr. do Sul 43 37.90 9.38 8.35 0.51 45.72 5.65
Santa Catarina 42 56.21 7.22 8.28 0.51 51.73 5.55
Sergipe 28 81.25 3.11 4.20 0.42 17.53 3.86
São Paulo 35 149.22 7.09 11.01 0.48 49.61 5.73
Tocantins 17 4.17 0.66 3.80 0.43 17.25 3.47
Notes: Pop: population per km2 in 2000, Firm dens: retail ﬁrms per 1000 inhabitants, GDP pc: GDP
per capita in 1000 reais in 2006, Fem. part: female labor force participation in 2000, and Car: the share
of households with a car in 2000 from IPEA (www.ipeadata.gov.br). Number of retail ﬁrms per 1000
inhabitants from Pesquisa de Comercio (IBGE, 2006b). The elasticity of substitution s is obtained as
the unweighted average of the normalized values from these variables and allowed to range between
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Figure 3.A.1. Taxes and distortions to output, excluding one state at a time
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Note: solid line shows β-coefficient, while dotted lines are the 95 % confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3.A.2. Diﬃculty in access to credit and distortions to capital, excluding one state
at a time
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Small Retailers in Brazil: Are
Formal Firms Really More
Productive?
4.1 Introduction
The informal (or unregistered) sector accounts for a large share of output and em-
ployment in developing countries (Schneider and Enste, 2000). For Brazil, the
share of the informal sector in total output is estimated at 40 percent in 1999/2000
(Schneider, 2005). Typically, studies ﬁnd that informal ﬁrms are less productive
than formal ﬁrms.1 As a result, a large share of the informal sector in the total eco-
nomy is viewed as having a negative effect on aggregate productivity, and govern-
ment initiatives therefore aim to increase formality. However, these studies usually
compare mean productivities, without adding controls. This chapter aims to contri-
bute to the literature, by controlling for self-selection and a rich set of ﬁrm, industry,
and owner characteristics when examining differences in productivity between for-
mal and informal ﬁrms.
The recent literature takes the difference in productivity between formal and
informal ﬁrms for granted and studies the effectiveness of government initiatives
in increasing formality. For example, the introduction of the SIMPLES program in
Brazil in 1996 lowered taxes and reduced procedures for becoming formal. Mon-
This chapter is based on the paper ’Small Retailers in Brazil: Are Formal Firms Really More Produc-
tive?’ The paper is forthcoming in the Journal of Development Studies.
1See for example McKinsey (1998); Sleuwagen and Goedhuys (2003); and Chapelle and Plane (2005).72 Chapter 4
teiro and Assunção (2007) and Fajnzylber et al. (2007) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in
formal licensing after the introduction of this program. Another government initia-
tive to increase formality was the opening up of the retail sector in the World Trade
Organization 1995 General Agreement on Trade in Services, but also within MER-
COSUL,2 and between the MERCOSUL members and the European Union. Fur-
thermore, the participation of foreign capital in Brazilian retail ﬁrms was freed from
restrictions in the Sixth Constitutional Amendment of 1995 (World Bank, 2004). The
liberalization of the retail sector aimed at the expansion of modern retail chains
through foreign direct investment, which would drive the independent small retai-
lers, which are often informal, out of the market (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002).
However, studies often do not examine whether the productivity differences
between formal and informal ﬁrms are robust to controlling for such characteristics
as the ﬁrm’s age and the owner’s managerial ability. Controlling for ﬁrm and ﬁrm
owner characteristics may be unfeasible if only few ﬁrms are surveyed or the sur-
vey contains little information on ﬁrm characteristics. Yet, if these controls are not
included, it cannot be ruled out that a positive correlation between formality and
productivity is merely spurious. For example, formal ﬁrms might be older than
informal ﬁrms and run by more educated ﬁrm owners, explaining their higher pro-
ductivity performance.
In addition, so far studies of the relation between formality and productivity do
not take into account that formality is a choice of the ﬁrm. That is, there may be self-
selection into the formal sector by more productive ﬁrms who are willing to incur
the cost of registering and paying taxes and as a result beneﬁt from access to formal
credit, access to public goods, the possibility to advertise, and the ability to increase
the customer base by issuing tax receipts (Rauch (1991); Loayza (1996); McKenzie
and Sakho (2009)). This issue of self-selection has its parallel in recent studies of
the relation between exporting and productivity (e.g. van Biesebroeck (2005); Wag-
ner (2007)). Here, the traditional view is that exporters acquire knowledge of new
production methods, inputs, and product designs from their international contacts.
This learning leads to higher productivity for exporters relative to their more insu-
lated domestic counterparts. The alternative view is that the higher productivity
of exporters may simply reﬂect the self-selection of more efﬁcient producers into a
highly competitive export market. Similarly, if ﬁrms self-select into the formal sec-
tor, business registration reforms may result in a higher number of formal ﬁrms but
not necessarily in improvements in productivity. Thus, it is important to examine
2Mercado Comum do Sul, the regional trade block consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uru-
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whether the relation between formality and productivity is positive and signiﬁcant
after controlling for self-selection.
In this chapter, we study whether formal ﬁrms are more efﬁcient than informal
ﬁrms. We aim to control for self-selection and a rich set of ﬁrm, industry, and ﬁrm-
owner characteristics when examining differences in productivity between formal
and informal ﬁrms. Because large retail ﬁrms may beneﬁt from economies of scale
(Doms et al., 2004), we limit attention to retailers with less than ﬁve employees
where scale economies are absent or small at best. For the year 2003, we use a large
and representative data set of 11,000+ small Brazilian retailers, consisting of small
full-service stores (e.g. treillers, which serve pavement trafﬁc and biroscas, which
areretailbusinesseswithinsomeone’shome), smallself-servicestores(convenience
stores), and business at traditional markets (feira livres). Our working deﬁnition of
formality is tax registration, which is the most common indicator of formality in
the literature (Fajnzylber et al., 2009), but we are able to explore alternative deﬁni-
tions as well.3 For this data set, we simultaneously estimate a stochastic production
frontier and an efﬁciency model as in Battese and Coelli (1995).
Our research adds to a nascent literature on the micro-level effects of formality
on ﬁrms. Fajnzylber et al. (2009) examined the effect of credit, training, paying
taxes, and belonging to business associations on the proﬁts of Mexican ﬁrms. Using
propensity score matching to control for the selection bias, they found a positive
effect of formality on proﬁts. McKenzie and Sakho (2009) examined the effect of tax
registration on proﬁtability of Bolivian ﬁrms. Using distance to the tax ofﬁce as an
instrument in a treatment-effects model, they found that registering for taxes has a
positive effect on business proﬁts. These ﬁndings suggest that registering for taxes
results in proﬁt gains. A related question is whether acquiring a formal status will
increase a ﬁrm’s productivity. It is productivity growth, rather than proﬁt making,
which is of interest to policymakers.
This chapter ﬁnds that formal ﬁrms are indeed more productive. When we do
not control for self-selection and ﬁrm characteristics, we ﬁnd large differences in
productivity between formal and informal retailers, consistent with previous stu-
dies (e.g. Chapelle and Plane (2005)). Following de Paula and Scheinkman (2007),
wecontrolforself-selectionbyusingaproxyforthedegreeofvalue-addedtaxcom-
pliance among the ﬁrm’s suppliers and buyers. Value-added taxes transmit forma-
lity, becausepurchasesfrominformalﬁrmsareineligiblefortaxcredits. Thus, value
added taxes create an incentive for propagation of formality upstream or downs-
3Typically, the formality of a ﬁrm is a matter of degree. We take this into account in our empirical
analysis by exploring the productivity gains for different deﬁnitions (degrees) of formality.74 Chapter 4
tream in the production chain. After controlling for self-selection and a large set
of ﬁrm, location, and ﬁrm-owner characteristics, we ﬁnd that the relation between
formality and productivity is still positive and signiﬁcant.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2, we docu-
ment thepoor productivityperformance of theretail sectorin Brazil anddiscuss the
potential role of the informal sector. Next, section 4.3 presents the data set. Stochas-
tic frontier analysis, which is used to examine differences in productivity between
formal and informal retailers, is described in section 4.4. Results are discussed in
section 4.5. Finally, conclusions are presented in section 4.6.
4.2 The Productivity Performance of the Retail Sector
in Brazil
The Pesquisa Anual de Comércio (PAC), the annual survey of wholesale and retail
trade ﬁrms, estimates that approximately 1.1 million retail trade ﬁrms are active in
Brazil in 2003 (IBGE, 2003). For that year, the employment and value added share
of retailing in the total economy was respectively about 11 percent and 5 percent
(IBGE, 2004a). Therefore, the retail sector accounts for a large share of the Brazilian
economy.
Figure 4.1 shows labor productivity (value added/employment) of the agricul-
tural, manufacturing, and the wholesale and retail trade sector relative to the ave-
rage productivity of the Brazilian economy during the 1985-2004 period.4 The re-
lative levels conﬁrm the general pattern that on average the agricultural sector is
least productive, the manufacturing sector most productive, and services are so-
mewhere in between. Disturbing, however, is the trend in the wholesale and retail
trade sector. During 1985-2004, the relative productivity level is falling, which im-
plies that productivity growth in this sector is below productivity growth of the
total economy. The productivity performance of the retail sector in Brazil differs
from that in OECD countries during the past decades. For a similar period, Inklaar
et al. (2008) show that productivity growth in the retail sector of OECD countries
was above total economy productivity growth. At least three (interrelated) reasons
might underlie the poor productivity performance of the retail sector.
First is the limited role of reallocation dynamics relative to within-ﬁrm pro-
ductivity growth in Brazil’s retail sector. During the period 1996-2004, Chapter 2
4The sectoral dataset presented in Timmer and de Vries (2009) does not allow us to separate wholesale
trade from retail trade.Formal and Informal Retailers 75
Figure 4.1. Sectoral productivity relative to the total economy
Data
Source: Timmer and de Vries (2009).
found little evidence for a reallocation of productive inputs and outputs. Typically,
new establishments from retail chains did not replace low-productive independent
stores. Instead, large chains acquired other (smaller sized) chains. This contributed
to a deepening of the dual structure in which low-productive independent stores
continued to coexist with a declining number of retail chains.
A second reason is that retailers have been slow to adopt Information and Com-
munication Technologies (ICT) (McKinsey, 1998). The potential to improve busi-
ness performance by investing in ICT was initially largely foregone, because Brazil
was closed to foreign hardware and software until 1992 (Luzio and Greenstein,
1995). Also, hyperinﬂation during the mid 1980s until 1994 distorted relative factor
prices. ICT investment prices were high relative to labor costs, inducing retailers
to hire extra workers instead of automating processes. Furthermore, the beneﬁts
of ICT adoption (and hence the ICT investments undertaken) are higher for large
ﬁrms, such as retail chains (Doms et al., 2004). Thus, the large share of small ﬁrms
in the total number of ﬁrms (IBGE, 2004a) may result in low ICT adoption.
Finally, a third reason may be the large presence of informal ﬁrms. If informal
ﬁrms are less productive than formal ﬁrms, the large share of the informal sector in
theretailsectorhasanegativeeffectonaggregateproductivity. Inaddition, because
informal ﬁrms do not expand their business in order to remain undetected by the
government, the relatively large presence of informal ﬁrms in the retail sector is76 Chapter 4
related with lower growth (McKinsey, 2004).5
In the remainder of this chapter we examine productivity differences between
formal and informal retailers. Our ﬁndings shed light on the implications of infor-
mal ﬁrms for the aggregate productivity level and growth rate of the retail sector.
Before turning to the empirical analysis, we ﬁrst describe the data and method.
4.3 Small Formal and Informal Retailers in Brazil: The
Data
The data set we use is the 2003 survey of small urban ﬁrms (Pesquisa de Econo-
mia Informal Urbana, ECINF), collected by the Statistical Ofﬁce of Brazil (IBGE)
in October 2003. The survey, which is the result of interviews by trained intervie-
wers, is representative of the urban own-account workers and ﬁrms with at most
ﬁve workers. Large retail ﬁrms may beneﬁt from economies of scale (Doms et al.,
2004), in particular with respect to the costs involved in setting up distribution cen-
ters and using ICT to keep track of inventories. Therefore, we focus on retail ﬁrms
with less than ﬁve workers (and with ﬁrm owners at least 15 years old) where scale
economies are absent or small at best. The dataset includes detailed individual in-
formation on the ﬁrm owner, the employees, and the (possible) family members
working in the ﬁrm. In this chapter we follow the set up of the survey and de-
ﬁne the total number of workers in the ﬁrm as the sum of employees and family
members.
The survey is set up as follows. In preliminary interviews before the survey,
households are screened for the presence of one or more entrepreneurs with a bu-
siness employing ﬁve or less people based on the 2000 demographic census. Hou-
seholds without such entrepreneurs are excluded from the sample frame of the
survey. The sampling is designed in two stages. First, in each Federal state, ur-
ban sectors are stratiﬁed geographically in three strata (capital, other urban sectors
in the capital metropolitan area, and remaining urban sectors). Second, the urban
sectors are stratiﬁed according to income levels within the geographical stratum.
Urban sectors are randomly selected, with the probability proportional to the num-
ber of households in the urban sectors. From each selected urban sector a total of
16 households are randomly selected for interviews.6 In total, the survey includes
5In our representative data set of small ﬁrms in Brazil, most informal ﬁrms are in the retail sector (about
25 percent). See also (McKinsey, 1998).
6See IBGE (2006a) for more information on the sampling strategy.Formal and Informal Retailers 77
11,158 retailers.
The data set allows us to examine the degree of formality in various ways. The
information provided by the surveyed ﬁrms is conﬁdential and only utilized for
statistical purposes, so we may assume that individuals truthfully report about li-
censes and tax compliance.7 In order to formalize, a ﬁrm has to undertake several
steps (see appendix table 4.A.1), and many ﬁrms do not complete all steps. There-
fore, 27 percent of the ﬁrms in our sample have a municipal license, 19 percent are
registered for taxes, 18 percent are registered as a micro-enterprise, and 15 percent
actually ﬁll in tax declarations.8
The variables employed in this chapter are described in appendix 4.A with sum-
mary statistics in table 4.1 distinguishing between formal and informal ﬁrms. A
non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used to examine whether the distribu-
tions of the variables signiﬁcantly differ between formal and informal ﬁrms.9 All
distributions differ signiﬁcantly at the 5 percent level.
On average, formal ﬁrms are larger. For example the average number of wor-
kers per ﬁrm (including the ﬁrm owner) is 2.65 for formal retailers and 1.28 for in-
formal retailers. Formal ﬁrms are older (8.88 years versus 6.63 for informal ﬁrms),
although the average age for both types is relatively high. The high average age
shows the ability of most retailers to survive, often by means of locating close to
consumers, offering the product assortment that their customers demand, provi-
ding a ’personal touch’, and offering special services such as selling on credit (Booz-
Allen Hamilton, 2003).
Both age and (labor) productivity are signiﬁcantly higher for formal ﬁrms. This
observation is consistent with models of ﬁrm dynamics (e.g. Jovanovic (1982)),
where (more) efﬁcient ﬁrms grow and survive over time, while inefﬁcient ﬁrms
stagnate and fail. However, it remains to be seen whether formal ﬁrms are more
productive if we control for a set of characteristics. For example, table 4.1 shows
7On the questionnaire, a disclaimer states the information is conﬁdential and protected by law.
8Registering for taxes is step 4, whereas obtaining a municipal license is step 6. Therefore, it is surpri-
sing that the share of ﬁrms with a municipal license is larger than that for tax registration. This might be
the result of greater interaction with municipal ofﬁcials or stronger enforcement at the municipal level
(McKenzie and Sakho, 2009). Alternatively, except for municipal licensing, the answers on licenses and
tax compliance depend upon the answer to an ambiguous question on the legal constitution. In appen-
dix 4.B we show that formality positively affects productivity across the different deﬁnitions. We prefer
to focus on tax registration in the main text, because it is one of the ﬁrst steps towards formalizing a
business. Firms that report they have a municipal license but are not registered for taxes are excluded.
The main results are similar if these ﬁrms are not excluded.
9IntheWilcoxonrank-sumtest, thevaluesofthevariablesforformalandinformalﬁrmsarepooledand
jointly ranked. The test-statistic is the sum of the ranks for the formal retailers. Wilcoxon (1945) shows
that the sum of the ranks is normally distributed, and gives formulas for the mean and variance of the
sum of the ranks under the null hypothesis that the two samples are drawn from identical distributions.78 Chapter 4
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics
Informal ﬁrms Formal ﬁrms
(without tax (with tax
registration) registration)
Production variables
Sales 1502.51 9356.32
Value added 360.21 1877.01
Capital 2407.61 27016.41
Hours worked 267.99 660.67
Total employment (including owner) 1.28 2.65
Labor productivity
Value added/Hours worked 3.33 3.83
Owner characteristics
Education owner 3.88 5.22**
Owner has second job 0.11 0.09
Motivation to start a business 0.4 0.14
Firm characteristics
ICT 0.03 0.31
Age ﬁrm 6.63 8.88
Credit granted in the last three months 0.08 0.17
Credit granted was a bank loan 0.04 0.13
Participation in a guild 0.03 0.27
Technical assistance provided by others 0.01 0.1
Technical assistance provided by the
government 0.01 0.02
Observations 9011 2147
Notes: Mean values are shown. Sales, value added, and capital are in current prices in Reais. Tax registry is the
Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas Jurídicas in the 2003 survey. Education is a categorical value: 1=no education;
2=reads and writes; 3=some primary education; 4=graduated primary school; 5=some secondary education;
6=graduated secondary school; 7=some college education; 8=graduated college. See appendix 4.A for a des-
cription of the variables. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used to examine whether differences between formal
and informal ﬁrms are signiﬁcant. All variables signiﬁcantly differ at the 1 percent level, except for ** at the 5
percent level. Source: Economia Informal Urbana 2003.
that formal ﬁrm owners are higher educated and make more intensive use of ICT
and credit, which might explain their higher productivity. In the next sections we
therefore outline an econometric approach and test whether formal ﬁrms are more
productive once we control for self-selection, and ﬁrm, industry, and ﬁrm owner
characteristics.
The reason for starting a business differs markedly across formal and informal
retailers. Table 4.2 shows that individuals who started a business to escape from
unemployment more frequently own informal (40 percent) than formal ﬁrms (14
percent). In addition, a larger share of informal (24 percent) than formal ﬁrm ow-
ners (12 percent) report they started a business to complement their family’s in-
come. In contrast, it is more common that formal ﬁrm owners started their busi-Formal and Informal Retailers 79
ness to be independent (26 percent for formal ﬁrms versus 15 percent for informal
ﬁrms) or that they saw it as a proﬁtable business opportunity (5.3 percent for formal
ﬁrms versus 0.5 percent for informal ﬁrms). Not being able to ﬁnd a job provides,
besides the educational level, an additional signal of the managerial ability of the
ﬁrm owner, which we will exploit in our efﬁciency analysis.
On the location of the business, table 4.2 shows important differences between
formal and informal ﬁrms as well. Although the share of ﬁrms that have their busi-
ness at home (biroscas) does not differ much, the share of formal ﬁrms with a store
is much larger (73 percent for formal ﬁrms versus 15 percent for informal ﬁrms).
Indeed, many informal ﬁrms do not have a ﬁxed location. For example, about 27
percent of the informal retailers in our sample report that their business takes place
along the road or in a public area (treillers). Not having a ﬁxed location may affect
the reported capital stock and therefore the production function estimates. We ad-
dress this issue in detail in appendix 4.B, and ﬁnd that the productivity differences
between formal and informal ﬁrms are robust to adjustments for the inaccurate
reporting of capital.
4.4 Stochastic Frontier Analysis
In frontier analysis, a production frontier for formal and informal retailers is deﬁ-
ned as the maximum possible output given a certain combination of inputs. Efﬁ-
ciency is measured as the distance to the frontier. In this study we will use frontier
analysis to compare the efﬁciency levels of formal and informal ﬁrms.
The production frontier can be obtained deterministically using data envelop-
ment analysis (DEA), which usually neglects possible measurement error. Alterna-
tively, the frontier can be estimated using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), which
allows for measurement error (Coelli et al., 2005).10 Given that our sample of small
retailers in a developing country is sensitive to measurement error, SFA is the pre-
ferable approach. Another advantage is that SFA allows estimating the stochastic
frontier and the efﬁciency model simultaneously.11 Consider the stochastic frontier
10Stochastic frontier analysis has been applied frequently in efﬁciency analysis of the manufacturing
sector. See, for example, Lundvall and Battese (2000) for Kenyan manufacturing ﬁrms, Hossain and Ka-
runaratne (2004) for manufacturing industries in Bangladesh, Oczkowski and Sharma (2005) for Nepa-
lese manufacturing ﬁrms, and Chapelle and Plane (2005) for the manufacturing sector in Côte d’Ivoire.
11A two-stage approach assumes that efﬁciency effects are identically distributed in the ﬁrst stage. Ho-
wever, in the second stage a model is speciﬁed for predicted efﬁciency effects, which contradicts the
assumption of identically distributed efﬁciency effects in the ﬁrst stage. Therefore, estimating the fron-
tier and efﬁciency model simultaneously is preferred.80 Chapter 4
Table 4.2. Characteristics of formal and informal retailers
Percentage of Percentage of
informal ﬁrms formal ﬁrms
(without tax (with tax
registration) registration)
Main reason to start a ﬁrm
Did not ﬁnd a job 39.9 14.4
Proﬁtable business 0.5 5.3
Flexible hours 2 0.8
Be independent 15.2 26.2
Family tradition 5.2 14.3
To help family income 24.2 11.6
Accumulated experience 2.8 9.9
Make a good deal 6.6 12.1
As a secondary job 1 2.1
Other 2.5 3.4
The business takes place
At home 27.8 21.7
Store or ofﬁce 15.2 73.2
At home of client(s) or place
decided upon by him 24.8 2.4
From a vehicle 1.9 0.7
Along the road or in a public area 26.9 1.2
Other 3.5 0.8
Source: Economia Informal Urbana 2003.
production function (Battese and Coelli, 1995):
Yi = exp
 
b0Xi + vi   ui

, (4.1)
whereY istheoutputofﬁrmi, X isa(k*1)vectorofinputs, and b isa(k*1)vector
of unknown parameters to be estimated. Random error vi is assumed independent
and identically distributed, with vi s N(0,s2
v), and ui is a non-negative random
variable, which is assumed to be independently distributed.
The term ui is an estimate of the technical efﬁciency of a ﬁrm.12 It is measured
as the ratio of the observed output to the corresponding potential output as given
12The economic efﬁciency (productivity) of a ﬁrm consists of technical and allocative efﬁciency. The
latter reﬂects the ability of a ﬁrm to use inputs in optimal proportions given their prices and the produc-
tion technology. Price information is unavailable, so allocative efﬁciency cannot be estimated. Following
standard practice, we drop allocative efﬁciency from the analysis by assuming that the ratios of the elas-
ticities of inputs to the total elasticity are equal to the expenditure shares of the inputs (Kumbhakar and
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by the frontier. Therefore, efﬁciency ranges from 0 (fully inefﬁcient) to 1 (fully efﬁ-
cient). Technical efﬁciency, ui, in equation 4.1 is speciﬁed as:
ui = d0zi + wi. (4.2)
The random variable wi is deﬁned by the truncation of the normal distribution
with zero mean and variance s2, such that the point of truncation is  dzi, that is
wi   dzi. Hence, ui is obtained by truncation at zero of the normal distribution,
with mean dzi and variance s2. The (m*1) vector zi includes ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables,
and d is a (m*1) vector of unknown coefﬁcients of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc inefﬁciency va-
riables. The prediction of technical efﬁciency (TE) in production for ﬁrm i is based
on its conditional expectation given the assumptions of the model, and deﬁned as:
TEi = exp( ui) = exp( dzi   wi). (4.3)
We estimate the parameters of the stochastic frontier and the efﬁciency model
simultaneously using the method of maximum likelihood. The likelihood function
and the partial derivatives with respect to the model parameters are described in
Battese and Coelli (1993). To estimate the production frontier, we specify a translog
functional form:13
lnYi = b0 + b1 lnKi +
1
2
b2 lnK2
i + b3 ln Hi (4.4)
+
1
2
b4 ln H2
i + b5 lnKi.ln Hi
+industrydummies + vi   ui.
Y, K, and H denote value added, capital, and hours worked respectively. Since
technology and market conditions may vary over retail industries, we include in-
dustry dummy variables (which act as intercept dummies) in the production func-
13We specify a translog functional form because it is more ﬂexible than a Cobb Douglas form and there-
fore allows for scale effects. A Cobb Douglas form is ﬁrst-order ﬂexible (that is, it has enough parameters
to provide a ﬁrst-order differential approximation), whereas a translog form is second-order ﬂexible. In-
creased ﬂexibility requires more parameters to estimate, which may give rise to multicollinearity. We
examine the robustness of our results to the choice of the functional form in appendix 4.B.82 Chapter 4
tion in order to control for it.14
Technical efﬁciency, ui, in equation 4.4 is estimated simultaneously, and related
to formality, where we control for ﬁrm and ﬁrm-owner characteristics:
ui = d0 + d1x1i + d2x2i + d3x3i + d4x4i (4.5)
+d5x5i + d6x6i + d7x7i + d8x8i
+d9x9i + d10x10i + d11x11i + d12x12i + wi.
Where:15
 x1: represents one of the four indicators of formality;
 x2: represents a dummy indicating whether the ﬁrm uses credit;
 x3: represents a dummy indicating whether the credit was obtained through
a bank loan;
 x4: represents a dummy indicating whether the ﬁrm participates in a guild;
 x5: represents a dummy indicating whether the ﬁrm uses ICT;
 x6: represents the age of the ﬁrm in years;
 x7: represents the age of the ﬁrm squared;
 x8: represents a dummy indicating whether the ﬁrm receives technical assis-
tance;
 x9: represents a dummy indicating whether the technical assistance is provi-
ded by the government;
 x10: represents a categorical value for the education of the owner;
 x11: represents a dummy indicating whether the ﬁrm owner started his busi-
ness because he/she could not ﬁnd a job;
 x12: represents a dummy indicating whether the ﬁrm owner has a second job;
14See appendix 4.A for the industries distinguished, and appendix 4.B for estimations of the model for
various sub-industries.
15See appendix 4.A for a detailed description of the variables.Formal and Informal Retailers 83
In the setup of our model, the results from the variables included in equation 4.5
reﬂect correlations with efﬁciency. Since formality may be the choice of a ﬁrm, we
instrument formality to examine the effect of formality on efﬁciency. As instrument
we consider the degree of tax compliance across Federal states. Our instrument is
motivated by the suggestion that value added taxes transmit formality (de Paula
and Scheinkman, 2007). That is, the formality of a ﬁrm appears to be positively
correlated with the formality of ﬁrms from which it buys and sells. Ideally we use
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information on the formality of the ﬁrm’s supply chain. However, in-
formation on the formality of suppliers and customers is only available at a higher
level. Therefore, we expect the average degree of tax compliance in a state to be po-
sitively related with the choice of being formal for individual retailers.16 The probit
model we estimate is:
x1is = g1taxcompliances + eis, (4.6)
The construction of the variable tax compliance is described in Appendix 4.A.
Subscript s refers to the Federal state. Predicted values of formality from equation
4.6 are used in equation 4.5 to examine the effect of formality on efﬁciency, which
may control for the selection bias.17
4.5 Determinants of Efﬁciency
Results from estimating equation 4.6 are presented in Table 4.3. The degree of tax
compliance is positively related with the indicators of formality. However, the
strength of the relationship varies across the indicators.18 The relation is stron-
gest for ﬁrms that actually ﬁll in tax forms (column 4). This is consistent with the
idea that tax compliance is a more binding constraint, and therefore a better ins-
trument, for ﬁrms that actually pay taxes. We substitute the predicted values for
each indicator of formality in equation 4.5. Since four indicators for the degree of
formalization are considered, there are four different model speciﬁcations.
16Results are similar if we include ﬁrm controls in equation 4.6.
17In appendix 4.B we consider the average educational level as an alternative instrument. The average
educational level might be considered a proxy for the degree of formality in the ﬁrm’s supply chains,
because higher human capital ﬁrm owners are more likely to own a formal ﬁrm (see table 4.1). We ﬁnd
similar results if the average educational level in a state is used to instrument formality.
18The number of correct predictions from the probit model varies from 73 percent for municipal license
to 85 percent for ﬁlled in tax forms.84 Chapter 4
Table 4.3. Probit estimates
Variable Tax Municipal Micro- Filled in
registration license ﬁrm tax
registration forms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -1.382 -1.148 -1.398 -1.702
(5.82)*** (5.73)*** (5.88)*** (8.07)***
Tax compliance 5.509 5.738 5.109 7.163
(2.01)** (2.48)** (1.86)* (2.98)***
Observations 11158 11158 11158 11158
Pseudo-R2 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.008
c2 4.06** 6.13** 3.46* 8.91***
Correct predications
(percentage share)
80.76 73.06 82.18 84.88
Notes: b-coefﬁcients are shown, and below the absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. * signiﬁ-
cant at 10 percent level of signiﬁcance, ** signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, *** signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.
Robust standard errors are clustered by Federal state.
Estimation results from simultaneously estimating equation 4.4 and equation
4.5 are shown in Table 4.4.19 The upper part displays the parameters from the pro-
duction frontier, whereas the lower part shows the effects of formality and other
variables on efﬁciency. The majority of the production frontier parameter estimates
are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level of signiﬁcance. The statistical insigniﬁcance of
some coefﬁcients is typical of translog functions were high multicollinearity is com-
mon among the inputs (e.g. Lundvall and Battese (2000); Oczkowski and Sharma
(2005)). The elasticities of capital and hours worked are obtained by taking the
ﬁrst-order derivative of the translog functional form (see equation 4.4) with respect
to capital and labor. The sum of the elasticity of capital (0.238) and hours worked
(0.258) indicates decreasing returns to scale (0.496). The b-estimates in the other
models are similar, indicating decreasing returns to scale as well. Thus, our ﬁn-
dings suggest that small retailers are unlikely to beneﬁt from economies of scale.
19In the model speciﬁcation in column (2) of table 4.4, we were forced to exclude the age of the ﬁrm
and whether the owner has a second job before the model converged. We performed various tests for
the parameters of the frontier and efﬁciency models. First, we tested whether the additional parameters
of the translog functional form are signiﬁcantly different from zero. The test indicates that a translog
speciﬁcation ﬁts the data better than a Cobb-Douglas at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level. Second, we
tested whether the inefﬁciency effects are not a function of the explanatory variables in equation 4.5.
The joint effect of the explanatory variables is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Thus, it appears that
a stochastic frontier model with inefﬁciency effects is the appropriate choice. However, g  s2
u/s2 is
low, which suggests that much of the variation in the composite error term is due to the random error
component. In appendix 4.B we study the heterogeneity of the sample in more detail. Estimating the
model using sales instead of value added, and for sub-industries separately, increases the variance in
the error term due to the inefﬁciency component. The ﬁndings across the different models, however, are
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From the model speciﬁcation in column 1 of table 4.4 we predict technical ef-
ﬁciency for each retailer.20 The mean efﬁciency is 0.28, which is low and implies
that ﬁrms can achieve substantially higher productivity levels if they use produc-
tion factors more efﬁciently. However, formal retailers (0.38) are more efﬁcient than
informal retailers (0.23), and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows that the distributions
are signiﬁcantly different at the 1 percent level.
20Efﬁciency results for the other models are similar.86 Chapter 4
Table 4.4. Stochastic frontier and eﬃciency model
Variable b SE b SE
(1) (2)
Production frontier
ln Capital 0.240 (19.76)*** 0.253 (21.13)***
ln Capital2 0.000 (0.07) 0.002 (0.72)
ln Hours worked 0.287 (4.60)*** 0.303 (5.03)***
ln Hours worked2 0.064 (7.28)*** 0.066 (7.67)***
ln Capital  ln Hours worked 0.013 (1.68)* 0.012 (1.62)
Sector dummies Yes Yes
Efﬁciency model
Tax registration (CNPJ)a -3.852 (7.11)*** - -
Municipal licensea - - -3.346 (7.19)***
Microﬁrm registrationa - - - -
Filled tax forma - - - -
Credit -0.109 (1.47) -0.126 (1.46)
Credit was bank loan -0.116 (1.27) -0.144 (1.33)
Participation in guild -0.269 (5.26)*** -0.391 (4.68)***
ICT -0.370 (6.97)*** -0.562 (2.59)***
Age of the ﬁrm -0.016 (4.44)*** - -
Age of the ﬁrm2 0.000 (2.59)*** - -
Technical assistance elsewhere -0.233 (3.00)*** -0.260 (2.38)**
Technical assistance gov. -0.086 (0.47) -0.288 (1.07)
Education owner -0.104 (11.53)*** -0.099 (9.78)***
Motivation 0.129 (4.15)*** 0.117 (3.46)***
Owner has second job 0.160 (3.27)*** - -
s2 0.882 0.892
g 0.029 0.029
Observations 4740 4826Formal and Informal Retailers 87
Variable b SE b SE
(3) (4)
Production frontier
ln Capital 0.240 (19.76)*** 0.240 (19.77)***
ln Capital2 0.000 (0.07) 0.000 (0.08)
ln Hours worked 0.287 (4.60)*** 0.287 (4.60)***
ln Hours worked2 0.064 (7.28)*** 0.064 (7.27)***
ln Capital  ln Hours worked 0.013 (1.68)* 0.013 (1.68)*
Sector dummies Yes Yes
Efﬁciency model
Tax registration (CNPJ)a - - - -
Municipal licensea - - - -
Microﬁrm registrationa -4.355 (7.10)*** - -
Filled tax forma - - -3.411 (7.04)***
Credit -0.109 (1.47) -0.109 (1.47)
Credit was bank loan -0.116 (1.27) -0.117 (1.27)
Participation in guild -0.269 (5.26)*** -0.269 (5.27)***
ICT -0.370 (6.97)*** -0.370 (6.96)***
Age of the ﬁrm -0.016 (4.44)*** -0.016 (4.44)***
Age of the ﬁrm2 0.000 (2.59)*** 0.000 (2.59)***
Technical assistance elsewhere -0.233 (3.00)*** -0.233 (3.00)***
Technical assistance gov. -0.087 (0.47) -0.085 (0.47)
Education owner -0.104 (11.53)*** -0.104 (11.53)***
Motivation 0.129 (4.15)*** 0.129 (4.16)***
Owner has second job 0.160 (3.27)*** 0.160 (3.28)***
s2 0.882 0.882
g 0.029 0.030
Observations 4740 4740
Constants not shown. The output and input variables in the production frontier are rescaled to have
unit means. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent level of signiﬁ-
cance, ** signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, *** signiﬁcant at 1 percent level. s2  s2
u + s2
v and g  s2
u/s2.
a Predicted values from equation 4.6 are used for tax registration, municipal license, micro-ﬁrm regis-
tration, and ﬁlled in tax form.
Forcomparison, weestimatedthefrontierandefﬁciencymodelwithoutcontrols
as well. For this ’naive’ speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd a larger difference in efﬁciency levels
between formal and informal retailers. The difference in mean efﬁciency is 0.24 in
the model without controls, which compares favorably with the difference of 0.1588 Chapter 4
in the model with controls. Therefore, formal ﬁrms are more productive, although
the difference is smaller if such factors as selection bias and the educational level of
the ﬁrm owner are taken into account.
The coefﬁcients of the explanatory variables in the inefﬁciency model (equation
4.5) are of interest as well. In this model, a negative coefﬁcient indicates that a hi-
gher value of the explanatory variable is associated with more efﬁciency (or less
inefﬁciency). Below, we examine the sign and signiﬁcance of the explanatory va-
riables.
Formality, which is instrumented, is signiﬁcant and has a positive effect on ef-
ﬁciency. This result is robust to controlling for some of the beneﬁts of formality
(such as obtaining bank loans), and by controlling for other ﬁrm and owner cha-
racteristics. Efﬁciency gains from registering may arise because of access to public
goods (such as the judicial system), and the ability to increase the customer base by
advertising and issuing tax receipts (Rauch (1991); Loayza (1996); McKenzie and
Sakho (2009)).
The coefﬁcient for education indicates a positive correlation between manage-
rial ability and efﬁciency. The negative relation between efﬁciency and ﬁrm owners
who could not ﬁnd a job and therefore started the business indicates an additional
channel of managerial ability. Firms for which the owner has a second job are less
efﬁcient. This result may arise, because owners who operate a business as an addi-
tional source of income have fewer incentives to operate their business as efﬁciently
as those for which the business is their primary source of income. ICT is positively
related with efﬁciency, which is consistent with studies of the relationship between
ICT and productivity for the retail sector in developed countries (e.g. Broersma
et al. (2003); Doms et al. (2004)).
The age of a ﬁrm is signiﬁcantly related with higher efﬁciency, and we ﬁnd sup-
port of diminishing returns to learning by doing. Previous studies show mixed
results on the age-efﬁciency nexus. Lundvall and Battese (2000) review the litera-
ture and show that ﬁndings on the age-efﬁciency relationship are negative, posi-
tive, or non-existent across studies. The results in this chapter suggest a positive
age-efﬁciency relationship for small retailers. Credit granted over the last three
months is correlated with higher efﬁciency, but the relation is not signiﬁcant. Whe-
ther credit is obtained from a bank does not have an additional positive effect on
efﬁciency. Informal ﬁrms can obtain credit via various channels, for instance from
friends, relatives, or from other ﬁrms. Apparently, the channel for obtaining credit
does not matter much for efﬁciency. However, the interest rate may vary across theFormal and Informal Retailers 89
different credit channels, thereby affecting proﬁts, which we are unable to examine
further in this chapter. Participation in a trade association is associated with higher
efﬁciency, perhaps because of the exchange of information on successful business
practice.
Finally, although only a limited number of ﬁrms in our sample received tech-
nical assistance (about 4 percent), we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive relation between
technical assistance and technical efﬁciency. However, whether the government
provides technical assistance does not appear to exert an additional inﬂuence on
efﬁciency. Hence, the channel for providing technical assistance does not appear to
matter for technical efﬁciency.
We examined the robustness of our results (see appendix 4.B for details). The
productivity difference between formal and informal ﬁrms appears robust to dif-
ferent speciﬁcations and adjustments for the inaccurate reporting of capital. Howe-
ver, the signiﬁcance of several inefﬁciency effects varies across the models speciﬁed
in the robustness analysis. In particular, credit is positively related with efﬁciency
in regressions where we adjust for the inaccurate reporting of capital by ﬁrm ow-
ners. Also, in some speciﬁcations we ﬁnd limited evidence for learning by doing
with diminishing returns. Thus, results related to credit and the age of ﬁrms in the
efﬁciency model appear not robust which may be due to the limited use of credit
by small retailers and the high average age.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter examined whether small formal retailers are more productive than
their informal counterparts. We simultaneously estimated a stochastic production
frontier and an efﬁciency model. We ﬁnd that the efﬁciency of ﬁrms is positively re-
lated with ICT adoption, managerial ability, technical assistance, and participation
in a guild. Efﬁciency is negatively related with ﬁrm owners having a second job.
The difference in efﬁciency levels between formal and informal retailers is large in
a ’naive’ speciﬁcation without controls for selection bias and our set of characteris-
tics. However, if we control for selection bias and ﬁrm, industry, and ﬁrm-owner
characteristics, our ﬁndings still indicate that formal retailers are more efﬁcient,
although the difference is smaller. Hence, our results suggest that business regis-
tration reforms, which positively affect the decision of ﬁrms to formalize (e.g. the
SIMPLES program in Brazil, see Monteiro and Assunção (2007); Fajnzylber et al.
(2007)), will increase productivity growth.90 Chapter 4
In the literature, it is suggested that productivity gains after registration may
arise from access to public goods, the ability to advertise, and the ability to issue
tax receipts. Public goods provision includes protection for formal ﬁrms by the
police and judicial courts. For example, contracts related to formal activities can be
enforced through the judicial system, which increases their value and usefulness.
The ability to sign contracts enforceable through the courts creates certainty and
reduces the transaction and monitoring costs in business dealings conducted by
formal ﬁrms. In turn, this increases investment that may come both from internal
sources (retained earnings) and from capital markets (Loayza, 1996). Also, formal
ﬁrms do not face obstacles in using public services such as social welfare, skill-
training programs, and government-sponsored credit facilities. Furthermore, the
ability to advertise and issue tax receipts by formal ﬁrms may increase the customer
base by raising awareness of the business, and permitting clients to use the tax
receipts for claims or tax refunds (McKenzie and Sakho, 2009).
The analysis in this chapter indicates that formal retailers are more produc-
tive, even after controlling for self-selection. Hence, the ﬁndings support the view
that registration results in productivity gains. However, the instrument we use
to control for selection bias has its limitations. As instrument we used the average
degree of tax compliance across Federal states, motivated by the suggestion that va-
lue added taxes transmit formality (de Paula and Scheinkman, 2007). Ideally, ﬁrm-
speciﬁc information on the formality of the ﬁrm’s supply chain should be used, and
other instruments may be considered as well in future research. For example, follo-
wing McKenzie and Sakho (2009) it may be argued that distance from the tax ofﬁce
affects the information a ﬁrm has about registration, but does not independently
affect productivity. Therefore, if available, a GPS-measured distance of a ﬁrm from
the tax ofﬁce can be considered as an instrument for whether or not a ﬁrm is regis-
tered for taxes. Extending the set of ﬁrm characteristics in this direction seems to be
a promising avenue for future research into the differences in productivity between
formal and informal ﬁrms.Formal and Informal Retailers 91
4.A Description of the Variables in the Dataset
Variables
Production variables:
 Sales: total nominal revenues (in Reais) in October 2003.
 Value added: nominal revenues minus cost of goods sold and intermediate
inputs (in Reais) in October 2003.
 Capital: the nominal value of ﬁxed assets (building(s), installations, equip-
ment, vehicles et cetera, in Reais).
 Employment: total number of workers, including the owner, employees, and
(possible) family workers.
 Hours worked: total number of hours worked in October 2003, including hours
worked by the owner, employees, and (possible) family workers.
Efﬁciency variables (+ (-) indicates whether the expected relation with efﬁciency is
positive (negative)):
 Formality: tax registration, which is the fourth step towards formalization (see
appendix table 4.A.1). Other indicators of (the degree of) formality include a
municipal license, micro-ﬁrm registration, and ﬁlled in tax forms. + Because
of access to public goods, and the possibility to increase the customer base by
means of advertising and issuing tax receipts.
 Education: educational level of the owner, which is a categorical value ranging
from no education (education = 1) to graduated from college (education = 8).
+ A proxy of managerial ability.
 Motivation to start a business: dummy which equals one if the owner states that
he/she started the business because he/she could not ﬁnd a job. - Reﬂecting
necessity and not managerial ability.
 Owner has a second job: dummy for owners with a second job. - Business might
be treated as a secondary source of income.
 ICT: dummy which equals one if at least one computer is used by the ﬁrm. +
ICT enables the owner to improve its business performance.92 Chapter 4
 Age ﬁrm: age of the ﬁrm in years. Age firm2: square of Age ﬁrm. + , - The
efﬁciency is positively related with the age of the ﬁrm due to a process of
learning by doing, but with diminishing returns.
 Credit: dummy variable, indicating whether the ﬁrm used credit in the last
three months. + Lenders select credit worthy borrowers, and borrowers im-
prove business performance in order to be able to repay the debt.
 Bank loan: indicates whether the bank provided the credit (as opposed to
friends, relatives, or other ﬁrms). + A beneﬁt of being formal.
 Guild: dummy for ﬁrms afﬁliated to a guild. + A beneﬁt of being formal.
Instruments for formality:
 Tax Compliance: Volume of revenues by state from SMEs that paid federal
taxes in 2003 under the simpliﬁed tax system, normalized by the total number
of SMEs in each state (Masci et al., 2007).
 Educational level: Average number of years of education for those above 25
years old by state (IBGE, available at www.ibge.gov.br).
Industry dummy variables (sectors of activity):
 SEC1: Retailing of agricultural products.
 SEC2: Retailing of food, beverages and tobacco.
 SEC3: Retailing of textile materials.
 SEC4: Retailing of clothing, footwear and complementary goods.
 SEC5: Retailing of wood, construction material, hardware and tools.
 SEC6: Retailing of electronic household articles, furniture, and other house-
hold articles.
 SEC7: Retailing of books, newspapers, and magazines.
 SEC8: Retailing of pharmaceutical and medical goods, cosmetic and toilet
articles.
 SEC9: Retailing of (non-electronic) machinery, equipment, and supplies.
 SEC10: Retailing of automotive fuel, excluding tank stations.Formal and Informal Retailers 93
 SEC11: Retailing of waste.
 SEC12: Retailing of raw materials (minerals).
 SEC13: Retailing of non-specialized goods, including second-hand goods.
 SEC14: Supermarkets and hypermarkets.
 SEC15: Non-specializedretailstores, withoutpredominanceinfoodproducts.
 SEC16: Retail trade via catalogues, television, Internet, or other forms of com-
munication.
 SEC17: Retail trade outside a ﬁxed locale, but located along public roads or
at markets.
Outlier correction
We corrected for outliers. First, we deleted observations on value added, hours
worked, and capital that fell into the 1st or 99th percentile of the distribution. Se-
cond, we examined the various combinations of variables (for example, total em-
ployment and total hours worked) and dropped unreliable observations.
Output measurement
To measure retail output, several concepts can be used. In this chapter, we use
value added. Sales are the number of goods sold multiplied by their respective
price. This is the broadest output concept, and both the product mix and the quan-
tity of goods sold affect output. If the cost of goods sold is subtracted from sales,
the resulting output concept is gross margin, which is preferably extended by the
provision of distribution services (Betancourt and Gautschi, 1993). Thus, higher
gross margins generally reﬂect higher value-added services. The gross margin out-
put concept has several inherent difﬁculties. First, subtracting cost of goods sold
from sales suggests that the costs of goods are separable from other costs the ﬁrm
faces. Second, gross margins can be affected by volume discounts. Firms with
market power might negotiate lower prices, thereby increasing their gross margin.
Third, volume measures of gross margin are difﬁcult to measure since price data
on cost of goods sold is needed. A third output concept is obtained by subtracting
intermediate inputs from gross margin, resulting in value added. Only labor and
capital costs are included in the value added output concept. Although the value94 Chapter 4
added output concept is usually regarded as the preferable output measure (Mc-
Guckin et al., 2005), it is vulnerable to measurement error. Value added is exposed
to measurement error, because the value added to sales ratio is typically small for
a retailer. Hence, measurement error in intermediate inputs will exacerbate errors
in the output variable. This partly explains the small efﬁciency to white noise ratio
(the g’s reported in table 4.4). In appendix table 4.B.1 (column 7), we estimate the
model using sales as a measure of output. Results for the production frontier and
the efﬁciency model are similar, but a larger share of the variation in the compo-
site error term is due to the inefﬁciency component. Hence, value added is more
sensitive to measurement error, but the results are not affected.
Although the various deﬁnitions of output differ in reliability, all measures are
imperfect. Many small retailers do not keep ﬁnancial records, making data col-
lection generally reliant on recall. However, recall error, for example, over four
months compared to one month is 10 to 15 percent larger (de Mel et al., 2009). The-
refore, information for a single month in our dataset might be of higher quality as
compared to information over larger periods.
Correlations
Appendix table 4.A.2 shows the correlation between the main variables in our ana-
lysis. All of the bivariate correlations between value added and the variables inclu-
ded in the model are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. In addition, we
ﬁnd a strong and signiﬁcant correlation between the different indicators of forma-
lity. However, the correlation is not equal to one, indicating that many ﬁrms only
partially comply with regulations.Formal and Informal Retailers 95
Table 4.A.1. Steps needed to register a business
Step 1. Consult whether the business is welcome
Consult at the secretariat of federal revenues (DRF), the administration of state
revenues (SEMFAZ), through the CPF of the bearer or partner, and SEMSUR for
approval of the commercial location of the ﬁrm.
Step 2. Consult the name of the ﬁrm at the Trade Board
Consult whether there already exists a registered ﬁrm with the same or a similar
name as the name that was chosen for the ﬁrm.
Step 3. Register at the Trade Board
A business with a social objective whose activity is related to industry,
commerce and/or services has to be registered at the Trade Board.
Step 4. Register at the secretariat of federal revenues
Register for taxes. A ﬁrm obtains an identiﬁcation number: Cadastro Nacional
da Pessoa Jurídica (CNPJ).
Step 5. State registration
Register at the state’s police department (Delegacia da Receita Estadual)
in case the activity of the business is: in commerce, in interstate industry or
transport services, a restaurant, a snack bar, a nightclub, in communication
services, a bar, or in the construction business.
Step 6. Business license
Obtain a municipal license
Step 7. Sanitary certiﬁcate
Allow the center for the surveillance of sanitary conditions to examine whether
the conditions of the activities related to food, health services, products, and
the environment are sufﬁcient.
Step 8. Register for social security (INSSS)
The bearer or partner of the ﬁrm (commerce, industry or services), in
accordance with the social welfare expenditure plan, is required to register and
monthly collect contributions for social security.
Step 9. Business entity registry
A business whose activity necessitates a professional business entity registry is
required to undertake the corresponding registration.
Step 10. Request for the emission of the ﬁscal documents
Step 11. Register employees
A ﬁrm with employees, irrespective whether they are family workers, is
required to register them.
Source: SEBRAE (www.sebrae.com.br).9
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Table 4.A.2. Correlation matrix
ln ln ln Hours Tax License Micro- Filled Educ. Other
Value Capital worked registration to ﬁrm in tax owner job
added (CNPJ) operate registration forms
ln Value added 1.00
ln Capital 0.64 1.00
ln Hours worked 0.46 0.46 1.00
Tax registration (CNPJ) 0.51 0.53 0.38 1.00
License to operate 0.41 0.39 0.32 0.50 1.00
Micro-ﬁrm registration 0.48 0.50 0.37 0.95 0.47 1.00
Filled in tax forms 0.46 0.47 0.34 0.86 0.63 0.81 1.00
Education owner 0.33 0.34 0.06 0.30 0.16 0.27 0.26 1.00
Owner has second job -0.07 0.01c -0.14 -0.02a -0.05  0.02a  0.02a 0.11 1.00
ICT 0.36 0.33 0.18 0.39 0.24 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.01c
Age ﬁrm 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.11 0.12 -0.14 -0.06
Credit granted in last three months 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.03
Credit granted was bank loan 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.03a
Participation in guild 0.28 0.25 0.19 0.35 0.29 0.33 0.32 0.17 0.00c
Technical assistance by others 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.21 0.12 0.20 0.19 0.13 0.01c
Technical assistance by government 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.01c
Motivation to start a business -0.18 -0.23 -0.05 -0.21 -0.15 -0.19 -0.18 -0.12 -0.10F
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ICT Age Credit Bank loan Guild Technical Technical Mot.
ﬁrm loan assistance assistance to start
by others by gov. a bus.
ln Value added
ln Capital
ln Hours worked
Tax registration (CNPJ)
License to operate
Micro-ﬁrm registration
Filled tax forms
Education owner
Owner has second job
ICT 1.00
Age ﬁrm 0.00c 1.00
Credit granted in the last three months 0.09 0.01c 1.00
Credit granted was bank loan 0.12 0.01c 0.75 1.00
Participation in guild 0.26 0.09 0.07 0.08 1.00
Technical assistance by others 0.17 0.02b 0.10 0.10 0.15 1.00
Technical assistance by government 0.03 0.01c 0.11 0.15 0.05 -0.02b 1.00
Motivation to start a business -0.15 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.10 -0.07 -0.02b 1.00
Note: All pairwise correlations are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, except for: a signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, b signiﬁcant at 10 percent level, c not signiﬁcant.98 Chapter 4
4.B Robustness Checks
In this appendix we present results from robustness tests for the productivity dif-
ference between formal and informal retailers. First, we examined issues related to
the measurement of capital. Second, several other speciﬁcations were explored. In
the model speciﬁcations estimated in this section, (instrumented) tax registration is
used as the indicator of formalization. We ﬁnd that the positive relation between
formality and productivity is robust to different speciﬁcations and adjustments for
inaccurate reporting of capital.
The measurement of capital
Our estimate of capital is subject to measurement error and missing observations.
For example, a ﬁrm may not break down multifunctional equipment in case the
ﬁrm does not have a location exclusively designated to business. Also, approxima-
tely 40 percent of the ﬁrms in our sample do not report capital. This may either
imply that the ﬁrm incorrectly reports it has no capital, that the ﬁrm does not make
use of capital, or a combination of both. Furthermore, ﬁrms that do not report ca-
pital may share certain characteristics, raising doubts about sample selection. We
examined whether the productivity difference between formal and informal ﬁrms
is robust to different speciﬁcations taking some of the limitations of capital measu-
rement into account.
First, we estimated the model using ﬁrms that had a location exclusively desi-
gnated to business.21 Estimating the model for these ﬁrms alleviates concerns that
ﬁrms that do not separate home from business report capital inaccurately. Column
1 in appendix table 4.B.1 shows that the productivity difference and the elasticity
of output with respect to capital are robust to examining ﬁrms with a designated
business location only.
Second, we considered the possibility that some retailers might not use capital
at all, in which case the estimated output elasticity with respect to capital is biased
(Battese, 1997). If some retailers do not use capital, this may affect the stochastic
efﬁciency component as well. Zero values for ﬁrms not using capital can be ad-
dressed for Cobb-Douglas production functions by replacing equation 4.4 with the
21Owners are asked whether they have a location exclusively designated to business (yes/no).Formal and Informal Retailers 99
following equation:
lnYi = b0 + b1D + b2lnKi + b3lnHi + vi   ui, (4.B.1)
where Di = 1 if lnKi = 0, Di = 0 if lnKi > 0, and lnK
i = Max(lnKi,Di). We
estimated equation 4.B.1 and equation 4.5 simultaneously (after instrumenting tax
registration). The results are shown in column 2 of appendix table 4.B.1. Accoun-
ting for zero values for ﬁrms not using capital does not change the results. The sign
and signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients in the efﬁciency model are similar to the base
model, except for the effect of credit and bank loan, which are now signiﬁcantly
related with efﬁciency. This suggests that measurement error in the reporting of
capital does not affect the productivity difference, but it does affect the relation
between the ﬁrm’s use of external ﬁnance and productivity.
Third, we used regression mean imputation and substituted the predicted mean
for missing values of capital. First, we regressed capital on value added and hours
worked (it does not matter which of the variables is the ’response’ in the model of
interest). Next, coefﬁcients of this regression were used to estimate the expected va-
lue of the capital stock for ﬁrms not reporting capital. Regression based imputation
can generate unbiased estimates of means, but the variability of the imputations
might be too small. Hence, the estimated precision of regression coefﬁcients may
be incorrect and should therefore be treated with care. Column 3 of appendix table
4.B.1 shows that results are similar to the base model.22
Other robustness checks
In this subsection we consider other robustness checks. First, we estimated a Cobb
Douglas production function. Column 4 in appendix table 4.B.1 shows that the sign
and signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients are similar if a Cobb Douglas functional form is
chosen.
Second, the odds of survival may differ across formal and informal retailers,
raising concerns about a sample selection problem. We examined the sensitivity
of our results to differences in survival probability between formal and informal
retailers, by excluding ﬁrms more than 3 years old (column 5). The results indicate
22Mean imputation gives similar results. Also regression mean imputation for formal and informal
retailers separately gives similar results.100 Chapter 4
that productivity differences between formal and informal retailers are signiﬁcant
for these groups as well.
Third, we estimated the model where we included an interaction between the
various factor inputs and tax registration (column 6). This model allows us to exa-
mine whether formal and informal ﬁrms share a common technology. The result
suggest that the elasticity of capital may be different for informal ﬁrms, as reﬂected
in the signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for squared capital interacted with tax registration.23
However, results from the efﬁciency model are not affected if we allow production
technologies to vary across formal and informal retailers.
Fourth, we estimated the model using sales instead of value added (column
7). Results are similar, but the efﬁciency to white noise ratio is higher compared
to the base model. Hence, measuring output by value added is more sensitive to
measurement error, but the results are not affected.
Fifth, we estimated the model for different sub-industries. Columns 8-9 show
the results for industry 2 (Commerce of food, beverages, and tobacco), and industry
13 (Commerce of non-specialized goods, including second-hand goods).24 We used
hours worked as the single input variable in these speciﬁcations. The output elas-
ticity of labor is similar for the sub-industries, and formal retailers are signiﬁcantly
more productive than their informal counterparts. The efﬁciency to white noise ra-
tio is higher compared to the base model, suggesting that some of the heterogeneity
in the sample may be captured by estimating the model for sub-industries.
Finally, we used the average educational level for each state as an instrument for
tax registration. Higher ability ﬁrm owners are more likely to be formal in order to
beneﬁt from access to public goods and the ability to increase the customer base by
advertising and issuing tax receipts. Formality transmits itself along the produc-
tion chain as a result of value added taxes. We used the probit model outlined in
equation 4.6, where we replaced tax compliance with the average educational level
for each state (results not shown). The average educational level positively predicts
formality (tax registration) at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level. Column 10 shows the
result from estimating equation 4.4 and equation 4.5 simultaneously, where forma-
lity is instrumented using the average educational level. The ﬁndings suggest that
formal ﬁrms are more productive after controlling for the selection bias and ﬁrm,
industry, and ﬁrm-owner characteristics.
23Also, a Wald test of the joint signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients suggests differences in technology between
formal and informal retailers.
24We present results for these sub-industries, because they are relatively large.Formal and Informal Retailers 101
Table 4.B.1. Alternative stochastic frontier and eﬃciency models
Variable b SE b SE
(1) (2)
Production frontier
ln Capital 0.237 (21.39)*** - -
ln Capital2 0.005 (2.01)** - -
D - - 1.017 (30.97)***
ln Capital  D - - 0.210 (31.22)***
ln Hours worked 0.389 (6.39)*** 0.276 (27.01)***
ln Hours worked2 0.075 (8.84)*** - -
ln Capital  ln Hours worked -0.001 (0.07) - -
Sector dummies Yes Yes
Efﬁciency model
Tax registration (CNPJ)a -3.883 (7.90)*** -4.482 (11.26)***
Credit -0.063 (1.00) -0.108 (2.03)**
Credit was bank loan -0.115 (1.46) -0.187 (2.72)***
Participation in guild -0.262 (6.13)*** -0.303 (7.46)***
ICT -0.355 (7.34)*** -0.511 (11.98)***
Age of the ﬁrm -0.015 (4.54)*** -0.028 (9.80)***
Age of the ﬁrm2 0.000 (2.41)** 0.000 (5.88)***
Technical assistance elsewhere -0.213 (3.00)*** -0.212 (3.32)***
Technical assistance gov. -0.091 (0.73) -0.005 (0.05)
Education owner -0.102 (12.42)*** -0.136 (21.01)***
Motivation 0.162 (5.76)*** 0.163 (7.44)***
Owner has second job 0.165 (3.66)*** 0.196 (5.73)***
s2 0.844 0.980
g 0.037 0.162
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Variable b SE b SE
(3) (4)
Production frontier
ln Capital 0.335 (34.88)*** 0.243 (34.48)***
ln Capital2 -0.006 (2.79)*** - -
ln Hours worked 0.199 (11.66)*** 0.232 (16.46)***
ln Hours worked2 0.081 (13.73)*** - -
ln Capital  ln Hours worked -0.033 (5.63)*** - -
Sector dummies Yes Yes
Efﬁciency model
Tax registration (CNPJ)a -3.021 (8.60)*** -3.624 (7.43)***
Credit -0.065 (1.38) -0.088 (1.38)
Credit was bank loan -0.140 (2.31)** -0.107 (1.35)
Participation in guild -0.250 (6.96)*** -0.297 (6.88)***
ICT -0.377 (9.98)*** -0.415 (8.62)***
Age of the ﬁrm -0.018 (7.29)*** -0.017 (5.28)***
Age of the ﬁrm2 0.000 (4.62)*** 0.000 (2.87)***
Technical assistance elsewhere -0.190 (3.39)*** -0.245 (3.46)***
Technical assistance gov. -0.026 (0.25) -0.102 (0.81)
Education owner -0.085 (14.87)*** -0.101 (12.47)***
Motivation 0.112 (5.77)*** 0.153 (5.51)***
Owner has second job 0.149 (4.96)*** 0.162 (3.64)***
s2 0.756 0.878
g 0.051 0.073
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Variable b SE b SE
(5) (6)
Production frontier
ln Capital 0.283 (12.35)*** 0.270 (17.80)***
ln Capital2 0.006 (1.34) 0.006 (1.98)**
ln Hours worked 0.283 (2.77)*** 0.226 (3.70)***
ln Hours worked2 0.065 (4.63)*** 0.038 (4.42)***
ln Capital  ln Hours worked 0.018 (1.37) 0.006 (0.76)
ln Capital  Tax registration - - -0.103 (4.25)***
ln Capital2  Tax registration - - -0.000 (0.06)
ln Hours worked  Tax registration - - 0.268 (1.13)
ln Hours worked2  Tax registration - - 0.153 (5.92)***
(ln Capital  ln Hours worked) 
Tax registration - - -0.011 (0.41)
Sector dummies Yes Yes
Efﬁciency model
Tax registration (CNPJ)a -6.134 (5.50)*** -3.852 (8.01)***
Credit -0.060 (0.45) -0.077 (1.23)
Credit was bank loan -0.218 (1.27) -0.094 (1.21)
Participation in guild -0.230 (1.44) -0.228 (5.32)***
ICT -0.668 (2.55)** -0.343 (7.15)***
Age of the ﬁrm -0.168 (2.19)** -0.016 (4.89)***
Age of the ﬁrm2 0.034 (1.36) 0.000 (2.67)***
Technical assistance elsewhere -0.097 (0.53) -0.195 (2.78)***
Technical assistance gov. -0.564 (1.32) -0.086 (0.68)
Education owner -0.142 (8.51)*** -0.095 (11.92)***
Motivation 0.083 (1.57) 0.127 (4.64)***
Owner has second job 0.175 (2.13)** 0.148 (3.37)***
s2 0.903 0.847
g 0.070 0.038
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Variable b SE b SE
(7) (8)
Production frontier
ln Capital 0.236 (20.49)*** - -
ln Capital2 -0.005 (1.84)* - -
ln Hours worked 0.238 (3.81)*** 0.538 (19.83)***
ln Hours worked2 0.068 (7.79)*** 0.105 (10.73)***
ln Capital  ln Hours worked 0.022 (2.95)*** - -
Sector dummies Yes Yes
Efﬁciency model
Tax registration (CNPJ)a -0.721 (11.66)*** -7.197 (8.18)***
Credit -0.307 (3.40)*** -0.320 (2.74)***
Credit was bank loan -0.037 (0.32) -0.093 (0.62)
Participation in guild -0.221 (2.72)*** -0.531 (4.84)***
ICT -0.779 (4.72)*** -1.014 (3.34)***
Age of the ﬁrm -0.021 (5.26)*** -0.056 (8.94)***
Age of the ﬁrm2 0.000 (3.87)*** 0.001 (5.57)***
Technical assistance elsewhere -0.122 (0.94) -0.885 (3.41)***
Technical assistance gov. -0.231 (1.04) -0.732 (2.61)***
Education owner -0.112 (10.38)*** -0.197 (14.14)***
Motivation 0.086 (2.57)** 0.192 (4.44)***
Owner has second job 0.076 (1.39) 0.262 (3.62)***
s2 0.946 1.222
g 0.195 0.118
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Variable b SE b SE
(9) (10)
Production frontier
ln Capital - - - -
ln Capital2 - - - -
ln Hours worked 0.676 (10.67)*** 0.602 (39.71)***
ln Hours worked2 0.078 (4.02)*** 0.076 (15.63)***
ln Capital  ln Hours worked - - - -
Sector dummies Yes Yes
Efﬁciency model
Tax registration (CNPJ)a -5.340 (3.04)*** -4.237 (16.45)***
Credit 0.459 (1.51) -0.219 (3.72)***
Credit was bank loan -0.943 (2.44)** -0.245 (3.12)***
Participation in guild -0.525 (2.95)*** -0.447 (8.77)***
ICT -0.695 (3.41)*** -0.901 (11.29)***
Age of the ﬁrm -0.038 (2.98)*** -0.038 (12.56)***
Age of the ﬁrm2 0.000 (1.50) 0.001 (6.66)***
Technical assistance elsewhere -0.119 (0.34) -0.274 (3.39)***
Technical assistance gov. -0.263 (0.43) -0.148 (1.07)
Education owner -0.157 (5.56)*** -0.178 (25.90)***
Motivation 0.262 (2.68)*** 0.234 (10.07)***
Owner has second job 0.063 (0.37) 0.205 (5.53)***
s2 1.109 1.103
g 0.562 0.198
Observations 622 9641
Constants not shown. The output and input variables in the production frontier are rescaled to have unit means.
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10 percent level of signiﬁcance, ** signiﬁcant at 5
percent level, *** signiﬁcant at 1 percent level. s2  s2
u + s2
v and g  s2
u/s2. a Predicted values from equation
4.6 are used for tax registration, except for column (10), where the average educational level across states is
used as an instrument for formalization.Chapter 5
ICT Adoption and
Heterogeneity in Production
Technologies: Evidence for
Chilean Retailers
5.1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that the adoption of information and communication techno-
logy (ICT) inﬂuences the organization of ﬁrms and their cost structures (Brynjolf-
sson and Hitt, 2000; Haynes and Thompson, 2000; Bartel et al., 2007). The potential
of ICT to reshape the retail industry was already acknowledged by Achabal and
McIntyre (1987). According to McKinsey (2001), more intensive ICT use should
improve retail productivity in two ways. Direct beneﬁts from ICT are due to, for
example, bar codes and scanners which reduce checkout time and eliminate the
need to manually price tag products thereby reducing labor costs. Most studies on
the relation between ICT and retail ﬁrm productivity therefore specify ICT capital
as an additional production factor (OECD, 2003; Broersma et al., 2003; Doms et al.,
2004).
But the indirect gains from a more intensive use of ICT for administration, in-
This chapter is based on the paper ’ICT Adoption and Heterogeneity in Production Technologies: Evi-
dence for Chilean Retailers’, jointly written with Michael Koetter. The paper is revised and resubmitted
to the Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics.108 Chapter 5
ventory control, storage optimization, and pricing and promotion of products may
be economically more important and should also inﬂuence the retailer’s produc-
tivity (McKinsey, 2001; McGuckin et al., 2005).1 In contrast to direct effects from
acquiring additional ICT hardware, these indirect ICT effects may require substan-
tial organizational changes (Bertschek and Kaiser, 2004). In fact, the implications
of ICT adoption for company organization and cost structures may be so pervasive
that it makes sense to generalize the production technology by allowing separate
technology regimes, rather than treat ICT capital as just an additional factor input,
which would be the more orthodox approach. To our knowledge, this indirect rela-
tion between ICT use and the production technology of retailers has received little
attention.2
In this chapter, we use a unique sample from the Chilean population of retailers
and consider, in line with previous studies, ICT capital as a component of ﬁxed
capital in the production process. In addition, we allow ﬁrms to operate different
production technologies. Instead of assuming certain group compositions a priori,
we specify observed indicators of ICT use as determinants of a ﬁrm’s probability
to belong to different technology regimes. Hence, we impose substantially less
structure on retail technologies than a more conventional analysis based on a single
regime.
This chapter addresses two limitations in previous studies, which examine the
relation between ICT and retail productivity by estimating production functions
(OECD, 2003; Broersma et al., 2003; Doms et al., 2004). The ﬁrst concerns the com-
mon, yet strong assumption that ﬁrms share a single production technology. But
incomplete ICT diffusion in developing countries (World Bank, 2008) may indicate
different production technologies across ﬁrms. And even for ﬁrms in developed
countries, the assumption of a single production technology is unlikely to hold
since both inter-ﬁrm and intra-ﬁrm ICT diffusion are incomplete in these countries
as well.3 Therefore, we hypothesize that ﬁrms have different production techno-
1Detailed examples include an improved matching of inventory to customer demand, more responsive
price changes, more efﬁcient use of shelf space, reduced inventory and fewer out-of-stock situations,
the potential to evaluate and optimize advertising campaigns, and more efﬁcient use of trucking and
shipping.
2A notable exception is Bertschek and Kaiser (2004) who estimate an endogenous switching regres-
sion model to allow different factor elasticities across two groups as a result of ICT-related workplace
reorganization. The method adopted in this chapter is different in several respects. For example, we al-
low inefﬁciency in the ﬁrm’s use of resources, and (potentially) a larger number of different production
technologies as a result of differences in ICT use across ﬁrms.
3We do not aim to explain why ICT diffusion differs. Stoneman (2002) discusses exogenous and en-
dogenous reasons for heterogeneous ICT diffusion across and within ﬁrms. For example, investments
such as cable networks, other infrastructure, or internet connections are necessary to eliminate exoge-
nous constraints on ICT adoption. Endogenous constraints related to ICT adoption include ﬁrm-levelICT Adoption and Heterogeneity in Production Technologies 109
logies because of differences in ICT use. A second, equally strong assumption in
much of the existing literature is that all ﬁrms operate fully efﬁciently.4 We hy-
pothesize that in developing countries some retailing ﬁrms make suboptimal use
of production factors. Some evidence for this hypothesis is available in related li-
terature. For example, for semi-formal ﬁnancial intermediaries (Popular Savings
and Credit Institutions) in Mexico, Paxton (2007) ﬁnds much dispersion in efﬁ-
ciency. But also ﬁrms and industries in developed countries show inefﬁciency in
the production process (Kneller and Stevens, 2006). Both the existence of different
production technologies and the presence of inefﬁciency need to be accounted for
when estimating production functions. We seek to address both issues by model-
ling retail production technologies in a latent class stochastic frontier model (LCSF
model), where the ﬁrm’s probability of technology group membership is determi-
nedbyICTuse. IntheLCSFmodel, multiplegroup-speciﬁcproductionparameters,
group-membership probabilities and ﬁrm-speciﬁc inefﬁciencies are estimated in a
single stage.
An alternative (two-stage) approach to account for cross-ﬁrm differences in pro-
duction technology is to cluster ﬁrms, for example based on indicators of ICT adop-
tion.5 But clustering has several shortcomings. First, any a priori selection criteria
is ultimately arbitrary. The common approach is to divide ﬁrms in a developing
country by employment size (Tybout, 2000). However, some small ﬁrms use ad-
vanced technologies and should be compared with larger ﬁrms doing so as well,
rather than with other small ﬁrms that use traditional technologies.6 Second, the
number of groups is unknown ex ante. Ideally the number of clusters should follow
endogenously from the data as a reﬂection of production technology heterogeneity.
In contrast to cluster analysis, the LCSF model allows us to remain agnostic as to
the number and composition of production technology regimes. Finally, cluster
differences of technological literacy and skills to install and maintain ICT systems. This chapter starts
from the observation that ICT adoption differs across ﬁrms and examines if differences in ICT use are
related to different production technologies.
4Note that industrial organization (IO) methods of production function estimation allow for ﬁrm-level
differences in TFP, which may imply efﬁciency differences to play a role, too. But these approaches focus
on addressing simultaneity problems when input variables are correlated with the unobserved produc-
tivity term and do not model inefﬁciency explicitly (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003;
Ackerberg et al., 2005). A shortcoming of stochastic frontier models is that they (so far) do not address
this endogeneity problem. But in contrast to IO methods, they allow to disentangle the contribution of
efﬁciency from other components to TFP levels and changes by making explicit distributional assump-
tions regarding the error term. Combining both approaches is clearly a preferred solution, which we
consider, however, out of the scope of the present chapter.
5Related approaches include regression tree analysis and threshold estimation, as in Durlauf and John-
son (1995) and Hansen (2000).
6In our data set of Chilean retailers, ICT adoption is not conﬁned to larger ﬁrms.110 Chapter 5
analysis splits a sample using the value of the separating variables, whereas the
LCSF model splits a sample according to the effects of the separating variables on
the dependent variable (Corral and Álvarez, 2004).
We use a unique data set of approximately 1,100 Chilean retailers surveyed by
the National Statistical Ofﬁce of Chile in its Encuesta Anual de Comercio for 2003
and 2004. The data include detailed information on ICT capital and ICT use for
each ﬁrm, and balance sheet and supplementary economic information such as the
number and types of employees. Our main result is the identiﬁcation of three pro-
duction technologies across Chilean retailers, which differ in terms of productivity,
efﬁciency, and production factor elasticities.
We ﬁnd that ICT use is a signiﬁcant determinant of a ﬁrm’s group membership
probability. The probability of membership in a high-productivity regime is posi-
tively related to ICT use. Most ﬁrms are allocated to a technology regime which
exhibits an intermediate level of productivity. On average, ﬁrms within this group
operate close to their regime-speciﬁc production frontier, that is they incur very lit-
tle operational slack. A second (relatively small) group of high-intensive ICT users
is signiﬁcantly more productive. Retailers in this group, however, exhibit inefﬁ-
ciencyontheorderof12percentonaverage. Potentially, theuseofmoreproductive
and innovative technologies requires adjustments and implies initially some ope-
rational slack. Finally, a third group of retailers lag behind in ICT use and also have
the least productive production technology. Retailers in this group incur the lar-
gest operational slack and forego on average more than half of their output due to
suboptimal use of resources. Hence, a considerable number of ﬁrms face substan-
tial room for performance improvement within their technology regime without
having to further intensify the use of ICT.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2 we present
a baseline frontier model and the latent class stochastic frontier model. Chilean re-
tail data and model speciﬁcation are described in Section 5.3. Results are discussed
in Section 5.4, and we conclude in Section 5.5.
5.2 Method
We ﬁrst introduce a baseline frontier model that accounts for inefﬁciency and helps
to highlight the limitations of assuming a single production technology. Next, we
present the latent class stochastic frontier (LCSF) model to account for the relation
between ICT use and heterogeneous production technologies.ICT Adoption and Heterogeneity in Production Technologies 111
5.2.1 Fixed Effects Stochastic Frontier Model
Retailers use production factors to sell goods and deliver services. Output-oriented
frontier analysis estimates the maximum possible output given a certain combina-
tion of inputs.7 Deviations from optimal output measure technical inefﬁciency due
to the suboptimal use of input factors. A stochastic ﬁxed-effects panel production
frontier is written in logs as (Greene, 2005):
yit = ai + b0xit + vit   uit, (5.1)
where y is the log output of ﬁrm i at time t, and the matrix xit includes the log
of (ICT and non-ICT) capital (K), high-skilled labor (HSL), and low-skilled labor
(LSL).Topartiallyaccountforheterogeneityinproductiontechnologiesacrossﬁrms,
we specify ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects ai. Contrary to previous retail productivity
studies (OECD, 2003; Broersma et al., 2003; Doms et al., 2004), we specify a compo-
sed error term accounting for both measurement error v and technical inefﬁciency
u.8 Technical efﬁciency is measured as the ratio of observed output to the estima-
ted stochastic frontier output (including the measurement error). The (exponent)
value of technical efﬁciency ranges from 0 (fully inefﬁcient) to 1 (fully efﬁcient).
For example, a ﬁrm exhibiting 20% inefﬁciency produced only 80% of its potential
output had it employed its inputs efﬁciently. To estimate Equation (5.1) with the
method of maximum likelihood, we follow the convention in the stochastic frontier
literature and assume that the measurement error term vit is iid with vit s N(0,s2
v)
and independent of the explanatory variables (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The
inefﬁciency term is assumed to be iid with uit s Nj(0,s2
u)j and independent of vit.
Two issues deserve consideration. First, neglecting cross-ﬁrm heterogeneity
may confound heterogeneity with inefﬁciency. Firm-speciﬁc effects ai aim to cap-
ture heterogeneity. But in a disparate sample, ﬁxed effects will capture much cross-
ﬁrm heterogeneity as well as any inefﬁciency in the production process (Greene,
2005). Second, a ﬁxed effects production frontier model is still inﬂexible since fac-
tor elasticities are assumed to be constant across potentially different ﬁrms. We
include ICT capital as a production factor in Equation (5.1). In addition, we hypo-
thesize that factor elasticities differ across ﬁrms because of ICT use. Heterogeneity
in production technology, however, is hard to deﬁne in terms of ICT use a priori.
7The production frontier can be obtained deterministically (using Data Envelopment Analysis, DEA)
or stochastically (using Stochastic Frontier Analysis, SFA). We use stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to
estimate the frontier, because this approach has been extended to a latent class structure.
8Most studies using frontier analysis ﬁnd that at least some ﬁrms operate inefﬁciently. See Alvarez and
Crespi (2003) for an efﬁciency analysis of Chilean manufacturing ﬁrms.112 Chapter 5
Therefore, we turn next to a latent class stochastic frontier model to separate inefﬁ-
ciency and heterogeneity.
5.2.2 Latent Class Stochastic Frontier Model
To model inefﬁciency and heterogeneity separately, we use a latent class stochastic
frontier (LCSF) model proposed by Greene (2005). While latent class models are
frequently used in mixture analysis (McLachlan and Peel, 2000), the adaptation to
frontier analysis is fairly recent.9 In this chapter, we examine whether retailers can
be grouped based on ICT use. Following Greene (2005), we write the latent class
stochastic frontier model as:
yit = aj + b0
jxit + vitjj   uitjj. (5.2)
In contrast to the ﬁxed effects stochastic frontier in Equation (5.1), parameters differ
across the latent classes j = 1,..., J and ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects ai are replaced by class-
speciﬁc constants. We thus assume a sorting of retailers into J latent production
technologies. Equation (5.2) is estimated using the method of maximum likelihood.
Maintaining the standard frontier assumption of a half normal distribution of the
inefﬁciency term, the likelihood function is:
LF(i,tjj) = f(yitjxit,aj, bj,sj,lj) =
f(ljeitjj/sj)
f(0)
1
sj
f
 
eitjj
sj
!
, (5.3)
where eitjj = yit   aj   x0
itbj, lj = suj/svj, sj =
q
(s2
uj + s2
vj) and f is the standard
normal density. Conditional on the ﬁrm being in class j, the contribution of each
ﬁrm to the likelihood function is:
LF(ijj) =
T
Õ
t=1
LF(i,tjj). (5.4)
9Mixture analysis estimates a "ﬁnite mixture" distribution. In a frontier setting, Greene (2004) segments
different health care systems based on their orientation, for example, towards AIDS in developing Afri-
cancountriesandcancerindevelopedOECDcountries. OreaandKumbhakar(2004)useanLCSFmodel
to study Spanish bank efﬁciency and ﬁnd that banks can be grouped according to business scope and
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The unconditional likelihood for each ﬁrm is averaged over the latent classes using
the prior probability as weights to membership in group j:
LF(i) =
J
å
j=1
P(i, j)LF(ijj) =
J
å
j=1
P(i, j)
T
Õ
t=1
LF(i,tjj). (5.5)
In Equation (5.5), the term P(i, j) is the prior probability, which is attached to mem-
bership of ﬁrm i in class j. Firms reside in a class permanently.10 This prior probabi-
lity therefore reﬂects the state of nature. The probability is speciﬁed for each ﬁrm if
there are characteristics, zi, that sharpen the prior. Group membership probabilities
are estimated using a multinomial logit:
P(i, j) =
exp(z0
ipj)
å
J
j=1 exp(z0
ipj)
,pJ = 0, (5.6)
where, j = J is the last group serving as the reference group and zi are ﬁrm-speciﬁc
characteristics, ICT use in our study, which co-determine ﬁrm-speciﬁc group mem-
bership probabilities. If no ﬁrm characteristics are speciﬁed in zi, latent classes
would still exist. But they would depend solely on production factors in the ker-
nel and P(i, j) would be a group-speciﬁc constant P(j). Hence both ﬁrm-speciﬁc
ICT use and the overall ﬁt of the stochastic frontiers are used during the maximum
likelihood procedure.
A caveat of the LCSF model pointed out by Greene (2005) is the necessity to
specify the number of groups J prior to estimation. In principle the number of
groups is only bounded by the number of cross-sectional units N. But the appro-
priate number of groups is likely much smaller and already for a number of groups
J substantially lower than N, the exceedingly large number of parameters in prac-
tice leads to over-ﬁtting problems. Therefore, we follow below Greene (2005) and
use a ’top-down’ approach to select the preferred model based on both statistical
tests and maximization diagnostics (see also Orea and Kumbhakar (2004)).
In sum, we estimate class-speciﬁc production factor coefﬁcients bj and relate
ﬁrm-speciﬁcgroupmembershipprobabilitiesindifferentlatenttechnologyregimes
to ICT use in a multinomial logit model.11 The relative ability of each ﬁrm to
convert production factors into output given its technology, i.e. the efﬁciency of
10This assumption might be reasonable for a 2 year panel data set.
11Group membership and hence efﬁciency estimates are based on the posterior probability. An alterna-
tive to calculate efﬁciency is to sum all posterior probabilities multiplied by the efﬁciency in using the
technology of class j (Orea and Kumbhakar, 2004). The difference between both efﬁciency estimates is
higher when the highest posterior probability is lower.114 Chapter 5
a ﬁrm, is estimated relative to the frontier of its class. Hence, productivity and ef-
ﬁciency should be carefully distinguished. The average productivity of retailers in
the different classes can be directly compared and straightforwardly interpreted.
However, efﬁciency of retailers is measured by the ﬁrm’s position relative to its
appropriate technology frontier, reﬂected in uitjj.
5.3 Data And Model Speciﬁcation
We ﬁrst describe our dataset of Chilean retailers and specify the model next.
5.3.1 Chilean Retail Firms
We use a short and largely balanced panel data set of registered, mainly single-
establishment Chilean retailers from the commercial survey (Encuesta Anual de
Comercio, EAC)for2003and2004. Retailersarelinkedusingtheirﬁrm-identiﬁcation
numbers. The commercial survey is conducted annually by the statistical ofﬁce of
Chile and covers a sample of approximately 1,100 retail ﬁrms from the total popu-
lation of retail ﬁrms in Chile.12 Firms report in EAC: (a) balance sheet and income
statement information, such as cost, revenue, and proﬁt information; (b) economic
information beyond the balance sheet and income statement information, such as
investment ﬂows and the number of employees; (c) ICT information. We use detai-
led data on internet use to proxy for ICT use. We create a discrete variable labelled
ICT use, which ranges from 0 to 7 based on the dummies for internet connection, e-
mail address, website, intranet, extranet, purchases and/or sales via the internet.13
To measure retail output, several concepts can be used. In this chapter, we use
value added. The broadest output concept for distributive trade ﬁrms is sales. Sales
12The commercial survey concerns ﬁrms registered at Servicio de Impuestos Internos (Declaración An-
nual de Impuestos a la Renta, formulario 22 y Declaración Mensual del IVA, formulario 29). The ﬁnal
set of ﬁrms from which the sample is drawn comprises ﬁrms with accumulated sales of 95 percent for
the sector. This cut off at 95 percent is due to a large number of extremely small ﬁrms that are difﬁcult
to monitor and display large instability over time. Some ﬁrms that would signiﬁcantly affect the preci-
sion of the aggregate variables are included (Inclusión Forzosa (IF) or forced inclusion). Other ﬁrms are
sampled from the remaining population of ﬁrms.
13The pairwise correlation between the ICT use variables ranges from 0.10 to 0.87. The highest correla-
tion is between having an internet connection and having an e-mail address. It might be inappropriate
to give each variable the same weight. To address this, we took the ﬁrst principal component of the se-
ven dummies. All variables load positively on the ﬁrst factor, and the proportion of variation accounted
for by the ﬁrst principal component is 49 percent. The ﬁrst eigenvalue is 3.06, the second eigenvalue is
1.21. The ﬁrst principal component is highly correlated (0.995) with the simple average of the dummy
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are the number of goods sold multiplied by their respective price.14 This output
concept implies that both the product mix and the quantity of goods sold affect out-
put. If the cost of goods sold is subtracted from sales, the resulting output concept
is gross margin.15 Thus, higher gross margins generally reﬂect higher value-added
services. The gross margin output concept has several inherent difﬁculties. First,
subtracting cost of goods sold from sales suggests that the costs of goods are se-
parable from other costs the ﬁrm faces. Second, gross margins can be affected by
volume discounts. Firms with market power might negotiate lower prices, increa-
sing their gross margin. Third, volume measures of gross margin are difﬁcult to
measure since price data on cost of goods sold is needed. A third output concept
is obtained by subtracting intermediate inputs from gross margin. This results in
value added. Only labour and capital costs are included in the value added output
concept. We use value added because it is common practice in national accounts. In
addition, by using a value added output concept we are able to distinguish whether
a retailer increased its value added output either by selling more or by reducing the
costs of intermediate inputs.16
Firms report depreciation of capital assets and investment. Firms do not report
gross ﬁxed capital assets. We approximate the non-ICT capital stock as follows.
First, the initial capital stock is estimated from Di,l,t = dlKi,l,t 1. The value of de-
preciation D by capital type l is given and we use depreciation rates, d, for the
different capital types by US retailers from the Bureau of Economic Analysis to es-
timate Ki,l,t 1 (Fraumeni, 1997).17 Several caveats apply. Firms report accounting
depreciation and not economic depreciation. Hence the capital stock is likely ove-
restimated in our approach. Also, we assume that capital depreciation rates for US
retailers are similar for Chilean retailers. However, differences in competition and
the functioning of ﬁnancial markets might drive a wedge between capital deprecia-
tion rates in developed and developing countries. If depreciation rates are lower in
developing countries, we underestimate the capital stock of Chilean retailers using
depreciation rates for US assets. Second, we estimate the capital stock using the
perpetual inventory method Ki,t = å
L
l=1 Ki,l,t = å
L
l=1 ((1  dl)Ki,l,t 1 + Ii,l,t), where
I is investment. We proxy the ICT capital stock by multiplying the number of com-
14Sales include net inventory adjustment. Sales, wages, the cost of goods sold, and intermediate inputs
for 2004 are deﬂated using the consumer price index.
15Preferably the gross margin output concept is extended by the provision of distribution services (Be-
tancourt and Gautschi, 1993).
16For further discussion of the appropriate output concept for retailers, see O’Mahony et al. (1998) and
McGuckin et al. (2005).
17The capital assets distinguished are: buildings, constructions, and installations, transport equipment,
machinery, equipment, and tools, ofﬁce equipment, and leasing equipment.116 Chapter 5
puters, laptops, and servers per ﬁrm by their respective price. These prices are
obtained from the statistical ofﬁce of Chile.18
Firms report the number of employees quarterly. We use the average annual
employment as a measure of labor input.19 EAC distinguishes between various
types of labor. We group these types into high-skilled labor (owners, executives,
and managers), and low-skilled labor (family without ﬁxed income, normal wor-
kers, temporary workers, and subcontracted workers).20 The sample includes 926
retailers in 2003 and 972 in 2004. The data set is smaller than the original sample
of approximately 1,100 ﬁrms from the EAC due to missing information for some
variables and the exclusion of outliers.21
Chilean retailers differ considerably in their activities. EAC reports the two
main activities of the ﬁrm, and the four main products it sells. Based on this in-
formation, we classify retailers into three-digit ISIC revision 3 categories and create
four according indicator variables, Sectorm. Sector1 comprises non-specialized re-
tail trade in stores, Sector2 comprises retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in
specialized stores, Sector3 comprises other retail trade of new goods in specialized
stores, and Sector4 comprises other retail services.
Table 5.1 reports average sales, cost of goods sold, value added, and the pro-
duction factors capital, high-skilled labor, and low-skilled labor as well (in natural
logarithms). Comparing indicators of ICT adoption by Chilean retailers with those
for developed OECD countries (OECD, 2003) shows that ICT diffusion is lower in
Chile. For example, around 80 percent of businesses in Japan, Australia, New Zea-
land, and Nordic countries use the internet while the Chilean average is 51 percent.
Likewise, the share of businesses using the internet for purchases and sales ranges
between 10 and 20 percent in these developed countries while only 3-4 percent of
Chilean ﬁrms score on this account. The data for Chilean retailers suggest that
ICT diffusion is incomplete. Next, we test if the incomplete diffusion of ICT use
observed among Chilean retailers is a determinant of ﬁrms’ group membership
18We are aware of the limitations regarding our approach and therefore experimented with several al-
ternatives. For example, we used depreciation rates as proxies for the ﬁrms’ capital stock. Alternatively,
we estimated the initial capital stock using the expression for steady-state capital implied by the Solow
growth model. These alternative approaches did not affect the main results.
19Seasonal and part-time employment affect the precision of our employment estimate.
20Ideally we use an employment classiﬁcation based on actual skills rather than on occupations. Ho-
wever, information on education and experience by persons engaged is not available in the survey. We
assume occupations reﬂect skills.
21We trim the 2.5 percent tails of the labor productivity distribution (VA/L) and the capital productivity
distribution (VA/K), respectively. This is somewhat higher than the common trimming of 1 percent tails
since measurement error for a sample of services ﬁrms in a developing country is likely to be higher.
The main results remain intact if we trim the 1 percent tails, but there are differences at more detailed
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probability.22
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics
Production factors Mean SD
ln Sales 13.02 1.96
ln Cost of goods sold 12.61 2.15
ln Value added 10.92 1.91
lnK 9.78 3.48
ln HSL 0.42 0.73
ln LSL 2.44 1.77
ICT use frequency distribution n Share
Internet connection 968 51%
E-mail address 878 46%
Website 335 18%
Intranet 299 16%
Extranet 111 6%
Purchases via internet 71 4%
Sales via internet 62 3%
Subsector frequency distribution n Share
Sector1: 560 29%
Sector2: 420 22%
Sector3: 732 39%
Sector4: 187 10%
Observations 1898
Note: Observations for 2003 and 2004 are combined. Values are in thou-
sands of Chilean pesos. Other retail services include: retail sale of second-
hand goods in stores, retail trade not in stores, and repair of personal and
household goods. The values of sales, cost of goods sold, value added,
and capital for 2004 are deﬂated. K is the capital stock, HSL is high-skilled
employment, LSL is low-skilled employment. Sector1: Non-specialized
retail trade in stores; Sector2: Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in
specialized stores; Sector3: Other retail trade of new goods in specialized
stores; Sector4: Other retail services.
5.3.2 Model Speciﬁcation
We specify a LCSF model for retailers using the translog functional form:
lnYitjj = aj + b1j lnKit + b2j ln HSLit + b3j ln LSLit +
1
2
b4j lnK2
it (5.7)
+
1
2
b5j ln HSL2
it +
1
2
b6j ln LSL2
it + b7j lnKit ln HSLit
+b8j lnKit ln LSLit + b9j ln HSLit ln LSLit + b1njSectorn + vitjj   uitjj,
22Unregistered ﬁrms are not sampled by the EAC. Since unregistered ﬁrms are less-intensive ICT users,
our data set overestimates ICT adoption by Chilean retailers. In addition, if more intensive ICT use is
related to higher productivity it also increases survival probabilities. Therefore, the dataset might suffer
from selection bias. If selection bias is present, this problem is small given the short sample period of
two years.118 Chapter 5
where subscripts i, t, j, and n refer to ﬁrm, time, class, and m   1 sector indica-
tors, respectively. Y, K, HSL, and LSL denote output, capital, high-skilled labor,
and low-skilled labor, respectively. Note that our measure of physical capital K
also contains the value of ICT assets, for example the value of desktop computers.
Ideally, we would like to specify different types of capital separately. But since
both proxies for K are fairly noisy and due to maximization problems associated
with more elaborate speciﬁcations, we opted for a joint measure of capital. As se-
parating variables in the identiﬁcation of latent classes we use our proxy for ICT
use. Latent class probabilities are written as:
P(i, j) =
exp(p0j + p1j ICTusei + pnj Sectorn)
å
J
j=1 exp(p0j + p1j ICTusei + pnj Sectorn)
,pJ = 0. (5.8)
In Equation (5.8), the last class serves as the reference group. To account for hete-
rogeneity in the retail sector, we include sector dummies both in the translog func-
tion form in Equation (5.7) and as separating variables in the latent class speciﬁca-
tion. Given the short period of two years, no time element is included in Equation
(5.8) and ﬁrms remain in a technology regime conditional on ICT characteristics in
2003.23
5.4 Results
In this Section, we ﬁrst present estimates from a ﬁxed effect stochastic frontier mo-
del. Next, we examine the results when estimating a latent class stochastic frontier
model.24 Finally, we examine the robustness of our results.
5.4.1 Speciﬁcation
We ﬁrst estimate a standard ﬁxed effects stochastic frontier panel model (FESF) as
in Equation (5.1) to test if efﬁciency prevails. Results are shown in the ﬁrst column
of table 5.2. First-order coefﬁcients of capital, and high- and low-skilled labor are
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Individual parameter estimates of l and s show
that inefﬁciency prevails. Wald tests conﬁrm that both inefﬁciency terms are in-
dividually and jointly signiﬁcant. Hence, a stochastic frontier speciﬁcation which
23Since our data set covers two years only, we do not extend the method to allow transitions between
technology regimes.
24We estimate the ﬁxed effect stochastic frontier model and the latent class stochastic frontier model
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allows inefﬁciency in the production process is the appropriate choice. In addition,
a Wald test of the additional input coefﬁcients from the translog functional form
supports the speciﬁcation of the translog as opposed to the Cobb Douglas functio-
nal form.25
Next, we estimate a latent class stochastic frontier model to test if different tech-
nology regimes prevail. Firm heterogeneity is then generated by a discrete distri-
bution. To specify the appropriate number of groups, we follow Greene (2005) and
use a ’top-down’ approach to select the preferred model. We tried to specify up to
J = 9 groups and compared the model to a nested speciﬁcation with J   1 groups.
The model with the highest likelihood ratio, the lowest Bayesian criterion, and the
lowest Akaike information criterion is preferred (see Greene (2005), and Orea and
Kumbhakar (2004)). In addition, we consult maximization diagnostics and prefer a
model with three latent classes, j = 3.26 Wald tests of the signiﬁcance of differences
between group-speciﬁc production parameters conﬁrm that factor elasticities are
signiﬁcantly different across groups.
5.4.2 ICT Adoption and Heterogeneity in Production Technolo-
gies
Results from estimating the LCSF model with three classes are shown in table 5.2.
Parameter estimates used to calculate output elasticities with respect to capital,
high- and low-skilled labor are shown for each class. Note that the regime-speciﬁc
vectors of production technology parameters are estimated simultaneously. Scale
economies at the ﬁrm level equal the sum of these partial derivatives per input
with respect to output. For each technology regime of retailers these are larger
than unity, which indicates (on average) the presence of increasing returns to scale
at the ﬁrm level (see table 5.3 and the discussion of scale economies in retailing
below). Parameter estimates for l (lj = suj/svj, where suj is the standard error
of the inefﬁciency term and svj the standard error of the measurement error term)
are signiﬁcantly different from zero, which implies the presence of inefﬁciency. In
the bottom row, the share of ﬁrms shows the allocation of the mass of the discrete
distribution to the latent classes. Approximately 16 percent of the retailers in our
25The P-value for the Wald test of no inefﬁciency is 0.00, and the P-value for the additional input coefﬁ-
cients from the translog functional form is 0.00 as well.
26All models with more than three pre-speciﬁed classes failed to converge. These maximization pro-
blems mirror those in other studies (e.g. Orea and Kumbhakar (2004) fail to achieve convergence for a
model with ﬁve classes). By adjusting convergence criteria, we obtained class-speciﬁc production fron-
tier parameter estimates for a model with four classes. However, the fourth class was small (less than
one percent). More importantly, the ﬁrst-order derivatives did not approximate zero.120 Chapter 5
sample belong to the ﬁrst class. This compares with 25 percent in the second class,
and 59 percent in the third class.
Of particular interest are the ICT coefﬁcients in the latent class probability func-
tions (the bottom part of table 5.2). For all classes ICT coefﬁcients are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Therefore, retailers do not share a common tech-
nology and ICT use signiﬁcantly determines the ﬁrm-speciﬁc group membership
probability. For the ﬁrst class, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive sign for ICT use. This
implies that higher ICT use is related to a higher probability for a retailer of be-
longing to the ﬁrst technology regime relative to belonging to the reference group
(group three in our case). For the second class, the negative sign for ICT use indi-
cates that lower ICT use is related to a higher probability of belonging to the second
class (again relative to the reference group).
Before investigating the characteristics of the different regimes in more detail,
note that the parameter estimates of the ﬁxed effects frontier in general lie within
the range of parameters from the latent classes (see table 5.2). Wald tests indicated
already that parameters of the latent classes are signiﬁcantly different. The results
indicate systematic differences in production technologies, to the extent that assu-
ming a single technological regime may be a poor approximation.
Descriptive statistics of the latent classes are presented in table 5.3. Three main
differences across Chilean retailers emerge from the distinction of technology re-
gimes by the LCSF model. First, ﬁrms in the ﬁrst class are largest on average. These
ﬁrms have the highest number of unskilled employees, which are probably hired
to stock shelves and check out customers. These ﬁrms make relatively more use
of the "advanced" ICT options, such as realizing sales and purchases via the inter-
net. Second, ﬁrms in the second class are smallest on average. Firms in the second
class show substantial variation in efﬁciency, and make less use of ICT. Third, most
ﬁrms are in the third class. Firms in this class operate their production technology
most efﬁciently. And ICT adoption is somewhat higher than for ﬁrms in the se-
cond class, although it is below the ﬁrst class on all indicators of ICT use. We label
the ﬁrst group of Chilean retailers as high-intensive ICT users, the second group
as low-intensive ICT users, and the third group as medium-intensive ICT users.
The positive correlation between ICT use and ﬁrm size will be discussed in Section
5.4.3.
The output elasticities of the production factors are obtained by taking the de-
rivative of Equation (5.7) with respect to the inputs. Some direct and interacted
parameter estimates are negative, but the average output elasticities of the produc-ICT Adoption and Heterogeneity in Production Technologies 121
Table 5.2. Production frontier parameter estimates FESF and LCSF models
Model FESF LCSF
Class 1 2 3
Production frontier
Intercept 11.04*** 8.31*** 9.01***
lnK -0.10*** -0.21*** -0.13** -0.09***
ln HSL 0.70*** 0.27** -0.39 0.69***
ln LSL 0.73*** 0.57*** 1.56*** 0.67***
1
2 lnK2 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.03***
1
2 ln HSL2 0.04 -0.01 0.46 0.10*
1
2 ln LSL2 0.03*** 0.002 0.11* 0.05***
lnK  ln HSL -0.02*** 0.002 0.12** -0.04***
lnK  ln LSL -0.01*** 0.01*** -0.10*** -0.01***
ln HSL  ln LSL -0.05*** -0.04* -0.31*** -0.03
Sector1 -0.18 0.02 -0.05
Sector2 -0.28** -0.04 -0.03
Sector3 0.004 0.13 0.14***
s 1.17*** 0.40*** 1.68*** 0.40***
l 2.38*** 1.47*** 5.18*** 0.97*
Probabilities
Intercept -3.47*** -0.58* ref. gr.
ICT use 0.43*** -0.26*** ref. gr.
Sector1 1.65*** 0.17 ref. gr.
Sector2 2.06*** 0.03 ref. gr.
Sector3 1.84*** 0.05 ref. gr.
Share of ﬁrms 0.16 0.25 0.59
Notes: FESF is ﬁxed effects stochastic frontier. LCSF is latent class stochastic frontier. The
number of observations is 1,898. Log-likelihood ratio ﬁxed effects stochastic frontier is -
1428.16. Log-likelihood ratio latent class stochastic frontier is -1652.35, AIC is 1.56, BIC is
1.71. *** indicates signiﬁcance at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and * at 10 percent level.
K is the capital stock, HSL is high-skilled employment, LSL is low-skilled employment, ICT
use is a discrete variable which ranges from 0 to 7 from the dummies of internet connection,
e-mail address, website, intranet, extranet, purchases and sales via the internet. Sector1: Non-
specialized retail trade in stores; Sector2: Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in spe-
cialized stores; Sector3: Other retail trade of new goods in specialized stores; Sector4: Other
retail services, serving as reference group. lj = suj/svj, and sj =
q
(s2
uj + s2
vj), where suj
is the standard error of the inefﬁciency term and svj the standard error of the measurement
error term.
tion factors are positive. For each class, we ﬁnd evidence of (on average) increasing
returns to scale. Economies of scale in retailing are a common ﬁnding in the litera-
ture (see e.g. Ofer (1973); Ingene (1984); Broersma et al. (2003)). Betancourt (2004)
discusses three broad sources of economies of scale in retailing: those that are due
to some element of ﬁxed cost, those that are due to demand uncertainty, and those
that are due to the association between average transaction size and store size. For
high-intensive ICT users we ﬁnd that the relative elasticity of output with respect to
capital is higher, whereas for low-intensive ICT users, the relative elasticity of out-122 Chapter 5
Table 5.3. Descriptive statistics per latent class
Class 1 2 3
Intensity of ICT use High Low Medium
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Frontier variables
lnK 11.00 3.26 8.61 3.49 9.74 3.41
ln HSL 0.67 0.93 0.24 0.48 0.39 0.71
ln LSL 3.12 1.99 1.72 1.60 2.44 1.65
ICT use 2.34 1.76 0.90 1.37 1.29 1.54
Ancillary parameters
Log of labor productivity 9.06 0.41 7.27 1.03 8.32 0.39
Technical efﬁciency 0.88 0.05 0.43 0.22 0.90 0.04
Output elasticity K 0.40 0.19 0.56 0.28 0.36 0.15
Output elasticity HSL 0.15 0.09 0.32 0.53 0.28 0.17
Output elasticity LSL 0.68 0.04 1.04 0.31 0.82 0.14
Returns to scale 1.23 0.16 1.92 0.48 1.46 0.17
Share Share Share
Share of ﬁrms with
Internet connection 74% 36% 48%
E-mail adress 70% 31% 43%
Website 35% 8% 15%
Intranet 29% 9% 13%
Extranet 14% 2% 4%
Purchases via internet 6% 2% 3%
Sales via internet 6% 2% 3%
Share of ﬁrms in
Sector1: 29% 31% 29%
Sector2: 19% 25% 22%
Sector3: 49% 33% 37%
Sector4: 3% 11% 12%
Observations 394 366 1138
Note: Observations for 2003 and 2004 are combined. Labor productivity is value added
dividedbythesumofhigh-andlow-skilledlabor. Thevalues(inthousandsofChileanpesos)
of value added, and capital are deﬂated. Other retail services include: retail sale of second-
hand goods in stores, retail trade not in stores, and repair of personal and household goods.
K is the capital stock, HSL is high-skilled employment, LSL is low-skilled employment, ICT
use is a discrete variable which ranges from 0 to 7 from the dummies of internet connection,
e-mail address, website, intranet, extranet, purchases and sales via the internet. Standard
deviations are in italics. Sector1: Non-specialized retail trade in stores; Sector2: Retail sale of
food, beverages and tobacco in specialized stores; Sector3: Other retail trade of new goods in
specialized stores; Sector4: Other retail services.
put with respect to low-skilled labor (LSL) is higher. This suggests differences in
output enhancing strategies across the different production technologies. It should
be noted, however, that the standard deviations for several scale elasticities (in par-
ticular HSL) across ﬁrms within the three classes are fairly large.
Labor productivity is highest in the ﬁrst class. Productivity and efﬁciency in
table 5.3 should be carefully distinguished. The average productivity of retailers
in the different classes can be directly compared and straightforwardly interpreted.ICT Adoption and Heterogeneity in Production Technologies 123
However, the efﬁciency of retailers is measured by each ﬁrm’s position relative to
its group-speciﬁc technology frontier, reﬂected in uitjj. For example, most retailers
in the third class are close to their technology frontier. Many retailers in the second
class are far from their frontier. So ample scope exists in the second class to increase
productivity by reducing inefﬁciency and thereby moving closer to their appro-
priate technology frontier. Labor productivity is lowest in the second class. Thus,
productivity is higher in classes with more intensive ICT use. In particular, the ﬁrst
class uses ICT most intensively and is also the most productive regime. Indicators
of internet use conﬁrm the differences. For example, the share of retailers in the
ﬁrst class with an internet connection is 74 percent. This compares with 36 percent
in the second class. While 35 percent of retailers in the ﬁrst class had a website, this
is only 8 percent in the second class. Labor productivity in the ﬁrst class is 1.7 log
points higher than in the second class.
Finally, subsectors appear reasonably distributed across classes. For example,
the share of ﬁrms within a class from non-specialized retail trade in stores is ap-
proximately equal. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out that some of the uncovered
heterogeneity may be partly associated with variation across subsectors of the re-
tail sector. For example, retail of second-hand goods is mainly grouped into the
low- and medium intensive ICT using class.27
5.4.3 Robustness Analysis
Based on the estimation of a LCSF model with three classes, we ﬁnd that Chilean
retailers do not share a common production technology and ICT use has a signiﬁ-
cant inﬂuence on the probability of more productive production technology regime
membership. Here, we examine the robustness of these results.
First, ICT use is positively related to ﬁrm size. That is, some potential indirect
beneﬁts from ICT use (such as intranet) are not used by smaller retailers, and lar-
ger retailers have higher investments in ICT (see also Doms et al. (2004)).28 While
higher ICT investments by larger retailers are already accounted for in the produc-
tion frontier, we are able to further examine the effects of ICT use in the probability
model. To examine this issue, we divide our measure of ICT use in two parts. The
27Estimating the model without retailers of second-hand goods gives similar results.
28To examine the relation between the size distribution and ICT use, we grouped retailers according
to ﬁrm size. We ﬁnd that 68 percent of small ﬁrms (less than 20 employees) make no use of internet
connection, e-mail address, and a website. 92 percent of small ﬁrms do not use an intranet, extranet, or
make purchases and or sales via the internet. This compares to 12 percent and 39 percent respectively
for large ﬁrms (more than 100 employees).124 Chapter 5
ﬁrst part, labelled ICTuselow, incorporates the dummies on internet connection, e-
mail address, and a website. These proxies for ICT use are not necessarily related to
ﬁrm size. The second part, labelled ICTusehigh, incorporates the dummies on intra-
net, extranet, and purchases and sales via internet. Results are shown in table 5.4.
Coefﬁcients of the production frontier are similar in this model speciﬁcation com-
pared with the results reported in table 5.2. Coefﬁcients in the probability model for
ICTuselow and ICTusehigh are consistent with the previous results as well. In addi-
tion, these results suggest that heterogeneity in production technologies is related
to the use of relatively "simple" technologies, which are not necessarily related to
ﬁrm size.
Second, ICT use in the probability model might be endogenously related to in-
puts in the production frontier. In particular, the use of ICT might be related to
skilled employment (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000). Interestingly, the correlation bet-
ween ICT use and high-skilled employment is 0.43, whereas the correlation bet-
ween ICT use and low-skilled employment is 0.54. This suggests that ICT skill
complementarities are not obvious in our sample of Chilean retailers. Instead, more
intensive ICT use in the retail industry might suggest a substitution effect of relati-
vely well-skilled staff and ICT. For example, some tasks of local branch managers
such as identiﬁcation of candidate products for sales activities may be automated
by ICT.
Ideally, we would combine the approach suggested in Olley and Pakes (1996)
and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to address further simultaneity problems when
factor inputs are correlated with productivity with the ﬂexibility of the LCSF model
suggested here. Unfortunately, stochastic frontier models do not explicitly allow
controlling for this endogeneity concern. This might result in biased parameter es-
timates in the production function, although there is no reason to expect that biases
in the parameters will move in opposite directions across the latent classes. In a
partial attempt to control for endogeneity, we speciﬁed the (one year) lag in ICT
use. This effectively halved our sample and based on likelihood ratios, Akaike and
Bayesian information criteria we chose a model with three classes. While this spe-
ciﬁcation corroborates the result of a signiﬁcant relation between ICT and heteroge-
neity of production technologies, we caution that a generally higher sensitivity of
the model towards maximization choices limits the scope to draw ﬁrm inference.29
Future research towards more explicit methodological advances to control for en-
dogenous factor choice in stochastic frontier analysis is warranted.
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Table 5.4. Distinction between size-related and size-unrelated ICT measures
Model LCSF
Class 1 2 3
Production frontier
Intercept 11.02*** 8.47*** 9.01***
lnK -0.21*** -0.11** -0.09***
ln HSL 0.25 -0.61 0.62***
ln LSL 0.57*** 1.43*** 0.65***
1
2 lnK2 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03***
1
2 ln HSL2 -0.02 0.85 0.09*
1
2 ln LSL2 0.005 0.08 0.05***
lnK  ln HSL 0.003 0.12* -0.04***
lnK  ln LSL 0.01 -0.08*** -0.01***
ln HSL  ln LSL -0.04 -0.32*** -0.03*
Sector1 -0.19* -0.05 -0.06
Sector2 -0.28*** -0.05 -0.03
Sector3 0.02 0.10 0.15***
s 0.42*** 1.56*** 0.37***
l 1.53*** 4.99*** 0.85*
Probabilities
Intercept -3.37*** -0.25 ref. gr.
ICTuselow 0.50*** -0.31*** ref. gr.
ICTusehigh 0.27* -0.22 ref. gr.
Sector1 1.72*** -0.03 ref. gr.
Sector2 2.12*** -0.04 ref. gr.
Sector3 1.78*** 0.02 ref. gr.
Share of ﬁrms 0.17 0.29 0.54
Notes: the number of observations is 1,898. Log-likelihood ratio latent
class stochastic frontier is -1662.77, AIC is 1.57, BIC is 1.73. *** indicates si-
gniﬁcance at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and * at 10 percent level.
K is the capital stock, HSL is high-skilled employment, LSL is low-skilled
employment, ICTuselow, incorporates the dummies on internet connec-
tion, e-mail address, and a website, ICTusehigh, incorporates the dummies
on intranet, extranet, and purchases and sales via internet. Sector1: Non-
specialized retail trade in stores; Sector2: Retail sale of food, beverages
and tobacco in specialized stores; Sector3: Other retail trade of new goods
in specialized stores; Sector4: Other retail services, serving as reference
group. lj = suj/svj, and sj =
q
(s2
uj + s2
vj), where suj is the standard er-
ror of the inefﬁciency term and svj the standard error of the measurement
error term.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter examines the relation between ICT use and heterogeneity in produc-
tion technologies for retailers in a developing country, namely Chile. We argue
that the implications of ICT adoption for company organization and cost structures
may be so pervasive that it makes sense to generalize the translog by allowing sepa-
rate regimes, rather than treat ICT capital as just an additional factor input, which126 Chapter 5
would be the more orthodox approach. Methodologically, we aim to advance by
estimating in a single stage a latent class stochastic frontier model in order to ob-
tain class-speciﬁc production frontier parameters, ﬁrm-speciﬁc inefﬁciency, and the
probability that a ﬁrm belongs to a latent technology regime related to ICT use. We
use a unique data set provided by the Chilean statistical ofﬁce which includes de-
tailed ﬁrm-level data on ICT, ﬁnancial accounts, and further economic information
for 2003 and 2004.
We identify three signiﬁcantly different production technologies across Chilean
retailers. In addition, ICT use is a signiﬁcant determinant of ﬁrm-speciﬁc techno-
logy regime membership probabilities. Firms in the ﬁrst group, comprising around
20 percent of all retailers, incur some inefﬁciency but also exhibit the highest pro-
ductivity in our sample. The (relatively large) ﬁrms in this group are the most
intensive ICT users as well. The inefﬁciencies that ﬁrms in this group incur are
moderate and might be attributable to operational slack associated with learning
effects in using new technologies. The second group comprises around 25 percent
of all Chilean retailers. Firms in this group are smaller, have the lowest labor pro-
ductivity, and are inefﬁcient. Firms in this technology class have ample scope to
improve their performance by optimizing the use of their production technology.
Their inefﬁciency implies that policies to foster ICT adoption among these ﬁrms
is not the only and perhaps not even the best way to enhance performance. Per-
haps economic gains from providing technical assistance are larger than providing
incentives for ICT adoption to these ﬁrms.
Overall, the signiﬁcant relation between ICT use and group membership iden-
tiﬁcation remains intact across a range of different ICT and capital proxies. The
signiﬁcance of this relation is also robust to an alternative lag structure, which we
specify to address endogeneity concerns regarding ICT use and production factors.
Other simultaneity problems when factor inputs are correlated with productivity
have been addressed by industrial organization methods of production function es-
timation, suchasOlleyandPakes(1996), LevinsohnandPetrin(2003), orAckerberg
et al. (2005). Stochastic frontier models do not allow controlling for these endoge-
neity concerns, and future research to combine their rigorous endogeneity treat-
ment with the adjustment for multiple technologies and inefﬁciency in this chapter
would certainly be fruitful. A related literature explores why ﬁrms differ in terms
of ICT adoption (see Stoneman (2002) for an overview). Uncertainty related to the
payoffs from new technologies and differential rates of returns from ICT adoption
across ﬁrms are potential underlying reasons for the incomplete diffusion of ICT.ICT Adoption and Heterogeneity in Production Technologies 127
Given the paucity of research on inter-ﬁrm and intra-ﬁrm ICT diffusion in develo-
ping countries, this is a second important area for future research. Finally, although
our analysis concerns ICT adoption among retailers, the approach may be extended
to other industries and technologies that have far-reaching effects on the nature of
production technologies. For example, the adoption of genomic technologies by
pharmaceutical companies is incomplete and may result in different production
technologies for these ﬁrms.Chapter 6
Conclusions
This thesis studied the relation between policy reforms and productivity perfor-
mance. Latin America offers a fertile ground to study this relation because of large
swings in government policy. The chapters in this thesis used retail ﬁrm-level data
fortwoLatinAmericancountries, namelyBrazilandChile. Theresultsshowedthat
heterogeneity at the ﬁrm-level is at the core for understanding the relation between
policy and productivity. This thesis addressed the following research questions:
 Did the opening up of the retail sector improve ﬁrm-productivity dynamics?
 Do taxes and access to credit affect the allocation of factor inputs across ﬁrms?
 Are formal ﬁrms more productive than informal ﬁrms?
 Is ICT related with heterogeneity in production processes across ﬁrms?
In this chapter, we present an overview of the results reported in the thesis.
Chapter 2 examined the effects of liberalization on productivity growth in Bra-
zil’s retail sector. The opening up of the retail sector was expected to raise produc-
tivity growth through the entry and expansion of high-productivity national and
international retail chains. Thus, the main effects of the reforms were expected to
work through reallocation dynamics.
We decomposed growth into the contribution from within-ﬁrm improvements
and reallocation dynamics during 1996-2004. We found substantial churning, with
average annual entry rates of 25 percent and exit rates of 18 percent. However, two
ﬁndings suggested that reforms did not live up to expectations. First, we found no
strong tendency of retail chains displacing independent stores. In fact, the employ-
ment share of single-establishment ﬁrms increased slightly in the period following130 Chapter 6
the reforms. Second, the contribution of reallocation dynamics to growth was nega-
tive, averaging -1.7 percentage points per year, whereas within-ﬁrm improvements
contributed 2.8 percentage points per year.
In the US, chains of convenience stores with bargaining power, centrally per-
formed operations, and best-practice operations have been displacing single-shop
convenience stores for several decades. Three aspects were considered that might
explain why the Brazilian retail sector does not show patterns similar to the US.
First, business regulation is slowing down the expansion of retail chains. Second,
the quantity, quality, and orientation of rail and road networks is holding back the
emergence of national distribution systems and thereby the expansion of chains.
Furthermore, early investments in railways were meant to integrate Brazil in the
international economy (that is, to export primary products) rather than to inte-
grate the regions into a large domestic market. Third, demand factors, such as
ingrained preferences for shopping on markets, inﬂuence the expansion of multi-
establishment ﬁrms. However, other demand factors are slowly favoring modern
retail formats, such as the increasing female labor force participation (shifting de-
mand to one-stop shopping), the recent improvements in the income distribution,
and the growing middle class. The analysis in chapter 2 indicated that distingui-
shing ﬁrms by size is important to understand the relation between the opening up
and the productivity performance of the retail sector.
In chapter 3 we examined the role of allocative efﬁciency in explaining low
growth following the reforms. In this chapter, we followed a novel methodolo-
gical approach which uses the gaps between marginal revenue products and input
prices to measure resource allocation. We applied the model to the detailed census
dataset of Brazilian retail ﬁrms that was used in chapter 2 as well. Wedges between
the opportunity cost and marginal product of factor inputs were measured and
implications for aggregate productivity were imputed. The results indicate large
potential productivity gains from the reallocation of resources toward the most ef-
ﬁcient retailers. Importantly, we ﬁnd limited evidence for improvements in allo-
cative efﬁciency. Potential output gains from resource reallocation have not been
realized during the 1996 to 2006 period. This ﬁnding is consistent with chapter 2
and supports the view that the absence of productive reallocation is underlying low
growth in Latin America following reforms.
After obtaining measures of distortions and examining its implications for ag-
gregate productivity, we related these distortions with regional variation in regu-
lation using a differences-in-differences approach. Selective policy implementationConcluding Remarks 131
and enforcement may create implicit or de facto differences in the business envi-
ronment small and large ﬁrms face. Therefore, we allowed the coefﬁcients in our
econometric model to vary by ﬁrm size. We ﬁnd that difﬁculty in access to credit
results in distortions to capital for small and medium ﬁrms, but not for large ﬁrms.
In contrast, taxes on gross proﬁts create distortions to output for large ﬁrms, but do
not signiﬁcantly affect the output of small and medium ﬁrms. Hence, the results
suggest that regulation results in distortions to output and capital, but the effects
differ by ﬁrm size. Separating output and capital distortions is important to re-
late regulation with productivity distortions due to opposing effects of regulation
across size class and type of distortion.
Chapter 4 focused on heterogeneity in regulatory compliance. While the cen-
sus dataset used in chapter 2 and chapter 3 only considered ﬁrms registered at the
tax authority, this chapter used a survey of about 11,000 small Brazilian retail ﬁrms
with detailed information on regulatory compliance. This chapter examined whe-
ther small formal retailers are more productive than their informal counterparts.
We simultaneously estimated a stochastic production frontier and an efﬁciency mo-
del.
We ﬁnd that the difference in efﬁciency levels between formal and informal re-
tailers is large in a ’naive’ speciﬁcation without controls for selection bias and a
set of ﬁrm, industry, and ﬁrm-owner characteristics. However, if we control for
selection bias and the set of characteristics, our ﬁndings still indicate that formal
retailers are more efﬁcient, although the difference is smaller. Hence, our results
suggest that business registration reforms, which positively affect the decision of
ﬁrms to formalize (e.g. the SIMPLES program in Brazil), will increase productivity
growth.
Chapter 5 examined the relation between ICT use and heterogeneity in pro-
duction technologies for retailers in Chile. We argued that the implications of ICT
adoption for company organization and cost structures may be so pervasive that
it makes sense to generalize the production function by allowing separate techno-
logy regimes, rather than treat ICT capital as just an additional factor input, which
would be the more orthodox approach. We used a unique data set provided by the
Chilean statistical ofﬁce which includes detailed ﬁrm-level data on ICT, ﬁnancial
accounts, and further economic information for 2003 and 2004.
We identiﬁed three signiﬁcantly different production technologies across Chi-
lean retailers. In addition, ICT use is signiﬁcantly related with differences in pro-
duction processes across ﬁrms. We ﬁnd important differences across the groups.132 Chapter 6
One group consists of ﬁrms that are intensive ICT users. The inefﬁciencies that
ﬁrms in this group incur are moderate and might be attributable to operational
slack associated with learning effects in using new technologies. Another group
comprises ﬁrms with high inefﬁciency. Firms in this technology class have ample
scope to improve their performance by optimizing the use of their production tech-
nology. Their inefﬁciency implies that policies to foster ICT adoption among these
ﬁrms is not the only and perhaps not even the best way to enhance performance.
Perhaps economic gains from providing technical assistance to improve the efﬁ-
ciency in using ICT are larger than providing incentives for ICT adoption to these
ﬁrms. Hence, ﬁrm-heterogeneity affects the potential of policies to improve pro-
ductivity performance.
In a nutshell, the studies in this thesis have shown that ﬁrm-heterogeneity af-
fects the potential of particular policies to improve productivity performance.Bibliography
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Ditproefschriftbestudeertderelatietussenbeleidshervormingenenproductiviteits-
groei. Het beargumenteert dat het onderkennen van de diversiteit van bedrijven
aandebasisligtvoorhetbegrijpenvanderelatietussenbeleidenproductiviteit. De
verschillendehoofdstukkeninditproefschriftrichtenzichoptweeLatijnsAmerikaanse
landen, namelijk Brazilië en Chili. Latijns Amerika heeft een grote verandering in
overheidsbeleidondergaan. Dezeradicalebeleidsveranderingbiedtmogelijkheden
om het effect van beleid op productiviteit te bestuderen.
Debeleidsveranderingwasdeverschuivingvaneendoordestaatgeleideeconomie
naar een door de markt geleide economie. Na de schuldencrisis van 1982 werd de
invloed van de overheid drastisch gereduceerd en vervangen door marktwerking.
Helaas voldeden de hervormingen niet aan de verwachtingen. De groei na de her-
vormingen was matig en zelfs lager dan voor de crisis. De lage productiviteitsgroei
in Latijns Amerika is een bron van zorg voor beleidsmakers, omdat het de welvaart
van een land bepaalt.
Dit proefschrift probeert een bijdrage te leveren aan het oplossen van de puzzel
van een lage groei in Latijns Amerika ondanks hervormingen. Aan de hand van
bedrijfsdata voor de detailhandelssector wordt dieper op deze puzzel ingegaan.
Speciﬁek komen de volgende onderzoeksvragen aan bod:
 Zorgt het openstellen van de detailhandelssector voor buitenlandse concur-
rentie in een verbetering van de productiviteit?
 Beïnvloeden belastingen en toegang tot krediet de plaatsing van werknemers
en kapitaal over bedrijven?
 Zijn geregistreerde bedrijven productiever dan bedrijven die de regelgeving
en wetten ontduiken?148
 Is het gebruik van Informatie en Communicatietechnologie (ICT) een onder-
scheidend karakteristiek van het productieproces van een bedrijf?
Hoofdstuk 2 bestudeert het effect van buitenlandse concurrentie op produc-
tiviteit in de Braziliaanse detailhandelssector. Brazilië stelde de detailhandelssector
open voor buitenlandse bedrijven in 1995. Academici en politici verwachtten dat
de toetreding en uitbreiding van nationale en internationale detailhandelsketens,
als gevolg van de liberalisatie, zou leiden tot een groei in productiviteit.
In dit hoofdstuk wordt een uitgebreide database van detailhandels gebruikt om
te bestuderen wat er gebeurde met productiviteit na de liberalisatie. Twee met
elkaar samenhangende resultaten verklaren waarom de beleidshervormingen niet
toteengroeiinproductiviteithebbengeleid. Teneersteisergeennoemenswaardige
tendens te bespeuren dat detailhandelsketens de minder productieve zelfstandige
ondernemingen uit de markt concurreren. Ten tweede vindt er geen verschuiving
van werknemers en investeringen naar meer productieve ondernemingen plaats na
de hervormingen.
In de V.S. is al langere tijd een tendens gaande dat kleine ’mom-and-pop stores’
plaatsmaken voor detailhandelsketens. Dit leidt in de V.S. tot een substantiële
groei in productiviteit. Waarom vindt er niet iets soortgelijks plaats in Brazilië?
Ten eerste verhindert zeer strikte regelgeving de uitbreiding van detailhandels-
ketens. Ten tweede weerhoudt de kwantiteit, kwaliteit en oriëntatie van spoor- en
wegennetwerken de opkomst van nationale distributiesystemen voor detailhan-
dels. Investeringen in het verleden in spoorwegen hadden bijvoorbeeld tot doel
om Brazilië te integreren in de wereldeconomie (dat is, primaire goederen te ex-
porteren), in plaats van het creëren van een grote binnenlandse markt. Ten derde
beïnvloeden vraagfactoren, zoals de voorkeur voor het winkelen op de markt, de
uitbreiding van detailhandelsketens. Echter, andere vraagfactoren, zoals de toene-
mende participatie van vrouwen in de arbeidsmarkt en de recente verbeteringen in
de inkomensdistributie, zorgen voor een verschuiving in het voordeel van ketens.
Dit suggereert dat wanneer regulering versoepelt en de infrastructuur verbetert,
een detailhandelsrevolutie mogelijk is.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt dieper ingegaan op de vraag waarom er geen verschuiv-
ingvanwerknemerseninvesteringennaarmeerproductieveondernemingenplaats
vindt na de hervormingen. Opnieuw wordt de census van detailhandels gebruikt,
net als in hoofdstuk 2. De toepassing van een nieuwe methodologie - die ver-
schillen tussen de marginale opbrengsten en de marginale kosten van kapitaal en
arbeid meet - zorgt voor een frisse blik op de vraag waarom productieve bedrijvenSamenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 149
niet groter worden na de hervormingen. Ook hier suggereren de resultaten dat
er geen herverdeling van kapitaal en arbeid plaats vindt. Dit is consistent met de
bevindingen in hoofdstuk 2 en onderbouwt de visie die stelt dat het ontbreken van
herplaatsing van werknemers en investeringen naar productieve ondernemingen
verantwoordelijk is voor de lage groei in Latijns Amerika na de hervormingen.
De nieuwe methodologie die wordt toegepast in dit hoofdstuk biedt ook de
mogelijkheid om te bestuderen of de verkeerde plaatsing van arbeid en investerin-
gen over bedrijven gerelateerd is aan regulering. Ondanks de liberalisatie zijn de
arbeids- en de productmarkt van Brazilië nog sterk gereguleerd. Belastingen bedra-
gen bijvoorbeeld 200 procent van de bruto winsten in Rio de Janeiro. De selectieve
wetshandhaving kan impliciet of de facto zorgen voor verschillen in de marktom-
standigheden voor kleine en grote bedrijven. Vaak vinden overheden in Latijns
Amerika het onpraktisch om belasting te heffen op kleine bedrijven. Overheden
vinden het makkelijker om hogere belastingvoeten te handhaven en die te heffen
op grote bedrijven. Maar de toegang tot krediet en strikte arbeidsregulering zijn
mogelijk grotere obstakels voor de groei van kleine bedrijven. Imperfecties in de
kapitaalmarkt kunnen bijvoorbeeld een groter probleem zijn voor kleine bedrijven
ten opzichte van grote ondernemingen, omdat ze niet over voldoende onderpand
beschikken.
Door middel van econometrische methoden vinden we dat het moeilijk verkri-
jgen van krediet de investeringsbeslissingen van kleine- en middelgrote bedrijven
beïnvloedt, maarnietdievangrotebedrijven. Integenstelling, belastingenopbruto
winsten beïnvloeden de productie van grote bedrijven, maar niet die van kleine- en
middelgrote bedrijven. De resultaten suggereren dus dat de effecten van regulering
afhangen van de grootte van het bedrijf. Beleidsmakers moeten daarom rekening
houden met de diversiteit van bedrijven wanneer regulering wordt herzien.
Hoofdstuk 4 richt zich op verschillen in de naleving van wetten en regels door
bedrijven. In dit hoofdstuk wordt gebruik gemaakt van een zeer gedetailleerde vra-
genlijst die is afgenomen onder meer dan 11000 kleine Braziliaanse detailhandels,
met uitgebreide informatie over de naleving van wet- en regelgeving. De enquê-
teurs bezochten huishoudens en verzekerden eventueel aanwezige eigenaren van
de detailhandels dat alle informatie die ze verstrekten niet tegen hen kon worden
gebruikt in de rechtszaal. Hierdoor biedt deze enquête een unieke mogelijkheid
om ondernemers te bestuderen die zich normaal verborgen houden voor de staat.
Speciﬁekbestudeertdithoofdstukofbedrijvendiedewet-enregelgevingnaleven
(geregistreerde bedrijven) productiever zijn dan bedrijven die dat niet doen (niet-150
geregistreerde bedrijven). De econometrische aanpak controleert onder meer voor
bedrijfs-, industrie- en ondernemerskarakteristieken, om er zeker van te zijn dat
verschillen in productiviteit tussen bedrijven zich daadwerkelijk voordoen, en niet
komt doordat bijvoorbeeld een bedrijf wordt geleid door een betere manager. De
resultaten suggereren dat verschillen in productiviteit tussen geregistreerde bedri-
jven en niet-geregistreerde bedrijven groot zijn als er niet wordt gecontroleerd voor
zelfselectie en de bedrijf-, industrie- en ondernemerskarakteristieken. Echter, als
we controleren voor zelfselectie en de serie karakteristieken, dan suggereren de re-
sultaten nog steeds dat geregistreerde bedrijven productiever zijn, hoewel de ver-
schillen kleiner worden.
De implicaties van deze bevindingen zijn belangrijk voor het overheidsbeleid.
Veel overheden in Latijns Amerika hebben namelijk hervormingen in de bedrijf-
sregistratie doorgevoerd om bedrijven ertoe te bewegen de wetten en regels na
te leven. De resultaten in dit hoofdstuk suggereren dat wanneer meer bedrijven
zich registreren, de productiviteit zal toenemen. Dit is mogelijk, omdat gereg-
istreerde bedrijven vrijuit kunnen adverteren en technische assistentie krijgen van
de overheid. Echter, alleen bedrijven verleiden om zich te registreren is niet genoeg.
Zoals beargumenteerd in hoofdstuk 3, is het verbeteren van de toegang tot krediet
en hervormingen van de arbeidsmarkt noodzakelijk voor het verbeteren van de
groeivooruitzichten van kleine productieve bedrijven.
Het laatste doel van dit proefschrift is het bestuderen van de relatie tussen
productiviteit en informatie en communicatie technologie. Hoofdstuk 5 beargu-
menteert dat de adoptie van ICT zulke verstrekkende gevolgen heeft voor de or-
ganisatie en de kostenstructuur van bedrijven, dat de adoptie van ICT het volledige
productieprocesbeïnvloedt. Indithoofdstukwordtgebruikgemaaktvaneenunieke
dataset, verstrekt door het statistisch bureau van Chili, met gedetailleerde infor-
matie over de investeringen en het gebruik van ICT door Chileense detailhandels.
Detoepassingvaneennieuweeconometrischetechniek, een’latentclassstochas-
tic frontier model’, biedt de mogelijkheid om te bestuderen of ICT een latente factor
is die het productieproces van een bedrijf verandert. We vinden dat het produc-
tieproces van detailhandels inderdaad van elkaar onderscheiden kan worden naar
gelang de intensiteit waarmee gebruik wordt gemaakt van ICT. De resultaten sug-
gereren dat ICT niet de enige en mogelijk ook niet de beste manier is om de efﬁciën-
tie van detailhandels in Latijns Amerika te verbeteren. De economische voordelen
van het geven van assistentie in het verbeteren van management en organisatiepro-
cessen zijn mogelijk groter dan het verstrekken van economische prikkels voor deSamenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 151
adoptie van ICT. Dit verschilt echter tussen bedrijven naar gelang het gebruik van
ICT.
Kortsamengevat, dediversiteitvanbedrijveniseencrucialefactordiemeegenomen
moet worden in het analyseren en verklaren van het effect van beleid op produc-
tiviteit.